Rethinking the ‘Restorative’: Ethical Relationships in Restorative Practice by O'Reilly, Naziya
 
Rethinking the ‘Restorative’: Ethical Relationships 




Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
The University of Leeds 
Leeds Trinity University 




Intellectual Property and Publications 
I, the candidate, confirm that the work submitted is my own and that appropriate credit has 
been given where reference has been made to the work of others. 
Parts of this thesis have already been published and are referenced as follows: 
Chapter 4: Dialogue or Discipline: Exploring Scripted Restorative Practices 
O’Reilly, N., (2017), ‘From performance to passionate utterance: Rethinking the purpose of 
restorative conference scripts in schools’, Ethics and Education, Vol. 12, Issue 2, pp. 170 – 183. 
Chapter 5: Striving for Stories: Disruption and Self-Transformation 
O’Reilly, N., (2019), ‘Tell me the story: Marginalisation, transformation, and school-based 
restorative practice’, International Journal of Educational Research, Vol. 94, pp. 158 – 167. 
This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no 
quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
Assertion of moral rights: 
The right of Naziya O’Reilly to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted by her in 
accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 




‘It takes a whole village to raise a child’. This was the essay question that had been set as part 
of the interview process for a place on the PGCE Primary programme. After sixteen years as a 
teaching professional, I can safely say that it takes an equally sizeable population to raise a PhD 
thesis. I would not wish to begin my acknowledgements without thinking of the many staff and 
pupils that have shaped my interest in pursuing educational research. However, my path from 
the classroom to the University has been an extraordinarily steep learning curve. To that end, I 
am truly fortunate to have benefited from a few particularly important sources of support.  
I would like to thank the members of my supervisory team including Dr Ann-Marie Mealey, and 
Dr Martin Barwood for their intellectual, emotional and material support. While each of them 
has contributed to the ideas in this thesis, or to helping me over the finish line, it has been the 
guidance of my primary mentor, Professor Amanda Fulford, that has helped me to piece 
together, and articulate, my ideas with ever increasing clarity and conviction. Were it not for 
Professor Fulford’s insistence almost a decade ago, at a time of great frustration, that I engage 
more deeply with educational philosophy, I would certainly not be writing these words. Her 
friendship, and intellectual companionship over the years, have afforded me greater 
opportunities than I would have thought possible.  
I would like to thank Leeds Trinity University for its financial support, including its generous 
maternity stipend, that has enabled me to devote my attention to pursuing this project. In 
doing so, I have been lucky enough to work alongside numerous other doctoral colleagues 
whom have let me benefit from their valuable intellectual support and build (I hope) life-long 
friendships. John McCall and Hannah-Freya Blake’s careful readings of this work have made an 
enormous contribution to its final presentation; Lauren Padgett’s generosity of spirit had us all 
trying to ‘be more Lauren’; the endless cups of tea and laughter provided by Jordan Beaumont, 
Liz Mistry, Shames Maskeen and the rest of the PGR community have been priceless through 
the often-lonely passage of post-graduate research. In this last year, I have also benefitted 
from the friendship of the wider Philosophy of Education community, including my fellow 
PESGB branch committee members, Ed Podesta and Professor Julian Stern and Dr Naomi 
Hodgson. It cannot be underestimated how much belonging to a such a varied community has 
given me the impetus to complete this project. To all of them I owe my gratitude. 
It (almost) goes without saying that this would not have been possible were it not for my 
husband of eleven years, Liam O’Reilly. Cheerleader, therapist, talking partner, devoted father, 
chief cook and editor; his unwavering support for not only the progress of my academic career, 
but also my personal health and well-being, has brought us both through what has been a 
iii 
difficult start to our life together. I am eternally grateful for you, our children, and this next 




In the fifteen years since restorative practices – an alternative to traditional punitive 
disciplinary measures – began to have a strong presence in educational thinking in the United 
Kingdom, research has shown that it holds significant potential as a means for teaching the 
skills of conflict resolution and nurturing relational school cultures. Nevertheless, there 
remains widespread concern that restorative practice risks being abandoned or co-opted and 
used in ways that encourage a lack of agency, increased marginalisation, and 
disempowerment. The originality of my research into restorative practice lies in locating the 
source of its anxieties away from current cultural, and instructional work, and explaining it as a 
deep philosophical mistrust with what we do with language. By placing educational philosophy 
directly with current theory and practice, this project aspires to re-think notions of what is 
restorative, seeing the term not as exclusively redemptive but as an engagement that seeks to 
problematise, even disrupt entirely, what is seen as its purpose. 
Part I explores the perception of how worsening behaviour in schools is linked to notions of 
zero tolerance and the performance agenda, and the rise of restorative practices as a 
response. Part II – comprising three central chapters – considers the key linguistic restorative 
concepts: restorative language, restorative story-telling and restorative relationships drawing 
on the work of Stanley Cavell and his reading of Wittgenstein and the American 
transcendentalist philosophers Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Henry David Thoreau. By opening 
each chapter in Part II with a scenario from a restorative conference, I show how language that 
is too strongly guided is ethically harmful to restorative practice’s claims for a relational 
pedagogy. At the end of this thesis I will make three claims: what it means to be in relation to 
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Part-way through Dorothy Vaandering’s (2014) study, revealing how the introduction of 
restorative practices in a school has varying implications for teacher pedagogy, Terri, one of 
the participating teachers, questions whether she really understands what restorative practice 
is: 
I do believe that my role is to listen to what these children are concerned about, 
whether they’re mine in my classroom or they’re in the hall and to ensure they’ve 
each had a voice and that we somehow settle the difficulties, the hurt feelings, 
that they walk away feeling restored, that they had a chance to be heard […] 
Maybe I muck up my basic philosophy with restorative practice … is restorative 
practice a value of a person? It’s not in its truest definition I suppose. Is it? … I’d 
like to think I’m restoring in that little boy who couldn’t stand me to put my hand 
on his shoulder [at the beginning of the year] but at the end [of the year], I put my 
arm around him, I’ve restored some esteem … some feeling of value … I’m getting 
things mixed up in my head about what’s just restoring and what’s restorative 
practice. I don’t know (Vaandering, 2014, p. 75). 
Reading Terri’s story, at the beginning of my own research into restorative practice and 
restorative justice, I was struck by both the confidence with which Terri describes her role as a 
listener and the uncertainty with which was she asked to define an approach she considers 
part of her ‘basic philosophy’. As I read more, I realised that Terri was not alone. Many 
teachers, believing that restorative practice is ‘who I am anyway’, struggle with the 
implementation of such practices, while those confident that they are restorative, refuse to 
engage with the term. I will base the exploration of this challenge on a kind of conundrum 
inherent within school-based restorative practices. This finds the core of a restorative practice 
philosophy divided between its positioning as an alternative theory of behaviour management, 
and a socio-ethical process that prepares children for citizenship through teaching the skills of 
conflict resolution. A preface is not the place to begin a proper exploration of this problem. 
Here, I want to show how Terri’s story was the spark behind the development of this thesis, 
one that fuelled latent memories of my own emerging teaching practice. Given that so much of 
this thesis places one’s story at the heart of restorative practice, the clarity that I am pursuing 
with regards to restorative practices, and its ethical foundations, cannot but be personal. I will 
start with mine.  
I came to restorative practice via my own difficult beginnings as a primary school teacher in an 
inner urban school in Leeds. It was not an auspicious beginning. My class, assembled from 
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several different cohorts, were unruly, aggressive, and indifferent to lessons. I felt that 
establishing genuine dialogue and rapport with my pupils would help ease a lot of tension, but 
I was unsure about how to find the time. Circle times,1 if we managed to hold them, were 
planned in detail by the subject leader, and did not allow for the kind of talk I had in mind. This 
was less a list of teacher-led questions and more of a conversation. Having those conversations 
with my pupils during their playtime didn’t seem appropriate, nor did having them in the 
classroom, where I tried hard to present myself as an authority figure. My eventual idea was to 
use my allocated planning, preparation and assessment time, to ask pupils to talk with me 
individually at first and then in groups. I started to question the children about aspects of my 
teaching practice, of their work, and of their relationships with each other. As the weeks 
passed, and our connection deepened, it came to be that I was listening to whatever they 
wanted to me to hear. To encourage our talk, I decided to use the deputy head’s office. Other 
spaces were used for the kind of intervention used to support pupils struggling in an aspect of 
their learning. The deputy head’s office gave our situation gravitas, as well as re-imagining the 
location as allowing for respectful conversation that was characterised by fairness, rather than, 
power.  
It won’t come as a surprise to learn that my confidence in my role, and purpose for teaching 
grew directly from my decision to take the time to talk. Whether around selecting curriculum 
content, learning activities or making assessment choices, the decision to establish an ongoing 
dialogue brought a sense of community and cohesiveness to this group of children. While I 
undoubtedly still struggled with aspects of my teaching poor behaviour eased significantly as I 
continued to develop my craft.  
I remember a comment made around this time by another teacher during a school assembly: 
‘Look at them’, she smiled as she watched my class patiently seated on the floor, ‘a few 
months ago, they would have been rolling in the aisles, or walking out. You’ve done 
amazingly’. What had I done? As my actions started to become noticed, I was asked to explain 
what I was doing. The funny thing was that, aside from giving the whole process some 
structure, I couldn’t really say. I only knew that, like Terri, in giving these children a chance to 
be heard, perhaps I was restoring some esteem … some feeling of value in these pupils. 
At the heart of good pedagogical practice is the weight given to developing techniques that 
impact pupil behaviour. In the years that followed, I looked to several theoretical models to 
inform these techniques, chiefly those related to social and emotional relationship building. 
 
1 Circle time is a popular activity in schools that refers to any time that a group of people are sitting 
together in order to socialise, build relationships, listen, read or share information (Moseley, 1996). 
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These included coaching and mentoring schemes, embedding social and emotional learning 
strategies, and employing the various ‘talk for learning’ approaches I encountered as part of 
my master’s degree research. However, with a change in the wind, both when it came to 
national educational policy, as well as a change in leadership in the school, I saw many of the 
presumed benefits of Social and Emotional Learning (SEL) were being pushed back in favour of 
punitive or zero tolerance approaches. In my own school this manifested as a re-
implementation of assertive discipline policies, a one-size-fits-all approach to the detriment of 
more individualised responses. At the start of my final year the domain of behaviour 
management and the domain of teaching and learning stood on opposite poles. Informed that 
our jobs were to teach, not to manage behaviour, a team of dedicated behaviour officers was 
appointed to handle misbehaviour that occurred during lessons – in our case former teaching 
assistants – and a behaviour unit established outside the school building. Walkie-talkie devices 
were placed in each classroom and teachers were told to call for help from ‘patrol officers’ 
should disruption occur. Pupils would then be removed to the outside unit where they could 
spend the rest of the morning in isolation.  
Following this, it was intriguing to hear about restorative practice, a behavioural and cultural 
approach to discipline in schools that is founded on the values of dialogical reparation and 
relationship. The positive evaluation of data in the UK, together with growing literature on its 
cultural and pedagogical value, had led to Leeds City Council offering free restorative practice 
training for schools. The project, known as ‘Child Friendly Leeds’ (Leeds City Council, 2020) 
gestured towards an opportunity to study restorative approaches to teaching and learning, 
behaviour and culture, that advocated similar ideals to the ones that I had sought to embody 
as a teacher. 
However, I did not just want to study the change process, perhaps highlighting those aspects 
key to successful implementation and sustainability. My own experience of how a change in 
the position of leadership could swiftly affect a paradigm shift showed that the pressure for 
more instructional improvement would leave restorative practice being shelved or co-opted by 
traditional educational hierarchies focussed only on enforcing power. Not disregarding the 
empirical evidence, I was drawn to research that acknowledged there was an urgent need to 
ensure that if a restorative practice framework were to be regarded as fundamental to the 
needs of teachers, staff, and pupils, then further research into the philosophical foundations of 
restorative practice must be done.  
The existing literature on restorative practice in schools is plentiful. However, in many ways it 
misses the point. This thesis, therefore, is an exploration of the values of restorative practice 
as they pertain to that most ‘basic’ of philosophical questions, that is, what does being 
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‘restorative’ claim to say about our human relationships, and our humanity? Could I have 
called my own attitude ‘restorative’ having never heard of the term? The suggestion that the 
rich, Cavellian philosophy with which I ‘rethink the restorative’ can be considered ‘basic’ is 
comical. Yet, in claiming that to be ‘restorative’ is to be ‘human’, we have an essential 
foundation for the practice. What this brings into focus is not a general theory, or philosophy, 
but what can be understood as an ethical orientation to relationships – a desire to do, or be, or 
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Chapter 1  
The Evolution of Current Thinking Regarding Behaviour in 
Schools 
1.1 Introduction 
This part of the thesis is devoted to the exploration of the way in which current 
conceptualisations of managing behaviour in schools have evolved. In this chapter I begin by 
considering the kind of educational climate in which these ideas have found a foothold. Since 
restorative practice is an alternative approach to behaviour management, I will focus this short 
introduction on the significant policy decisions and educational theories that have led to the 
creation of a specific behaviour culture in English schools. In doing so, I will lay the foundations 
for presenting some of the triumphs and critiques associated with restorative practice, which I 
will discuss in later chapters. 
1.2 What is Good Behaviour?  
What do we imagine when we think of behaviour in schools? It is commonly accepted that 
while some schools endure very challenging cultures, ‘the great majority of children and young 
people enjoy learning, work hard and behave well’ (Ofsted, 2005, p. 5). Behaviour, meaning 
‘the whole range of ways pupils can act in school, including disruptive or aggressive 
behaviours, prosocial behaviours, and learning behaviours’ (Rhodes and Long, 2019, p. 3) is 
previewed as the common factor driving school improvement between schools of varying 
demographics, locations, and economic circumstances. Teachers are urged to think not of 
management but of ‘behaviour for learning’ in order to take the prevailing view that schools 
provide opportunities for acquiring an education and not simply learning how to behave (Ellis 
and Tod, 2015). The message that school leaders should invest significantly in their behaviour 
cultures is concomitant with the aims of education which include not only the academic 
education of the student and the nurturing of their best interests but the training of a 
workforce and socialisation into working cultures (p. 13).  
The elevation of specific skills by which good behaviour can be taught acknowledges that 
teachers must ‘[establish] a series of procedures by which efficiency and effectiveness might 
be achieved’ (Adams, 2011, p. 475). Despite this, ‘low-level disruptive behaviour in primary 





‘talking unnecessarily or chatting; calling out without permission; being slow to start work or 
follow instructions; showing a lack of respect for each other and staff; not bringing the right 
equipment; using mobile devices inappropriately’ (p. 4), it is low-level disruption, and not the 
more headline-grabbing acts of violent behaviour that contributes to a ‘significant amount of 
valuable learning time lost’. Yet poor pupil behaviour is one of the most talked about, argued 
over, and lamented issue in the English teaching community (Hulme, 2017; BBC News, 2014), 
and with good cause. The most recent statistics on pupil exclusion published by the 
Department for Education (DfE, 2018) show a significant spike in the number of pupils given 
permanent or fixed-term exclusions for assaulting adults, while permanent exclusions for 
pupils attacking other children is reported to be an even bigger concern.  
It is therefore unsurprising that despite measures for inclusion, and increased risk of children 
developing serious psycho-social problems, black and white measures of behavioural 
expectations and associated consequences, called zero tolerance, have taken root. To 
understand how and why this persists I want to briefly summarise the distinctive features of 
English education, their impact on thinking around behaviour management, and behaviour for 
learning. In this chapter, I discuss key legislative policies and their resulting discussions 
surrounding teacher efficacy, and accountability. I also outline popular behavioural theories 
consisting in discipline and control, their limitations, and the draw towards social and 
emotional measures to resolve difficult behaviours. The chapter concludes that while 
establishing good relationships is vital for any behavioural intervention, there is a need for 
such interventions to be thought of as ethical in nature. 
1.2.1 From Inclusion to Performance 
The history of behaviour problems among pupils is a long and complex story. Let me begin, 
therefore, with the idea that issues with behaviour management are often laid at the teacher’s 
door (Davey, 2016). From poor resource preparation, slack classroom routines, a lack of 
communication, that includes ‘bad lesson planning and delivery, which includes failure to 
match learning tasks to abilities, makes disruptive behaviour by bored or frustrated pupils 
more likely’ (Varma, 1993). In other words, ‘it is the lot of the inefficient teacher’ (DES, 1989, p. 
109). These kinds of ill-managed classrooms are stated to be significant for not only 
perpetrating poor pupil behaviours but also for disrupting the learning of the entire classroom 
(Haydn, 2014, Corrie, 2002, DES, 1989). Once referred to as teaching ‘discipline’ (DES, 1989), 
the DfE defines behaviour management as ‘actions taken by the teacher to establish order, 





that there is a ‘range of practical strategies […] for dealing with such matters as noise levels in 
class, calling out, teasing and dobbing’ (Rogers, 2007, p. 12) to be deployed at the relevant 
moment.  
That teachers may become unknowing accomplices in perpetuating classroom inequalities is 
why the construct of teacher expectancy has been used to encourage pupils to justify the 
extended disciplinary exercises seen as conducive to learning (DES, 1989). While a history of 
behaviour and schooling could begin anywhere in time (the myths of Ancient Greece told of 
the deities Uranus’ and Gaia’s approaches to managing the disruptive actions of their twelve 
Titan children which consisted in chaining them to the bottom of a deep abyss), I will begin by 
locating current perceptions of behaviour management with the national scandals of the 
1970s, such as the William Tyndale affair. A controversy in English education, William Tyndale 
primary school came under intense media focus when it emerged that ‘necessary deference to 
the autonomy of teachers’ (Davis, 2002, p. 275) had led to adventurous, progressive methods 
of teaching. Including the abandonment of formal lessons and complete pupil choice over 
what they learned, and how they behaved, the unfolding of the affair highlighted the division 
between radical and traditional teaching and marked a turning point in modern educational 
history (ibid.). Here, history clearly begins to associate the ‘progressive state school 
movement’, defined as ‘democratic, caring and inclusive’ (Cooper, 1999, p. 24) with the image 
of the incompetent teacher. Teachers who openly shared a dissatisfaction for authoritarian 
styles of teaching and learning were accused of ‘presiding over declining standards of literacy 
and numeracy, and who preached revolution, socialism, egalitarianism, feminism and sexual 
deviation’ (Ball, 2006, p. 29).  
For some, the only way to counteract the trouble-ridden development of such communities, or 
at least modify their progressivism into more traditional approaches, was to increase state 
involvement in educational affairs. Where the role of government had previously been 
restricted to a few overarching measures,2 a persistent attitude of increased centralisation had 
an enormous effect on destabilising the teaching profession. Despite Prime Minister James 
Callaghan’s insistence that he would ‘keep off the educational grass’ (Callaghan, 1976), the 
following decades saw the introduction of a national core curriculum, standardised testing, 
 
2 This included ensuring that free secondary education was available to all and making sure that Local 
Education Authorities (LEAs) were adequate and well-directed. Callaghan challenged what he saw as the 
‘secret garden’ of education. He stated there was an increasing disillusionment within the education 
system, and that education was the business of government while his critics were furious at what they 





reform of the examination system, a national inspectorate, clear links between industry and 
government, and globally competitive standards and skills that contradicted his previous 
assertion. Beginning with what Stephen Ball called ‘a legitimisation of the discourse of 
derision’ (Ball, 1990), and described as ‘the direct criticism of comprehensive and progressive 
education in Britain’ (Ball, 2006, p. 28), the prioritisation of the quality of relationships, as 
characterised at A.S Neill’s (1998) Summerhill School, stood accused as the paramount threat 
to economic welfare and prosperity.  
While the William Tyndale affair and publications like the Black Papers3 (Cox and Dyson, 1972) 
focussed public attention on teacher accountability, and declining standards of achievement, 
the seminal work Fifteen Thousand Hours (Rutter et al., 1982) and the DFE’s (2012) ‘Behaviour 
in Schools’ were key in ‘[associating] aspects of pupil performance with overall standards of 
discipline’ (Ball and Goodson, 1985, p.3). In the ensuing decades the overall ‘marketisation’ of 
education, combined with the notion of schools as accountable to the state, has configured to 
produce an idea of ‘the performing school’ (Falabella, 2014, p. 3). The presentation of this 
reform, collectively termed ‘policy technologies; the market, managerialism and 
performativity’ (Ball, 2003, p. 215), were designed to open ‘educational services up to the 
market, diversifying school providers, generating competition between the private and public 
sectors, and offering ‘free choice’ (and exit) to parents’ (Falabella, 2014, p. 3). Added to this 
was the idea that schools were now responsible for obtaining data on attendance, 
examinations, and exclusions. These contributed to school league tables that judged their 
efficacy in the same light as other consumer goods and services.  
These displays of ‘educational technicism’ (Carr, 2000, p. 9), the technologies, and culture, by 
which such judgements can be employed, together with the monitoring systems that produces 
the information ‘as means of incentive, control, attrition and change’ (Ball, 2003, p. 216), have 
been strongly critiqued under the banner of performativity, or accountability (Tomlinson, 
2005; Giroux, 1999). Coined by Jean-François Lyotard (1979), performativity meant an end to 
the ideal of knowledge as a goal for freedom or autonomy, and the legitimisation in the means 
and skills by which the state might efficiently operate within the world market (Marshall, 
1999a). In educational philosophy, performativity is critiqued as the vehicle for economic 
development, reducing education to an exercise in delivering certain standards of schooling, or 
 
3 The Black Papers on Education were a series of articles on education published as a contrast to the 
government’s White Papers. Containing a range of contributions from different writers, including 





run the risk of state intervention,4 while accountability redefines parents as consumers, and 
schools as small businesses (Biesta, 2004). These pressures have served to create attitudes 
which ‘suit the system (inspectors and such like) as oppose to those that encourage 
professional and responsible action’ (p. 240). 
The prevailing cultural view of education is that schools provide opportunities for 
advancement, both socially and on a global stage. Moreover, it is understood that a teacher’s 
efficacy will be the key in determining pupil performance and pupil success. I now want to take 
a closer look at those specific discourses surrounding behaviour management that have come 
to characterise this facet of performance-based education. 
1.3 Recent Policy Initiatives 
In many ways the Committee of Enquiry into Discipline in school, known as the Elton Report, 
(DES, 1989), still epitomises the determination to stress the importance of teacher 
responsibility when it comes to behaviour. Based upon ‘teachers’ perceptions and concerns 
about discipline’ (p. 220), it was given the following terms of reference: 
In view of public concern about violence and indiscipline in schools and the 
problems faced by the teaching profession today, to consider what action can be 
taken by central government, local authorities, voluntary bodies owning schools, 
governing bodies of schools, head teachers, teachers and parents to secure the 
orderly atmosphere necessary in schools for effective teaching and learning to 
take place (DES, 1989, p. 54). 
The Elton Report outlined a two-pronged approach to providing a solution. Firstly, to improve 
school effectiveness, it advocated the development of whole school behaviour policy around ‘a 
clear code of conduct backed by a balanced combination of rewards and punishments within a 
positive community atmosphere’ (p. 99). This meant a reinforcement of a school code of 
conduct, strong senior leadership and a sense of community responsibility. Secondly, in the 
 
4 The emergence of this culture has had a dramatic impact on the teaching profession. There are huge 
concerns over teacher recruitment, retention and morale (Bates et al., 2011). As the advent of 
performance related pay dawns (understood as the linking of pupil progress to teachers’ salaries), 
academic research and anecdotal evidence suggest overwhelmingly that the side effects of 
performativity, and accountability, has threatened the substantive identity of the teacher as an 
authority figure (Troman, 2008; Ball, 2003). Also known as the ‘discourse of derision’ (Ball, 1990), 
performativity and accountability have reduced the perception of teacher agency, their resilience, their 





improvement of teacher efficacy, stressing the application of good classroom management, 
communication and pupil knowledge, the report stated that ‘bad lesson planning and delivery, 
which includes failure to match learning tasks to abilities, therefore makes disruptive 
behaviour by bored or frustrated pupils more likely. It is the lot of the inefficient teacher’ (p. 
109). 
1.3.1 The Teacher Standards 
Despite the increasingly contested nature of educational debate, the overall tone of the Elton 
Report remained moderate. As well as calling for teachers to exercise firm boundaries 
‘unequivocally and at once’, it encouraged consistency in the use of appropriate punishments 
(pp. 65–66). In doing so, it was careful to support the agency of the teacher. For example, in 
promoting the use of clear sanctions where rules were transgressed, such as when pupils are 
late, lateness should not be a cause of immediate punishment where pupils have just cause. 
Punishment, the report concurred, ‘would not be seen as fair by the pupils involved or by their 
friends […] teachers will have to make judgements about whether punishment is appropriate 
in such cases’ (p. 101). Despite its identification of a more established professional response to 
the educational needs of pupils, the Elton Report took care to point out the amount of 
influence present in the teacher-pupil relationship, stating that only teachers themselves could 
be well-informed enough to recognise that the choices and decisions made in the classroom, 
that might adequately modify children’s behaviour. While there was always a desire to 
recognise the importance of quality relationships (more on this later) the powerful movement 
to improve standards in education recommended the need for further policy-based guidance 
on the decision-making processes concerning behaviour management. Since 2011, these key 
principles have been epitomised by a code of professional conduct known as the Teacher 
Standards (DfE, 2011a) and which include the official sanctioning of Teacher Standard 7 to 
‘manage behaviour effectively to ensure a good and safe learning environment’ (p. 12). The 
DfE’s (2016) recently updated advice for schools on pupil behaviour continues to set out clear 
and specific advice on policy areas including highlighting support for teachers’ use of 
reasonable force which gives educators the power to control pupils or to restrain them when 
they feel it is necessary, the power to impose detentions on pupils without parental consent, 






1.3.2 Managing Behaviour Effectively 
This ‘structured, systematic, common-sense approach’ enables a ‘highly organised teacher-in-
charge-environment’ to take place (Bennett, 2010). This is combined with a ‘discipline action 
plan’ (p. 23), a three-part, structured routine that consists in clearly visible and articulated 
classroom rules, verbal reinforcements, positive feedback, and corrective action that is 
‘consistent, fair and proportional’ (p. 15). Coming to prominence in the mid-70s, through the 
work of American educators Lee and Marlene Canter (1992), ‘assertive discipline’ (AD) has long 
been considered ‘the gold standard’ in the field of behaviour management (Muijis and 
Reynolds, 2018; Elven, 2017; Wallace, 2017; Scott et al., 2017). A teacher might use AD 
proactively, for example, to teach her class expected behaviour before starting lab work, or 
reactively, by requiring primary pupils to miss five minutes of playtime for misbehaviour 
(Malmgren et al., 2005). Emphasis in assertive strategies rests on authority and consistency. 
Using pre-agreed rules, a stressed teacher can quickly regain mastery of a class whose 
collective behaviour is problematic (Watt et al., 1999) and work to reduce low level, off-task 
behaviours in pupils (Hayes et al., 2007). Case studies have sought to show how a model of 
assertive discipline strategies, described as a logical, stepped program, have been very 
successful in curtailing classroom indiscipline by creating an atmosphere where pupils are calm 
and ready to learn (Logan, 2003; Francois et al., 1999). Recent examples of this kind of 
behaviour management include banning pupils from speaking between lessons and the 
implementation of the ‘silent corridor’ (Perraudin, 2018) rule where pupils are expected to 
move around the building in silence. Sanctions for breaking the silent corridor rule result in 
twenty-minute detention while any repeated failure to follow school policy result in 
appropriate escalations.  
How ‘good and safe’ AD is remains a contestable issue. For instance, the notion of rewards 
proposes that children who undertake an activity as a means to an ulterior end, show less 
intrinsic interest then those who engage in an activity without expectation (Black and Allen, 
2018; Hoffman et al., 2009; Kohn, 1993. Greene and Lepper, 1974). Pupils do act when 
threatened by coercion or promised rewards, and indeed they can modify unattractive 
behaviours based on their view of the motivational scales. Teachers might utilise certificates as 
rewards for good behaviour, Vivo miles,5 or simply resort to the store cupboard treat jar. 
 
5 Vivo Miles is a ‘fully-customisable recognition and rewards platform for schools […] It enables schools 
to define criteria for praise and then teachers award their students electronic points called Vivos. Vivos 
can be spent on a number of gifts from a catalogue, donated to charity or used to qualify students for 





However, the danger lies in the pupils’ adoption of such behaviours due solely to the strength 
of the external motivation, and not from any personal judgement that the end goal is 
reasonable or valuable in itself (Straughan, 1982). In this assessment, children do not follow 
rules because they are rules, instead ‘learning to follow rules goes hand in hand with 
developing trust and confidence in [a teacher]’ (p. 68). While it may be easier to use rewards 
and punishments as ways of motivation it is the skills of critical thinking and judgment that is 
morally justifiable (Robenstine, 1997). 
1.3.3 Positive Discipline 
Accordingly, AD’s ‘prescriptive’ (Down, 2002, p. 30), popularity in the UK is less favoured than 
positive discipline (PD) defined as ‘the application of positive behavioural intervention and 
systems to achieve socially important behaviour change’ (Sugai and Horner, 2002, p. 133). PD 
is linked to the work of Alfred Adler and Rudolph Dreikurs (Dreikurs et al., 2004), whose 
reference to understanding and transforming maladaptive behaviour in school children was of 
social origin. Similar to AD in its use of ‘logical consequences’ (Malmgren et al., 2005, p. 37), 
person-centred approaches guide teachers towards ‘assisting students in meeting their innate 
need to gain recognition’ (p. 37), and ‘[establishing] a classroom where all students feel 
recognized and accepted’ (ibid.). For example, excluded pupils can return to the classroom 
only after they agree to re-join the group without disruption. If a pupil is unwilling to listen to 
instructions, perhaps by refusing to complete work, the teacher should ignore the unwanted 
behaviour and ‘try instead to work the student into some sort of leadership role, like helping 
the teacher take roll, proofreading an answer key, or writing the day’s homework assignment 
on the overhead’ (p. 37). The increased investment in personal relation, due to the specific 
teaching of interpersonal skills results in less time dealing with problem behaviour (Clunies-
Ross et al., 2008; Jared et al., 2006; Luiselli, et al., 2005; Scott and Barrett, 2004). Popular 
rituals, such as displaying of pupils’ work, holding achievement assemblies, distributing reward 
certificates, and ‘Hot Chocolate Friday’(where selected pupils are rewarded by having social 
time and a hot beverage with a school leader) not only follow the tradition of positive re-





learning,6 of not only one pupil, but also the whole school population. 
The idea that people are more amenable to change through the identification of personal 
relation takes me back to discussion of progressivism earlier in this chapter. However, PD’s 
‘more person-centred alternative[s] to aversive intervention’ (Jared et al., 2006) is less to do 
with creating an individualistic, therapeutic milieu for intervention (Bettelheim, 1955), and 
more of a ‘shifting from a reactive response to a preventative focus’ (Rogers, 2018, p. 6). The 
simple and seductive idea presented by top-down policy and conceptualised in both AD and 
PD, and which is concomitant with the market forces model, is the notion of homogeneity. As 
Cooper (1999) notes ‘one of [market analogy’s] major flaws is the way it creates “winners” and 
“losers” (p. 31). Although the Elton Report was helpful for bringing the idea of consistency into 
the classroom, the long-term implication ‘was to create an artificial division between what 
might be termed mildly disruptive behaviour or “indiscipline” and the more severe EBDs’ (p. 
35). Using AD or PD to develop behavioural performance indicators takes no account of those 
who for one reason or another are less able to make informed choices or to act on choices 
they might prefer to make. The losers in these circumstances are those potentially disruptive 
and difficult children, children with special needs, and teachers and other mediating adults 
who do vital work amidst increasingly deteriorating circumstances (Busby, 2018a). 
1.4 Good Relationships Matter 
Recognition for establishing good teacher-pupil relationships through regular, effective 
communication is not a new idea but draws on the insight of philosophical and psychological 
luminaries such as Rousseau, Montessori, Freud, and Glasser, to name but a small number. 
William Glasser (1988), in particular, continues to exert a strong influence through his Glasser 
 
6 Social and emotional competence is understood as the ability to understand ourselves and other 
people, and to be aware of, understand, and use information about the emotional states of ourselves 
and others with competence. It also includes the ability to understand, express and manage our own 
emotions, and respond to the emotions of others, in ways that are helpful to ourselves and others 
(Weare, 2004). Although learning styles, and to a lesser extent, multiple intelligence have been roundly 
criticised (Kirschner and van Merriënboer, 2013), notions of emotional literacy have had a clear 
influence on education in recent years. Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences, linking learners to 
activity types, and drawing out ‘the central role the emotional side of the brain plays in the process’ 
(Weare, 2004, p. 5) is relevant. So too, is Goleman’s (1996) statement that emotional problems lead to 
reduced potential for learning. The qualities, or competencies desirable for emotional literacy, 
encompass self-understanding, understanding, expressing and managing emotions; and understanding 
and making relationships. In conjunction with this idea is a focus on building self-esteem and is 
connected to the idea that poor self-esteem is typically associated with low aspiration, and a shortage of 





Schools’ theory. A person-centred (or social) approach to education, his interpretation of 
choice theory subverts the notion of conditioned responses in order to shape behaviour. Using 
democratic councils and decision making, pupils are guided towards an understanding of how 
to internally shape their own behaviour (Wubbolding, 2007). Glasser’s use of dialogue 
demonstrates that the relationship between talking, thinking, and learning has been 
recognised as not only fundamental to child-initiated learning, but in supporting children’s 
social interactions (Rhodes and Long, 2019; Lefevre, 2018; Webster-Stratton, 2012). In such 
scenarios pupils typically talk about themselves, what they are proud of, and what they would 
like to change, while the practice of group work promotes the ability to communicate 
effectively. In schools, it has been firmly established that participation in dialogue is crucial to 
development and learning (Jones and Hodson, 2018; Lefstein, and Snell, 2014; Mercer, 2000). 
Associated with this view is the increasing prominence of classroom talk (Manning-Morton, 
2014; Mercer and Littleton, 2007; Chilvers, 2006). Regular dialogue with in-school mentors, for 
example, can reveal that “Pupil B’s” display of disruptive classroom behaviour is the result of 
low social confidence (Rhodes and Long, 2019). Through a little encouragement “Pupil B” 
becomes more aware of her own behaviours as well as being positively influenced by the 
friends and mentor she has grown close to’ (p. 9). She can adjust her behaviour and thus 
curtail the need for disciplinary action. There is also a growing argument that pedagogy 
grounded in dialogical inquiry has a positive effect on decreasing incidents of bullying in 
schools (Glina, 2015). The identification of a programme of structured philosophical dialogue 
such as Philosophy for Children (P4C) would lead to interventions with the goal of educating 
pupils in ‘critical examination and reinvention of more empathetic, caring and just ways to 
treat one another’ (p. 10).  
Of course, the establishment of dialogue is important, but this does not quite answer the 
destructive formalism of authoritative teaching methods. In order to turn away from the 
notion of the performing school, and ideas of good conduct associated with that notion, ‘a 
change of philosophy is advised; one which makes mental health part of everyday 
conversation with children and young people’ (Danby and Hamilton, 2016, p. 100). This 
requires the creation of a truly safe environment where pupils can build conducive 
relationships and form a positive view of themselves. The teaching of resilience, together with 
social and emotional learning, has been called ‘a new bio-social technology’ (Wyness and Lang, 
2016, p. 1044), enabling vulnerable children and those from poor backgrounds to compete 
with more affluent peers. The need for social services and adolescent mental health services is 





the margins of society, un-socialised and often violent’ (Collins et al., 2015, p. 26). Pupil 
exclusions are stated to ‘often occur in families that are already struggling with poverty, 
marginalisation through race, and/or class and supporting children who are struggling with 
school’ (Hodge and Wolstenholme, 2016, p. 1307). From a social justice perspective, initiatives 
that support children’s social and emotional development might compensate for parental 
inadequacies and socio-economic status (Wood, 2018).  
1.4.1 The Rise in Psycho-Social Problems 
The implication of this social focus, to promote mental and emotional health for everyone, and 
not the select few outliers, broadens the individual focus on behaviour. Worrying statistics 
show Special Educational Needs and Disabilities (SEND) pupils are often the most harmed 
within the school community. Research from the Anti-Bullying Alliance (2016) found that 1 in 3 
children with SEND were victims of frequent bullying and ‘more than twice as likely as their 
non-disabled peers to be called mean names, to be teased, to be hit, pushed or kicked, or to 
be excluded by others’ (p. 2). It is unsurprising, therefore, that children with SEND account for 
‘around half of all permanent exclusions (46.7 per cent) and fixed period exclusions’ (44.9 per 
cent). Research suggests that statistics such as these are indicative of pupils with unmet social, 
emotional and mental health needs (University of Exeter, 2018; Visser, 2015, Spratt et al., 
2006). 
Clearly, something more is called for. The view supported by the evidence of national reports 
and case-studies (House of Commons Education Committee, 2018; Earl et al., 2017; Georges et 
al., 2012; Green et al., 2005) is for a deepening understanding that ‘the very essence of being a 
teacher [is] wrapped up with wider notions of social justice, care and an understanding that 
educational success is not simply down to that which occurs in the classroom’ (Adams, 2011, p. 
479). While a commitment to academic excellence that has been accused of leading to an 
‘emptying [of] the social centre’ (Wexler et al., 1992, p. 65),7 its challengers insist that the 
school setting must become one that is ‘essentially holistic, or as some now label it “eco-
holistic”, to reflect the interrelated nature of the parts and the whole’ (Weare, 2013, p. 21). As 
 
7 It is worth noting that the expansion of the school as a social framework around which children’s social 
and emotional competencies were used to improve the quality of behaviour for learning in schools had 
previously included the flagship programme, ‘Every Child Matters’ (DfES, 2003) (linking economic 
success to emotional well-being, ‘The National Healthy Schools Programme’ (healthy eating and 
emotion), and ‘Social and Emotional Aspects of Learning’ (DfES, 2005) (a programme directed towards 
the explicit teaching of emotional behaviours to further learning). In addition, peer to peer support 
initiatives became popular, with long term peer mentoring pilot schemes launched in 180 UK schools 





a result, increased stressors on pupils and reduced freedom of teachers ask us to be mindful of 
changing not only school practices around behaviour but ‘triggering “secondary” effects […] 
transforming school life, ethics and teaching profession subjectivities in complex and deeply-
rooted ways’ (Falabella, 2014, p. 1).8 It is this shift towards an ethics of relation, and which has 
been described as a ‘welcome counterpoint to the amoral, technocratic focus promoted by 
policy makers and education reformers’ (Levinson, 2015, p. 12), that I am most concerned 
with. What are the ways in which disquiet over ethics has been expressed, and how do 
teachers exercise a properly ethical role? 
1.4.2 Ethical Schools  
I will begin with the notion that ethical knowledge, in schools, relies on teacher awareness, 
understanding, and acceptance of the demands of moral agency (Campbell, 2003). The 
development of what I will refer to as ethical relation is also heightened by teacher attention 
to moral dilemmas and their experience of the complexities surrounding routine challenges. 
While teachers are constantly called to task as moral agents, made accountable by adherence 
to professional standards, there is also an awareness that teachers’ ethical practice must be 
embedded ‘in a clear set of principles or virtues in which he or she believes or he or she acts’ 
(Sockett, 1993, p. 108). In summary, teaching of ethical relationships cannot be defined by 
formalised codes of practice such as the Teacher Standards. Instead, it is, at its most basic 
construal, an orientation towards an overall moral practice that is embodied by elements of 
human virtue, such as fairness, honesty, and justice, and ‘expressed through the nuances of 
attitudes, intentions, words and actions’ (Campbell, 2003, p. 9). Plentiful academic literature 
(Pike, 2014; Knowles and Lander, 2012; Starratt, 1994) has sought to clarify what it means for 
teachers to act in a moral and ethical manner with several ideas forming around a deeper 
acknowledgement equity and fairness (Buckmaster, 2016), listening to student voice (Tal and 
Shapira, 2019) and ‘the comprehensive understanding of how the development of healthy 
relationships plays an important ethical role in the school’ (Bergmark and Alerby, 2008).  
1.4.3 Character Education 
One interesting route to what might be perceived as an ethical school is the recent popularity 
of Character Education (The Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, 2018; Hand, 2017), a 
 
8 Certain recent events, such as the ‘Trojan Horse’ affair (Clarke, 2014) have also strengthened the 
‘perception that mainstream schools in England lack a moral narrative that can provide the school, its 






schools-based programme that explicitly teaches traits assumed to underpin success in school 
work. Derived from the Greek word for charaktêr which ‘originally referred to a mark 
impressed upon a coin’ (Pala, 2011, p. 24), a person’s character ‘refers to the disposition and 
habits that determine the way that a person normally responds to desires, fears, challenges, 
opportunities, failures and successes’ (ibid.). Originally found in Aristotelian virtue ethics, 
Character Education is ‘the deliberate effort to cultivate virtue’ (Lickona, 1999, p. 23) that will 
help students to ‘to become good persons and citizens, able to lead good, as well as 
“successful” lives’ (Arthur et al., 2017, p. 177). These are: ‘perseverance, resilience and grit, 
confidence and optimism, motivation, drive and ambition neighbourliness and community 
spirit, tolerance and respect honesty, integrity and dignity conscientiousness, curiosity and 
focus’ (DfE, 2015). Virtuous decision-making, such as that which can be relied on during a 
dilemma, depends on the inner cultivation of good-sense or practical wisdom (phronesis) in 
the person. If human flourishing is the aim of a good life, then the practice of moral, 
intellectual, and civic virtues is essential to its achievement (Annas, 2011). Proponents argue 
that through practical habituation with their chosen virtue, pupils are provided with the self-
regulation that allows them to develop intrinsic motivation to virtuous action.  
An effective way to teach character is though curriculum implementation (Bourke et al., 2019; 
Pike, 2015). For instance, a lesson teaching year 7 pupils the virtue of integrity will ask pupils to 
read an extract from The Lion, The Witch and The Wardrobe by C.S Lewis (Leslie et al., 2018). 
After reading, pupils identify phrases in the text that show the character of Lucy is ‘truthful’. 
This is contrasted with another character who shows dishonesty or a lack of integrity. Pupils 
engage in virtue-matching activities and group discussion to find virtue synonyms and 
antonyms. Developing a ‘virtues vocabulary’ allows pupils to take part in related activities that 
show the virtues they wish to grow in. Pupils record and track achievement of target virtues 
which are shared at home to encourage parental support and development. Case studies 
suggest that embedding curricula of this nature nurtures a ‘positive school climate where 
students identified as having a greater sense of school belonging’ (Bourke et al., 2019, p. 14); 
its comprehensive approach cultivating an ethos ‘where children feel safe because they are in 
an atmosphere that values respect, responsibility and compassion, not because a guard or 
metal detector is posted at the door (Pala, 2011, p. 26). 
There is an argument that the type of value placed on virtues-thinking that is behind Character 
Education has been seen in forms of moral, spiritual, and cultural education before. For 
example, as ‘Values Education’ (Halstead and Taylor, 1996), or as ‘Spiritual and Moral 





cultivation of virtues presents certain difficulties. Shelby (2003) notes that despite the value on 
doing and not only on reasoning, cultivation of virtue, or character traits, are often 
accompanied by forms of praise or blame. By imposing a top-down set of arbitrary values, and 
pre-conditioned behavioural responses, rather than an education that truly engages them in 
deep, critical reflection, Character Education is said to invite a comparison with deontological 
measures that do no more than traditional measures of discipline in habituating pupils to 
prescribed behaviour (Kohn, 2017). Sanderse (2016) summarises this discomfort by stating 
that while character education ‘may be hot in educational theory, academic advances have not 
always reached teachers, heads of school, policy-makers and politicians’ (p. 446). The 
academic work in question refers to the connection between action research and Aristotelian 
virtue ethics. Specifically, that which is understood as Aristotelian in this sense is the kind of 
dialogical enquiry that contributes to the growth of practical wisdom in teachers, and in turn 
on pupils. In this respect, research that focuses on the ‘effectiveness’ of Character Education 
programmes is not as ethically important as that which attends to ‘extending and refining 
teachers’ own practical wisdom and virtue’ (ibid.). As such, there is caution against the value of 
ethics programs that assume pupils as independent, mature, moral agents who treat the 
establishing of ethical relation as a process of logical abstraction.  
1.4.4 The Rise of School-Based Restorative Practice 
It is into this difficult terrain that restorative practice has laid its roots. Since the mid-1990s 
there has been a shift in schools from the traditional punitive way of dealing with challenging 
behaviour to something quite different. Restorative practice – or restorative 
approaches/restorative measures – as it is also known, is the doing of restorative justice, an 
alternative approach that is designed to make wrongdoers aware of harm and deliver 
reparation to victims. The use of restorative practice receives not only a mention in current 
recommendations for schools in England and Wales (Bennett, 2017; DfE, 2011b) as the most 
valuable strategy schools could employ in dealing with bullying, it is also endorsed by the 
Scottish government (Black et al., 2017). Combining a commitment to the development of self-
discipline through shared responsibility, restorative practice replicates what schools look for in 
terms of a behaviour policy with the therapeutic, and relational culture that ‘challenges deeply 
held beliefs around notions of discipline and authority’ (Blood and Thorsborne, 2005). It is this 
potential for increased social cohesion that has taken root amongst practitioners. George 
(2014) describes schools delivering restorative justice as proactively building a community that 
encourages students to feel a ‘belonging and significance’ (p. 212) by returning issues of 





examine these claims, firstly by establishing its emergence within criminal, social, and 






Chapter 2  
Notions of Restorative Justice and Restorative Practice 
2.1 Mapping the Field: Restorative Justice 
In Chapter 1, I laid out the assumption that establishing assertive or positive behaviour for 
learning rests, for the most part, upon the following lines: What rule was broken? Who is to 
blame? What punishment or consequence is deserved? In paying attention to the question of 
how to understand restorative justice, and the various developments that have been warmly 
embraced by schools, restorative practice is not confined to the maintaining of discipline, but 
welcomed as a pedagogical approach, one that makes links with theories of social and 
emotional learning and the building of social capital. Indeed, such is the support for restorative 
practice by its proponents that ‘practitioners and policy makers should not be asking the 
question “Does this work?” but “How do we make this work here?”’ (Hopkins, 2004, p. 15). 
The body of research pertaining to restorative justice is vast, to the extent that it is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to summarise its entirety. Therefore, in thinking of schools, I want to 
highlight the key aspects of restorative justice that schools are currently looking for in 
establishing their own behaviour models. The first part of this chapter comprises a synopsis of 
the defining principles and theories of restorative justice by outlining its emergence within the 
criminal, social, and youth justice systems, and within transitional contexts. The second part of 
this chapter is concerned with its application in schools. 
2.1.1 Defining Restorative Justice 
In the contemporary criminal, or retributive justice, crime is seen as a violation of the law and 
the state and the terms victim and offender are used to identify the parties during legal 
proceedings (Hudson, 2003). Justice, therefore, is required by the state to determine blame 
(guilt) and impose payment, made through punishment.9 Retributive justice assumes that if a 
state of injustice arises between two persons, the one who has committed the wrong must 
undergo pain or suffering that is in proportion to the original wrong. The reparative notion of 
restorative justice rejects this. Restorative justice is said to begin from a concern with the 
victims and their needs, seeking to repair the harm as much as possible both concretely and 
 
9 Gavrielides and Winterdyk (2011) note that the word punishment is derivative from the Greek pune 
(ðïéíÞ), meaning an exchange of money for harm done. In addition, they also state that the term guilt 





symbolically (Johnstone, 2011). While it is important to acknowledge that the Western legal or 
criminal justice system has its strengths, namely the protection it affords by a jury and the 
presumption of innocence, the question of how we should respond to wrongdoing – what 
needs to happen and what justice requires – have been intensified by global tragedies such as 
the September 11th terrorist attacks in the U.S. (Umbreit et al., 2003). 
The turn towards restorative justice, therefore, is one that acknowledges wrongdoing not 
through a punitive lens, but a relational one. This is an understanding that sees wrongdoing 
not only as a violation against the state but as harm done to a person and to the relationship 
with that person (Zehr, 2002). For the victim, attempting to build a dialogue-centred 
relationship with their offender is said to bring attention to the emotional harm they have 
undergone (Stobbs, 2013). Validation and meaningful recognition that victims of crime receive 
through restorative justice measures is stated to go some way towards ameliorating that 
harm, while Hudson (2003) claims that restorative justice alters the very definition of the 
relationship between victim and offender ‘so that it is no longer one of harming and being 
harmed’ (p. 81). It is understood victims of crime suffer from low self-esteem, mental health 
problems, post-traumatic stress disorders, as well as the loss of familial and social networks. 
The sense of personal agency that can be handed back to victims, from the opportunity to 
express the way that they feel about what has happened to them, is thought to be an essential 
component to repairing the harm of crime (Button et al., 2015; Calhoun, 2013;).  
During the 1970s, key pieces by ‘penal abolitionists’, Barnett (1977), Christie (1977) and Eglash 
(1977) spoke of a crisis in the justice system that would inevitably lead to its demise. This can 
be seen in growing concern over the marginalisation of victims’ rights, rising concern over the 
costs of prisons and offenders brutalised by uncompassionate procedures in addition to rates 
of recidivism (Immarigeon and Daly, 1997; Walker, 1991). The ensuing rise in restorative 
justice writing has contributed to the growth in experimentation and evaluation of various 
restorative justice practices in countries such as Australia, the US, UK, Canada, and New 
Zealand. As the concept has been developed, however, abolitionist pressure has faded, with 
most contemporary theorists seeing restorative justice as a complementary part of the justice 
system. 





A problem solving approach to crime that focusses on restoration or repairing the 
harm done by the crime and criminal to the extent possible, and involves the 
victims(s), offender(s) in an active relationship with statutory agencies in 
developing a resolution (United Nations, 2003, p. 43). 
It can be simplified as a ‘a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offence 
come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its 
implications for the future’ (Marshall, 1996, p. 37). Restorative justice is not to be thought of 
as ‘un-doing’ a crime (Bevan et al., 2005). Instead, restorative justice is said to repair the 
damage done to these relationships as the ‘full moral, spiritual, relational and emotional 
consequences of offending’ (Marshall, 2007, p. 4). The term restorative justice is so-called as it 
is ‘centrally concerned with restoration, restoration of the victim, restoration of the offender 
to a law-abiding life, restoration of damage caused to the community’ (Marshall, 1999b). For 
these reasons, restorative justice remains ‘a deeply contested concept’ (Johnstone and Van 
Ness, 2007, p. 9). As theories and programmes of restorative justice have flourished, there has 
been widespread critical attention around not only definitions and principles but exactly what 
restorative justice might be taken to mean. Such debates give rise to questions asking if 
restorative justice is a serious alternative to retributive justice or only a working element 
within the criminal justice system. Restorative has become an influential movement within the 
youth justice system, as a diversion away from penal criminal justice. To what level of 
seriousness can restorative justice be safely applied? Is it suitable for crimes of serious harm or 
merely petty vandalism and how has the concept of restorative justice found itself a 
compatible home among other organisations?  
Critics also take issue with the terminology itself. For example, in pulling apart notions of 
restorative and justice, ‘the term restorative frequently leads to questions about what exactly 
is being restored’ (Vaandering, 2011, p. 307). For some, the lack of a definitive theoretical 
rationale makes ‘it unlikely that restorative justice will progress as a viable paradigm to 
address problems of crime and criminality’ (Lokanan, 2009, p. 289). It is also important to note 
the ways in which restorative justice defines itself in opposition to retributive justice. 
Restorative justice has become an international business that has, in turn, spawned 
widespread and multi-faceted policy and practice experimentation, massive research interest 
and a monumental literature (Cunneen and Goldson, 2015, pp. 139–140). However, since ‘the 
business of crime control is complex, multi-dimensional, global and profitable’ (Tauri, 2014, p. 
48), simplifying the relationship, between both concepts, makes the ‘sales pitch simple’ (Daly, 





boundaries need to be marked between the good (restorative justice) and the bad (retributive 
justice)’ (ibid.). All this might be taken to mean that the gap between the literature of 
restorative justice and its actual practice in the field is so great as to give a distorted 
characterisation of the evidence. The principle of encounter, that is most useful when giving a 
one-sentence definition of restorative justice, is also the most disputed. What if the respective 
parties are unable to meet? Or where encounter is not possible or advisable? Can restorative 
justice occur if the victim is deceased or if the offender is never found (Braithwaite, 2000)? 
Moreover, what are the values that make encounter restorative, as opposed to merely 
punitive? 
In presenting a negative picture of some sorts of encounters, Johnstone and Van Ness (2007) 
declare ‘the encounter process alone is not enough to ensure the desired results’ (p. 11).  
Indeed, strongly adhering to only an encounter perception of restorative justice would mean 
that ‘any punishment meted out by a victim on an offender, such as lynching and stoning, may 
potentially satisfy the definition of restorative justice’ (Roche, 2001, p. 344). Despite its 
procedural nature, one of the most striking characteristics of restorative justice is a certain 
conceptual uncertainty at the heart of restorative practice with theorists themselves 
exclaiming that what happens remains for the most part ‘ambiguous and unclear’ (Barrett, 
2013, p. 335). Several differing values, or outcomes, have come to the fore: ‘reciprocity, 
dialogue, collectivity, community, problem solving, reparation and future-oriented healing’ 
(Cunneen and Goldson, 2015, p. 138). What then is restorative justice, how do we define it, 
and map out its relevance for today’s society?  
2.1.2 Origins of Restorative Justice 
As the favoured form of justice in ancient societies, Gavrielides and Winterdyk (2011) state ‘it 
is impossible to safely claim that the current and future theoretical potential and practical 
implications of RJ is well understood, if the historical events surrounding it are not captured’ 
(p. 109). To this end, it is worth exploring proponents’ claims that restorative justice is not a 
new form of justice but grounded in pre-modern, religious, and indigenous justice practices. 
Scholars (Van Ness and Strong 2010; Daly, 2002) have suggested that the term restorative 
justice, as it is understood in its modern-day justice context, was initially coined from the work 
of Albert Eglash (1977). Nevertheless, Gade’s (2018) historical findings report the term as 
appearing as far back as the 1800s in Christian magazines and pamphlets although there was 
no clear explanation about what was meant by the phrase. Going back even further, 





with the period between the 8th and 11th centuries. A supposed ‘golden age’ (Zehr, 1990), 
admissions of guilt, apology, and reparation were used as the basis of restitution, and 
considered the main paradigm to restoring peace and order after conflict (Bianchi, 1990). 
Following the Norman Invasion of England in 1066 the transformation of a largely feudal 
society to one governed by State saw the conversion of dispute to one occurring between 
individuals to one against the State (Daly, 2002; Michalowski, 1985).10  
Daly (2002) argues that this ‘reverence for and romanticization of an indigenous past’ (p. 62), 
including ancient Arab, Greek, Roman, and Eastern civilisations, risks the assumption that 
there is a similarity of purpose in what is considered ‘restorative’.11 Nevertheless, despite work 
challenging the emergence of ‘restorative justice assumptions and dogmas’ (Gade, 2018, p. 
32), it is worth locating its direct translation from the modern era’s most enduring models of 
restorative justice practices found in indigenous cultures such as the Māori, particularly as 
certain practices attributed to these peoples are used in relation to non-criminal forms of 
behaviour, including behaviour in schools. For Māori, healing through establishing a 
connection to others is expressed through whakapapa, which means ‘a set of relationships 
with the living and the departed, and the individual and their environment (Te Huia, 2015, p. 
19). Alongside the idea of interconnection lies interdependence, a realisation that survival is 
contingent upon the nurturing of relationships with the wider living world and with their 
whanau or wider community grouping. 
For those who share whakapapa relations, a sense of mutual belonging provides individuals 
with guidance about their role and status within the community. Should transgression occur, 
Māori revert to tikanga o ngā hara (the law of wrongdoing) which is centred on notions of 
collective rather than personal, responsibility (Hudson, 2003). In tikanga o ngā hara the victim 
is the focal point; the goal is to heal and renew the victim’s physical, emotional, mental, and 
 
10 Our present understanding of reparation as connected to money allows for a recognition of the 
symbolic significance of wrongs that have been committed and that reparation matters in a way that is 
both theoretical and practical (Ost, 2016). Even today, in a context where establishing a relationship 
between a child and their offender would be considered highly inappropriate, financial reparation shows 
the ‘victim has suffered a quantifiable harm that can be at least partly redressed by a monetary 
payment’ (p. 619). Reparation is itself a principle of law that has been in use for centuries, referring to 
the obligation of a ‘wrongdoing party to redress the damage caused to the injured party’ and ‘as far as 
possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act’ (The Redress Trust, 2003, p. 7). Embedded in 
both domestic and international law, monetary reparation has been the basis of US Victim-Offender 
Reconciliation Programmes while in the England, restorative justice for victims of child pornography 
includes financial redress. 
11 For example, if we have a conference in which all parties decide to boil the offender in oil and criticise 





spiritual well-being. Tikanga o ngā hara also involves deliberate acts by the offender to regain 
dignity and trust and is considered necessary for the offender and victim to both save face, and 
to restore harmony within the various personal and communal relationships: victim-offender; 
victim-offender-community; offender community; offender-family. What these religious and 
cultural practices have in common is the view that wrongdoing is a violation of relationships. 
Therefore, restoring the bonds of community by allowing all parties a stake in a resolution is 
characteristic of a restorative approach.  
The expanding use of restorative justice also includes the pan-African concept of Ubuntu,12 a 
Nguni Bantu phrase often translated as ‘humanity to others’, or, ‘I am what I am because of 
who we all are’ (Dreyer, 2015; Tutu, 1999). It was often heard in conjunction with Desmond 
Tutu and transitional justice in South Africa, where the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
set up in the aftermath of apartheid was described as an attempt to promote an African 
restorative justice (Gade, 2013). However, drawing examples from Rwanda, northern Uganda, 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe, Mangena (2015) argues for restorative justice’s deep roots in 
Africa existing before the coming of Europeans and hence is entirely cognizant with pan-
African ideals. In addition, ideas of healing and holism are found in the world’s most populous 
religions, namely Christianity, Judaism and Islam. This brings in the restorative idea that 
‘because crime hurts, justice should heal, and a justice that leaves wounds open will not seem 
like justice at all’ (Nickson and Braithwaite, 2014, p. 451). In the historical roots of these 
Abrahamic religions, reconciliation and mercy are part of the essence of holistic justice (Brunk, 
2001). Both Judaism and Christianity have a Hebrew word for holistic peace with justice that is 
known as shalom, while the Arabic salam or salaam is a general greeting used by Muslims that 
literally means ‘peace’ (van Gorder, 2014). These moral and religious associations with 
forgiveness add another dimension to the process of reconciliation. Although perspectives vary 
across religions, followers are expected to imitate the forgiving nature of God (Lokanan, 2009). 
In this way of thinking, the Biblical ‘priority of restoring relationships and social wholeness in 
the face of brokenness and alienation’ (Grimrud and Zehr, 2002, p. 267) has been translated by 
Mennonite Christians into existing criminal justice practices such as victim-offender 
reconciliation projects. 
 
12 To denote someone as having Ubuntu is to say that they are open, generous and compassionate. 
indeed, that they have a self-assurance that comes with knowing they belong to a whole greater than 
themselves. Moreover, the wholeness that is derived from Ubuntu is diminished when others are 





It would be remiss when talking of the origins of restorative justice not to mention the 
influence of Nils Christie’s (1977) influential argument, Conflicts of Property, against the 
handling of crime by state actors. In this, Christie describes his experience of attending a court 
case in Tanzania between a man and a woman who had been engaged and were now in 
dispute. He noted that while establishing restitution was important, the most illuminating 
facet was the framework for conflict resolution established between the couple and the on-
looking community. The central couple were listened to, ‘but they [the wider community] did 
not take over’ (p. 2). In contrast, Christie states that the representation of all parties in the 
traditional western justice system hurts both victim and offender. Not only has the victim 
suffered from material, physical or mental hurt, but ‘above all he has lost participation in his 
own case […] It is the Crown that describes the losses, not the victim’ (p. 7). Restabilising the 
balance of power extends not only to the victim, but also to the offender, and their ability to 
take responsibility for the act of offence. Christie states that by losing the opportunity to 
explain himself to a person whose evaluation of him might have mattered, offenders lose one 
of the most important possibilities for being forgiven (p. 9). For Christie, in both the case of 
victim and offender, loss of voice can be translated to loss of power, and therefore the loss of 
‘pedagogical possibilities’ (p. 8) arising from conflict.  
Handing control of conflict, the opportunity for dialogue and personalised encounter back to 
its principal participants is what ‘closely involved parties find is just, and in accordance with 
general values in society’ (p. 9). That is, not just the reparation of financial terms but ‘what are 
often the much more profound psychological and spiritual terms’ (Brunk, 2001, p. 48). The 
adversarial nature of retributive justice concerns itself with preparing people to damage each 
other’s claims and strategies (Stobbs, 2013). In its place, restorative justice aims to promote 
the values of democracy, participation and deliberation rather than governmental self-interest 
(Roche, 2001). This wider range of values provides an incentive to involve the community, to 
close the distance between the courts and the public, and to transform notions of the self and 
society, damaged by crime and social exclusion’ (Muir, 2014).  
2.1.3 Personal Testimony: Circles, Conferences and Community 
Taking the lack of a ‘definitive theoretical rationale’ (Lokanan, 2009, p. 289) into account it 
becomes an impossible task to locate the notion of restorative justice within a single theory or 
point of origin. Rather, let me turn to its identifying practices. Whether scripted or unscripted, 
restorative justice is constructed from the ability of participants to speak personally, each from 





stories’ (Van Ness and Strong, 2013, p. 84). In other words, it is necessary to pay attention to 
the stories of those harmed in order to repair the harm. In seeing each other as a person with 
a story to tell, ‘both victim and offender are confronted with each other as a person rather 
than a faceless antagonistic force’ (ibid.). Personal narrative also has the power to bring 
emotion to the forefront, itself seen as a useful tool in creating empathy. Indeed, the ability to 
comprehend and voice strong emotion is seen as key to listening to each other. It is the 
combined use of ‘meeting, narrative and emotion [that] leads to understanding’ (p. 88). The 
enactment of dialogue between victim and offender involves an encounter that begins ‘to act 
out the more morally adequate relationships at which they aim’ (Urban Walker, 2006, p. 212). 
The notion of establishing dialogue between individuals in conflict is not only an issue for 
restorative justice but is also a practice that has been well established in couples and family 
therapy (Kornaszewska-Polak, 2016), community conflicts (Høg Hansen, 2006), and 
psychoanalytic therapy (Shapiro, 2002). The process is said to be a way for the person or 
people at the centre of the therapy to feel heard and respected, and to lessen the sense of 
isolation and distance that conflict produces. For example, restorative practice has started to 
play a key role in instances of workplace harassment and instances of bullying behaviour 
(Hutchinson, 2009). Workplace bullying, defined as repeated inappropriate behaviour 
conducted by one or more persons against another at their place of employment, is reported 
to constitute a huge problem. The detrimental effects of social isolation, stigmatisation, and 
helplessness lead many to seek leave for stress-related illnesses, loss of productivity while at 
work, and to take voluntary unemployment. While the employee remains and the bullying 
goes unchallenged, the resulting negative culture can result in more workforce absences or 
‘presenteeism’ where employees are present, but not fully on task. (Cole, 2004). In this. 
restorative practice’s emphasis on conflict resolution makes it a good fit for companies seeking 
to build success by increasing the capability to effectively manage and motivate their workers. 
The basic structure of dialogue allows the victim and offender to pursue three lines of enquiry. 
Briefly, this translates as what has happened, who has been harmed, and what needs to be 
done in order to repair the harm. The most commonly used models of dialogue in modern 
restorative justice are methods of conferencing (also mediation) and circles (Johnstone, 2011; 
Morris and Maxwell, 2001). Conferencing is where any group of individuals who are connected 
by conflict can come together to discuss the issues that have arisen (McDonald and Moore, 
2001). Conferences are facilitated or coordinated by a third party to ensure discussion stays on 
track. A conference can involve the families and supporters of both the both victim and 





New Zealand, family group conferences (FGCs) are unscripted and used when a plan of action 
is needed to support a young person or family through a variety of offences such as theft, 
arson, drug offences or assault (Bazemore and Umbreit, 2001).13 An example from the 
literature is that of ‘Angie’ who is asked to ‘stand up’ in front of a community of people who 
have been hurt by her participation in violent crime. She is asked to tell her side of the story, 
apologise and then communicate to the community what she has learned. The community 
members can voice their grievances and fears before discussing ‘how to proceed with Angie’s 
treatment and healing within the community’ (Crawford, 2011, p. 20). The process of family 
decision making is said to ‘create a sense of ownership and motivate those involved to carry 
out and implement the plans made’ (Hopkins, 2004, p. 37). In the field of social work, 
participation by family members has the advantage of increased compassion and reconciliation 
(Pennell, 2006), while the opportunity to provide a support system in an otherwise 
dysfunctional family ‘is a prime format for decision making concerning the vested interests of 
the child’ (Van Wormer, 2003, p. 448). 
The use of circles as dialogue-driven, community-based decision making was popularised in the 
US after a pilot project initiated in Minnesota and has been used for adult and juvenile 
offences both in urban and rural settings (Raye and Warner Roberts, 2007). Circle sentencing is 
said to be a ‘holistic re-integrative strategy’ (Bazemore and Umbreit, 2001, p. 6) that not only 
considers the needs of the offender but also the victim and the wider community. Circles are 
facilitated by a lead practitioner called the Keeper who is a trained community member. 
However, the symbolic nature of the circle is also practical. All who attend, offenders, victims, 
families, and friends as well as representatives from the justice system and the wider 
community are given a chance to speak, often by holding a symbolic item to indicate turn-
taking. The success of sentencing circles is said to rely heavily on the partnership between the 
community and the criminal justice courts. Those that bring cases from the court system to the 
sentencing circle need training, skill building and time to develop strong relationships that, 
between them, can not only conduct the circle but offer community support following the 
decisions made.  
 
13 In South Australia, the facilitator is required to follow a script in which the offender speaks first, then 





2.1.4 Transitional Justice 
The shift in attitude towards the other brought about by such dialogical encounters is that 
which allows for personal transformation: 
Facilitators of restorative processes regularly observe a personal and social 
transformation occur during the course of the process. There is often the strong 
sense that something significant is occurring which has very little to do with the 
facilitator and operates at a subconscious level among the participants (McCold, 
2000, p. 363). 
The reference to transformation, described in this passage, and within the advocacy literature, 
is multiple and varied. Within the justice system this includes the anticipation that restorative 
practice can ‘transform the crime into something different’ (Liebmann, 2007, p. 25). With 
regards to recidivism, proponents insist that restorative practice offers offenders a 
transformative experience that goes beyond incarceration, or reoffending rates (Johnstone, 
2011). This is not seen as limited to the individual, and interpersonal, but harbours a broader 
concern with ‘social transformation, peacebuilding, and the promotion of common good’ 
(Toews, 2013, p. 10). It is common in ethno-national conflicts that researchers working in the 
field of transitional justice (meaning the transition from war to democracy) should advocate 
active story creation and the opportunity to share accounts widely as a key tenet of 
transitional justice (Worth, 2019). On this scale, the formal process of reparation, where 
judicial and non-judicial measures are taken to restore legacies of a variety of human rights 
abuses, is known as transitional justice. Instituted at a point when governments hope to 
transition after periods of war, anarchy, genocide or political unrest, transitional justice 
measures include criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, and 
institutional reform.  
One aspect of transitional justice is narrative justice, defined as ‘the way in which stories 
provide genuine knowledge, regardless of whether they are true of false, and examines the 
influence of stories on a particular type of inhumanity’ (p. 106). For historical purposes, stories 
serve as important reminders of lived experience, giving invaluable insight into the myriad of 
ways in which people were harmed or wronged (Worth, 2019; Porter, 2016). In this regard, the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions was charged with investigating human rights abuses 
perpetrated by white apartheids towards their black counterparts ‘in a manner that would 
ensure reconciliation and transformation to a better society’ (Vorster, 2004, p. 480). After fifty 





election of Nelson Mandela, such reconciliation seemed unimaginable. In the opening to its 
Truth and Reconciliation final report, Archbishop Tutu stated that it is precisely this history 
that South Africans needed to come to terms with:  
We could not pretend it did not happen. Everyone agrees that South Africa must 
deal with that history and its legacy. It is how we do this that is the question 
(South Africa, 1999, p. 1).  
In rejecting the urge that the past should be forgotten or that the only form of justice worth 
pursuing was retributive justice, Tutu gave three reasons. Firstly, he insisted that perpetrating 
amnesia, by denying experience, would result in the further victimisation of victims.14 
Secondly, Tutu maintained that repudiating the past would not eliminate it. However painful 
the knowledge, he assured, wounds cannot be allowed to fester; they must be cared for 
properly. Finally, Tutu affirmed that familiarity with the past strengthens the resolve that this 
should never happen again, arguing ‘we need to know about the past to establish a culture of 
respect for human rights. It is only by accounting for the past that we can become accountable 
for the future’ (South Africa, 1999, p. 7).  
In thinking of narrative justice, Worth (2017) insists ‘the emphasis should not just be on the 
ways in which different people suffer injustice, but rather the validation that they feel when 
their stories are heard’ (np). When stories are communicated to a larger audience, victims can 
gain a feeling of validation that their experiences have been recognised. This is understood as 
having narrative agency (Porter, 2016), telling one’s story (or the right not to tell it at all) in a 
safe environment that might not necessarily match up with a master narrative. Agency in one’s 
own story allows sufferers not only to connect with other’s experience but to make sense of 
what otherwise might remain insensible. When large scale injustice has taken place, forcibly 
stripping away any sense of agency, the ability to speak without fear of repercussion is 
essential for the repairing relation with oneself. Meaningful story construction that results in 
personal understanding, awareness and connection is akin to narrative therapy (see Chapter 
 
14 Tutu gives as an example the plot of the Ariel Dorfman play Death and the Maiden. In the play, 
Pauline Salas ties up and threatens to kill a man who she believes has raped and tortured her. It is only 
when he admits to carrying out both acts, after listening to her story that she finally unties and lets him 
go. His admission of guilt, by way of a full and signed confession, has confirmed the horrific experience 
for Salas as real and not an illusion thereby affirming her sense of self. Dorfman basis his protagonist 
and the political context of his play on investigations into the rule of Pinochet by Chile’s National 
commission on Truth and Reconciliation (Urban Walker, 2006). In the real inquiry, the commission was 
only charged to investigate cases of disappearance and torture that led to homicide. Surviving victims of 





5). However, as a central component in narrative justice establishing many such stories has the 
effect of creating mass healing for entire groups and ethnicities. Here the potentially 
reparative and transformative elements of narrative testimony is realised as ‘an ethical and 
moral imperative that seeks to appeal to community’ (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2012, p. 286). This 
goes beyond the imperative of public testimony (about human rights crimes) and into a 
‘reflective engagement with the story of what happened’ (p. 287). The experience of sharing 
stories about the past both allows us to glimpse moments of empathic engagement between 
victims and perpetrators and to understand how stories allow connection to the past, and at 
the same time, the connection to each other. That is, the narrative of ‘who I am’ (or ‘who we 
are’) and the narrative of ‘how we have gotten here together’ is threaded through by another 
story, one about ‘what this means’ (Urban Walker, 1998, p. 113). Listeners are not simply 
present to provide containment. Bearing witness draws listeners to participate in the listening 
by bringing their own narratives from the past and ‘telling’ these stories, as it were, through a 
silent and dialogic process of identification with the stories of others through which a history 
of moral concepts can be acquired, refined and replaced. It is this latter sense in which 
restorative justice is used to repair relationships not only between individuals whose 
relationships have been damaged but also entire groups of peoples who have suffered violent 
conflict and oppression (McGregor, 2018).  
2.1.5 Changing Lenses 
In the justice courts dialogic models are said to ‘work’ (Restorative Justice Council, 2016) to 
reduce recidivism. A seven-year research study found that reoffending, after restorative justice 
intervention, had dropped by 14% and that 85% of victims were ‘satisfied with the process’ 
(ibid.). Despite the authors’ caveat on the validity of the research due to, in part, the lack of a 
singular definition of what constitutes good practice, evaluators of the UK Home Office’s 
'Crime Reduction Programme' point to a considerable growth and influence of restorative 
justice to combat recidivism, particularly among youth offenders (Palmer, 2009; Robinson and 
Shapland, 2008). Favourable evaluations such as these are not simply confined to the UK. In 
New Zealand, reoffending analysis of restorative justice cases from 2011/2012 predicted 1,100 
fewer offences to be committed and 650 fewer prosecutions required over the next three 
years. Is this a changing of lenses for justice in the UK? 
While politicians and policy makers are inclined to a more pragmatic view of how restorative 
justice works, evidence on re-offending rates is also described as ‘limited, incomplete and 





alone fails to capture the extent of victim satisfaction and offender responsibility (Little et al., 
2018; Joudo Larson, 2014). This ranges from ambivalence in the research, where there were no 
significant differences in reoffending rates between those participating in restorative justice 
schemes and those who did not, inconsistency in the application of victim statements (Jeong et 
al., 2012) to a complete rebuttal of restorative justice’s ability to affect levels of incarceration 
and overrepresentation in juvenile systems (Little et al., 2018). Supporters of restorative 
justice also claim that focussing on re-offending alone fails to capture the extent of victim 
satisfaction and offender responsibility (Joudo Larson, 2014; Aertson et al., 2011). Rather the 
vision that guides us on how to change social responses to crime and wrongdoing should be 
based on a way of behaving and a way of living (Johnstone, 2011). With this in mind, let me 
now shift my focus to school-based restorative practice and schools’ changing responses to 
incidents of pupil wrongdoing. 
2.2 Mapping the Field: School-Based Restorative Practice 
Since its inception in the late 1990s restorative practice in schools has had world-wide impact 
on decreasing incidents of challenging behaviour measured by levels of suspensions, 
exclusions, and raising attainment in academic learning particularly in disadvantaged pupils 
(Denholm, 2017; Gregory et al., 2016; Grossi and Santos, 2012; Wearmouth and Berryman, 
2012; White, 2016). In this, restorative practice is stated to be successful with not only raising 
standards of behaviour within minority ethnic communities, but also low socio-economic 
groups in general (Drewery and Kecskemeti, 2010). Historically, the strategy of holding FGCs 
formed the basis of early notions of restorative practice in New Zealand’s schools (Drewery, 
2004). In 1999, its Ministry of Education in New Zealand contacted the University of Waikato 
to develop a process of conferencing in schools to reduce the rise in suspensions of Māori 
children (Drewery, 2010). In the participating 29 schools, the number of suspensions15 declined 
and led to the establishment of the Suspension Reduction Initiative and the more recent 
Student Engagement Initiative.16 In Australia, the Department for Education found inspiration 
in the police-led conferencing developed in New South Wales. Ministers started to trial the use 
of restorative conferencing in schools to find a solution to serious bullying. The trials were 
 
15  In New Zealand a suspension is the formal removal of a pupil from the school until a decision is made 
by the board of trustees.  
16 Drewery (2010) also acknowledges that a possible reason for the decline might be the Hawthorne 





found to have been highly transformative for students particularly in addressing bullying (Ryan 
and Ruddy, 2015; Cameron and Thorsborne, 2001).  
2.2.1 The Influence of Restorative Practice in UK schools 
Restorative practices in UK schools, including restorative conferencing, was introduced in both 
secondary and primary schools from the late 90s. The earliest evidence-based data on the 
transformative success of these early initiatives was the National Evaluation of the Restorative 
Justice in Schools Programme (Bitel, 2005). Still the largest evaluation of restorative practice in 
UK schools, the national evaluation explored the impact of restorative practices, such as 
circles, peer mediation and restorative conferences, on levels of victimisation, bullying and 
robbery in 26 schools. The report concluded that despite initial misgivings most staff believed 
that they had benefited from implementation of restorative approaches. Described as both a 
time-saver and catalyst to culture change, restorative practice, when done well, ‘allows 
children (and parents if involved) to be listened to and have a voice’ (p. 56). Despite no 
evidence to suggest that restorative practice had an impact on reducing exclusions, the short 
and long term effects on pupils’ experience of victimisation, robbery and bullying showed 
‘evidence that restorative approaches helped perpetrators gain a better understanding of the 
full effects of their actions, and take responsibility for them [and also] helped increase the 
confidence of victims (p. 68). The evaluation concluded ‘restorative justice is not a panacea for 
the problems in schools but, if implemented correctly, it may be a useful resource that 
improves the school environment and enhances the learning and development of young 
people’ (p. 65). 
A small number of local evaluations supported this early pilot. In Scotland, McCluskey et al., 
(2008a; 2008b) noted that there was strong evidence of cultural change, such as the use of 
restorative language, a calmer school atmosphere, and more pupils showing positivity about 
their school experiences of wrongdoing. In Bristol (Skinns et al., 2009) researchers found that 
restorative practice impacted the learning climate by allowing staff to ‘resolve behavioural 
issues for good by getting to the bottom of it’ (p. 61). Pupils felt better for being treated in ‘a 
more reasonable and adult way [that] moved beyond simplistic bully/victim categories’ (ibid.) 
Restorative practice improved communication by encouraging calm talk as opposed to 
shouting. Pupils stated that they had better relationships with their peers and that 
‘conferences gave pupils a voice and helped to redress the power imbalance in staff pupil 
relationships’ (ibid). Recently Bonell et al’s., (2018) first randomised control trial of restorative 





in restorative practice programmes ‘had a higher quality of life and psychological wellbeing 
and lower psychological difficulties’ (p. 7) than pupils who were not participating.  
Literature consistently indicates that the effectiveness of any type of restorative initiative in 
schools is dependent upon adopting a whole-school approach (Hansberry, 2016; Thorsborne 
and Blood, 2013; Skinns et al., 2009, Hopkins, 2004). This is achieved by strong commitment 
from the senior leadership team and comprehensive long-term school development plans 
offering detailed monitoring strategies and success criteria. Case studies, such as those 
described above, suggest that a whole school approach is highly successful in achieving the 
purpose of transforming school cultures. However, to return to my argument in Chapter 1, it is 
essential that if a restorative culture is to truly espouse a gentler, more ethical way of being, 
then it should also recognise that whole school and enforced behaviour change runs the risk of 
ignoring individual student needs and the very idea of ethical relation entirely.  
2.2.2 Establishing a Relational Pedagogy 
One of the first items to address when exploring notions of ethical relation is to acknowledge 
that while terms such as victim, offender, and justice are common to criminal disciplinary 
codes, these terms are problematic where there has been no legal offense (Vaandering, 2014), 
and possibly damaging in the long term (Hopkins, 2004). Instead, advocates of restorative 
justice in schools have adopted labels such as the harmer or harmed (or wrongdoer), for victim 
and offender, and fairness instead of justice (Cooper-Johal, 2016). There is also a preference 
for using the expression restorative practice (RP) (sometimes restorative approaches, or 
restorative measures) to assert how, in an educational setting, these methods are based on 
the principles of restorative justice, rather than its overall aim. As Drewery (2010) states:  
Justice is about determining whether a crime has been committed and who is 
responsible. Education is about trying to produce young people who will become 
good citizens. Educationalists are not trained to judge whether young people have 
committed crimes (Drewery, 2010, p. 210). 
Accountability, meaning the responsibility that individuals have to each other and their school 
community (Amstutz and Mullet, 2005), allows individuals to behave well, not out of fear of 
punishment but through a sense of shared communal value with their peers. Working 
restoratively therefore, is not about administering blame or punishment but establishing a 
relational pedagogy (Vaandering, 2015; Morrison and Vaandering, 2012). As such restorative 





p. 26). Figure 1 explains how a relational pedagogy differentiates restorative practices from 
other behavioural approaches: 
 
Figure 1 The social discipline window (McCold and Wachtel, 2001b, p. 113) 
The four windows represent different combinations of high and low, controlling and 
supporting behaviour strategies. Let me describe how utilising the window helps to explain a 
restorative approach.  A high control/low support approach, such as a punitive approach, 
characterises the use of strategies done to pupils; the person with authority deals a detention 
or suspension to whomever they believe caused the wrongdoing. While a neglectful teacher 
would do nothing at all (not likely), a permissive teacher shows care for the pupils. 
Unfortunately, high support/low control view is likely to view pupils as ‘helpless objects of 
need’ (Hansberry, 2016, p. 37). Failure to provide control, in the form of appropriate 
boundaries for behaviour quickly sets leads to worsening behaviour as pupils push against 
limits.  
In contrast, restorative practice is not only high in control but also high in support. Restorative 
practice portrays itself as working with pupils by engaging them in the process of becoming 
accountable with the wider community. Its proponents state that working with highlights its 
‘fundamental unifying hypothesis [...] that human beings are happier, more cooperative and 
productive, and more likely to make positive changes in their behaviour when those in 
positions of authority do things with them, rather than to them or for them’ (Wachtel, 2013). 





125), or since genuine democracy is superseded by traditional hierarchies, as a ‘benevolent 
leadership’ (Hansberry, 2016, p. 41). 
How is a sense of democracy manifest within school-based restorative practice? Key to this is a 
sense of agency in pupils. Pupils are listened to, and have their feelings validated. They suggest 
solutions or ways of working (Macready, 2009). Teachers encourage the building of 
relationships, through dialogue with those involved, taking the time to understand the point of 
view of another. Above all, wrongdoing is seen as an opportunity for personal transformation 
and healthy growth where agency alters the overreaching ethos of the school from an 
authoritarian model of passive citizenship, where expected behaviour is reinforced by rewards 
and sanctions, towards one that expects its youngest people to work together to create 
solutions to problems (Dubin, 2016). In this zone, teachers expect conflict to be a normal part 
of the educative process in which wrongdoing is addressed directly. For example, teachers 
work towards change with their pupils; they refrain from dictating rules over conduct. 
Teachers assist their pupils to think through conflicts; they do not arbitrarily decide which 
sanction is appropriate to the rule broken. Finally, teachers guide pupils in recognising and 
understanding the harm done to others, they do not assume that delivering a sanction will act 
as a deterrent to future reoffending. Developing these social and emotional competencies by 
building social capital facilitates the restoration of relationships, and social order that is vital 
for improving classroom behaviour and academic outcomes (Morrison, 2015; Wachtel, 2017; 
Morrison et al., 2005). In doing so, restorative practice creates ‘a climate or environment for 
teaching and learning that can be created, maintained and repaired when needed’ 
(Thorsborne and Blood, 2013, p. 31).  
2.2.3 Caring Ethics 
Drewery (2004) pinpoints restorative justice practices as corresponding directly with Nel 
Nodding’s (2013) and Carol Gilligan’s (2003) caring ethics that sees commitment to others as 
the highest priority. How schools fulfil this is well-researched with some key themes being the 
deliberate crafting of spaces in which relationality can emerge. These include fashioning 
spaces for mediation (Tsuruhara, 2018); altering existing curricula and developing pedagogical 
methodology favourable to emphasising critical discussion between pupils (Guilherme, 2017; 
Nolan and Stitzlein, 2016). This entails moving away from abstract dialogue about principles of 
how to care towards models that are grounded in ‘caring ethics’ (Noddings, 2013). As a 
contrast to a programme of taught ethics, for example Character Education, caring ethics is a 





recognised in education, pedagogy, psychology, healthcare and social work (Monteverde, 
2016; Quigley and Hall, 2016; Hermsen and Embregts 2015; Wrench and Garrett, 2015).  Far 
from focussing on curriculum aims, Noddings states that an ethics of care emphasises a caring, 
nurturing atmosphere appropriate to that between teacher and pupil. At its core is the 
understanding that relation is ontologically basic, and the caring relation as ethically (morally) 
fundamental (Noddings, 2013). To elaborate: our human flourishing is conditional on the 
flourishing of certain relationships with others and it is through relation that a human 
individual emerges (p. 771). Within a school culture, caring ethics points out humans as 
essentially dependent on each other, and parents (and teachers), as having a moral, and 
ethical, responsibility to care for their children (students).  
Caring ethics provides a unique perspective on the teacher-pupil relation. As one teacher 
explained: ‘I knew she would just get yelled at the whole time. She is so smart, and she needs 
the love. I will care for her’ (Quigley and Hall, 2016, p. 182). Rejecting an impulse to care, 
thereby turning one’s back on what one knows to be ethical is ‘an evil that cannot be 
redeemed’ (Noddings, 2013, p. 115). Therefore, the ability to experience care from others, and 
naturally caring in turn, builds an ethical ‘ideal’ (p. xvi) image of the person one wants to be. 
Moreover, this is a sense of caring that concentrates on the ‘expressed’ needs of the student, 
as opposed to the ‘assumed’ need. Teachers who assume a need are noted as ‘virtue carers’: 
they do not establish caring relations based on what they think the student needs. They ‘must 
listen, not just tell’ (p. 773). Noddings proposes that ‘an important task for teachers is to 
connect the moral worlds of school and public life’ (Noddings, 2012, p. 779). For instance, in a 
short discussion on the insidious nature of cheating in tests, Noddings expects that teachers 
should rely less on increased surveillance ‘and more time talking with their students about the 
moral foundation of the knowledge world’ (p. 779). Far from falling victim to the demands of 
the market, or standardisation, ‘history and common sense tells us that a democratic society 
expects much more’ (Noddings, 2005, p. 11). Rather than approaching the development of 
moral people as something to be achieved ‘on top of all the other demands’ (Noddings, 2013, 
p. 777), Noddings states that ‘establishing such a climate is not “on top” of other things, it is 
underneath all we do as teachers. Teaching caring ethics would balance (particularly for girls), 
disciplinary structures that demand emotional compliance. Despite critical objection that 
caring ethics provides ‘nothing of substance to teach’ (p. 341), its insight as an orientation 
towards an alternative, human response to relation offers a higher social response (Shelby, 
2003). It is particularly pertinent to restorative practices where the turn to philosophies such 





involves shifting notions of restorative practice from a discourse of behaviour to a ‘discourse of 
pedagogy’ (Vaandering, 2014, p. 508), an idea that sees restorative practice only not as a 
collection of approaches, or tools with which to do behaviour management, but also as a 
methodology with which to transform the culture of a school.  
It is important to acknowledge that a discourse of pedagogy includes pupils with SEND for 
whom it is argued that restorative practice is responsible for the creation of a safe and just 
school community whose applications can be considered a viable approach for children who 
are cognitively impaired, who do not know what is happening, for those who find it difficult to 
empathise, to communicate, or to sit still during dialogue (Lea et al., 2015). Indeed, barring 
children with SEND on the grounds they may not be able to feel remorse, or express regret, is 
short-sighted and ‘having the person who has done the harm just say that what he or she did 
was wrong might be useful to the person harmed (Burnett and Thorsborne, 2015, p. 12). With 
careful support and reasonable adjustments, restorative practices can be used where the 
person has an impairment or disability. Burnett and Thorsborne (2015) identify possible areas 
of difficulty for a range of diagnoses, and possible adaptations. For example, when working 
with pupils with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorders facilitators are asked to keep their 
language short and simple, to make use of visual supports, such as a comic strip, and to 
provide clear opportunities for movement to occur. For children with Autistic Spectrum 
Disorders, the authors suggest story-boarding pupil-teacher talk, additional thinking time to 
process events, opportunities to rehearse, reminders, and explicitness in language. 
Consideration of the pupil’s communication ability is obviously crucial, but so is the explicit 
teaching of cognitive empathy ranging from the teaching of facial expression through to the 
learning of socially responses to a range of real-life situations. As with the question of any type 
of new learning behaviour, Burnett and Thorsborne reiterate that the ability to acquire 
restorative behaviour is a developmental process that needs modelling, practice, and 
rehearsal. Restorative practice that is done often enough will help to develop both empathy 
and the ability to see the world from the eyes of another.  
2.2.4 Theories of Emotion  
The importance of educating pupils to verbalise their emotions is a vital component of 
developing caring relations (Kelly and Thorsborne, 2014). For educationalists, an 
understanding of Affect Script Psychology (ASP) has come to provide a significant theoretical 
basis for understanding the methods and successes of restorative practice. Conceived by the 





and personality’ (Kelly and Thorsborne, 2014, p. 27) that categorises a combination of 
emotions such as surprise-startle, enjoyment-joy, or shame-humiliation. Known as affect 
programs, they are wired into our central nervous system and triggered as a result of 
environmental stimuli. For example, the fear-terror affect program, in pupils, might be 
triggered by being questioned by a teacher. Constant fear-terror stimulation will then form the 
motivation for individual behaviour patterns, specifically avoidance or evasion. This forms the 
basis of pupils’ emotional connection with the teacher, and perhaps with others in their class 
(when I feel afraid, I don’t like to talk). With regard to restorative conferencing, or circles, 
researchers in school practice believe that theories of emotion, such as ASP, explain why pupils 
who are able to express their feelings about an incident can undergo significant changes in 
emotion and behaviour through such interventions (Morrison, 2006). Conference scripts are 
specifically designed to prompt feelings of shame and guilt by maximising the emotional 
vulnerability of participants (Harris et al., 2004). Exploration of harm through lines of 
questioning is the ‘core lesson for wrongdoers who have not yet shown remorse or 
understanding for their actions’ (Thorsborne and Vinegrad, 2008, pp. 25–26) and is even more 
likely to have an impact on the wrongdoers than day to day teacher-pupil talk.  
It is worth highlighting here how the presence of shame-humiliation as a possible emotional 
‘affect’ has come to play a key role in restorative practices. This includes John Braithwaite’s 
theory of reintegrative shaming (Ttofi and Farrington, 2008; Braithewaite, 1989) and 
hypotheses of reconciliation and forgiveness, both of which are identified as crucial in 
constructing the emotional scaffolding needed to boost self-regulation (Ahmed and 
Braithwaite, 2006). Following this, Donald Nathanson’s (1994) development of ‘the compass of 
shame’ (p. 312), has allowed school-based practitioners to perceive how disruptive and 
damaging the experience of shame is on an individual. A shameful incident leads to a pupil 
experiencing either feelings of withdrawal, attacking self, attacking other, and avoidance. For 
example, one pupil who had drawn a sexually explicit picture of himself and shown it to his 
teacher was emotionally changed by hearing the hurt and embarrassed reaction of the adult 
(Dubin, 2016). Feeling shame, the pupil who had committed the wrong started to cry as ‘the 
conversation enabled him [the offender] to empathize with her [the teacher] and to feel the 
remorse and guilt that would prompt him to learn from his mistake’ (p. 18). School 
practitioners that are aware of the effects of shame are able to recognise their physical and 
emotional manifestations, such as disrupted relationships or disrespectful language, or to 





based upon a solid understanding of how others care and how that motivates their behaviour’ 
(Kelly and Thorsborne, 2014, p. 46). 
2.2.5 Guiding Principles in Restorative Conversations 
Knight’s and Wadhwa’s (2014) study on use of restorative circles to build resilience, discusses 
‘critical restorative justice’ (p. 11) as offering open-ended opportunities to empower voice in 
marginalised young people. In their research, the authors insist that resilience is not a 
descriptor but the recognition of experience that an individual has. Already a popular process 
in schools, a circle-time structure can be used to air a problem or issue with a group of pupils 
while providing everyone within a community the opportunity to speak (Moseley, 1996). As I 
stated earlier, the circle approach has a long history with community wrongdoing. In schools, 
the popularity of circles lies in the power to give voice, to build trust and mutual 
understanding, and to perpetuate a sense of shared values with even the most diffident 
students (Costello et al., 2010). As facilitators of the circle, teachers looking to deal with 
ongoing problems use circles to foster a sense of responsibility, to build social cohesion, and to 
humanise themselves as members of the extended community. For more serious wrongdoing, 
applications include ‘mediation’ and ‘restorative conferencing’ (Thorsborne et al., 2019; 
Claassen and Claassen, 2015; Hopkins, 2015). Similar to the justice system, the person who has 
committed wrongdoing hears directly from those people they have affected. Unlike circles, 
conferences are not routine in their implementation requiring a trained facilitator and a series 
of scripted questions to guide participants in their thinking about the wrongdoing (Wachtel et 
al., 2010). 
However, the most informal response to wrongdoing is the implementation of dialogic 
practices known as restorative enquiries (Hopkins, 2004). This may be an informal process 
between teacher and pupil, a restorative chat, characterised by the use of ‘affective language’ 
defined as ‘personal expressions of feeling in response to specific positive or negative 
behaviors of others’ (IIRP, 2010) and which is ‘underpinned by values that place the 
relationship at the heart of problem-solving’ (Thorsborne and Blood, 2013, p. 41). Built upon 
establishing a connection with pupils, affective language is typified by developing a type of 
address that ‘separates the evaluation of a person’s behaviour from the evaluation of the self’ 
(George, 2014, p. 229). Also known as ‘I statements’, they are used in the beginning of non-
threatening, non-blaming conversations that ‘are respectful but emotive ways of letting others 





affective language often follows a formula such as: I feel [state the emotion] when [this 
happened] because [state the reason]. Below is an example: 
While you guys might not like my English class, I work very hard to make this 
interesting. I don’t think it’s fair for you to say that assignments are ‘stupid’ 
without even giving them a chance and it hurts my feelings. I’d like you to make a 
commitment to not do that anymore (Wachtel, 2017, p. 152).  
Restorative practitioners state that the versatility of affective statements (and affective 
questions) mean they can be taught to be used both positively (I’m really pleased with how 
quietly we are all working today) and negatively (I’m disappointed that some of us are calling 
out). Moreover, many practitioners find it an effective way to teach children how to express 
difficult emotion in a respectful way. The cumulative cultural impact of improving dialogue, 
with the use of affective language, is stated to create a ‘restorative milieu’ (Hopkins, 2004, p. 
170) an environment that consistently deals with misbehaviour by fostering awareness, 
empathy and responsibility. As in the justice system, it follows a clear order which with the 
help of facilitators work with participants to find an outcome that will resolve the conflict.  
Nevertheless, a focus on building relationships through the development of interpersonal 
skills, means that establishing dialogue has the potential to move beyond the ‘righting of a 
wrong’, to building social capital in the form of increasing social understanding, and empathy 
amongst participants. Instead of ‘lecturing, scolding, threatening or handing out detentions, 
suspensions and expulsions’ (McCold and Wachtel, 2001a, p. 126), having a restorative 
conversation asks that participants engage with four key principles: these are connectedness, 
caring, value, and belief (Thorsborne and Blood, 2013). The table below shows an example of 










Table 1 Four guiding principles in restorative conversations (adapted from Thorsborne and 
Blood, 2013, p. 41) 
Statement Key Principle 
Hi Joe, nice to see you. How are you going 
today? Could we have a chat about your 
uniform? 
Connectedness (to the individual) 
 
I don’t want you to be cold, but is there 
another way you could keep warm? How 
about wearing something underneath your 
school jumper that doesn’t show? 
Caring (about their issues) 
 
Wearing the uniform is about belonging and 
you belong here, so it is important that you 
wear it in a way that shows that. 
Value (their presence in community) 
 
I know you are clever enough to keep the 
small things small. Have a great day. 
Belief (that they can be better) 
 
 
Many schools have established codes of conduct and behaviour management practices that 
teach the values around behaviour by default. In restorative schools, however, the use of 
restorative conversation with pupils can ‘incorporate reintegrative and transformative 
interventions in the classroom’ (Thorsborne and Vinegrad, 2008, p. 52). Let me now turn to 
how the potential to achieve these outcomes can be perceived as problematic. 
2.2.6 Problems of Implementation  
Implementation of restorative practices has been considered a challenge with a ‘one size fits 
all’ model representing the kind of pre-packaged approach to behaviour management that 
teachers are quick to dismiss (Şahin-Sak, et al., 2018). As such, there are concerns within the 
restorative researcher community that, despite the best intentions of schools, restorative 
practice poses possible negative effects for pupils, particularly victimised pupils. If the needs of 
the victimised pupil are not prioritised, then there is the risk of secondary victimisation, 
meaning victims of harm will understandably have concerns over being in the same room as 





restorative intervention (Hopkins, 2004). These wronged pupils, injured by conflict, are doubly 
victimised as ‘pawns in a process’ (p. 105), put at further risk for the ‘higher good’ (p. 105) of 
diverting offending pupils. Additionally, researchers warn that there is an unfair expectation 
that pupils will be linguistically and cognitively adept at engaging in the kinds of discursive 
encounters expected from such interventions. A ‘moral exercise’ (Hayes, 2006) in admitting 
guilt and responsibility, young people with ‘inadequate verbal toolkits’ (Snow, 2013, p. 20) are 
at a disadvantage since they cannot verbally repair the damage caused by their actions, nor 
understand what they are being told. 
Hence for restorative practice to be indeed restorative, it must prioritise both the needs of the 
victim and the needs of the offender above that of the school (Snow and Sanger, 2011). This 
considerable commitment to extra focussed time for pupils represents ‘a considerable 
commitment in time, resources, and energy from a significant proportion of the staff’ (Kaveney 
and Drewery, 2011, p. 11). Not only does the implementation of restorative interventions 
require additional time taken from the teaching day, estimated time scales for embedding a 
restorative culture range from 3-5 years to 5-10 years. As is the case with such interpretations 
of restorative terms, there is lingering fear that restorative practices are a deliberate attempt 
to erode teacher agency (Harford, 2018). There is complaint of feeling disempowered by an 
approach that signals to pupils that teachers are considered equally culpable in an incident. 
While fear that restorative practice is fuelling bad behaviour in schools leads to the opinion 
that while a restorative policy may be fine in theory, an equitable approach to discipline means 
‘some schools are interpreting restorative justice as merely having a conversation with a pupil 
about the incident, without any sanctions being applied’ (Turner, 2019). For many teachers 
used to looking for and dispensing justice more traditionally, a practice that allows a pupil to 
benefit from such a hearing just seems wrong.  
The reality is that for many schools a rigid, punitive behaviour system is the quickest route to a 
highly controlled atmosphere. The perceived ‘wrongness’ of restorative practice is due to a 
legacy of punishment, increased systems of surveillance, and zero-tolerance approaches to 
indiscipline that have contributed to schools becoming inexorably more risk averse 
(McCluskey, 2018). For overworked and underpaid teachers, a restorative approach 
complicates issues of behaviour management (Alvis, 2015). Examining this further, White 
(2016) singles out the lack of extended training around what restorative practice actually is: 
[…] teachers cannot recall being asked how they would feel adopting it in their 





contrary, teachers were provided with an RP manual, a few trainings and from 
then were expected to begin driving these practices on top of their already hectic 
jobs (White, 2016, p. 17). 
This has led many teachers to limit their acceptance of restorative practice to high tariff 
offences to the pluck-and-choose model (Sawatsky, 2009)17 with schools viewing restorative 
practice as ‘just one more tool in the tool box; another strategy for schools to use when 
necessary’ (Kane et al., 2008, p. 97). Practice, in this instance, can be isolated to small pockets, 
such as a behaviour unit, or of a low key, preventative approach where restorative practices 
become integrated with existing behaviour management models that include traditional 
punitive measures. In these cases, the decision to use a restorative approach is dependent on 
the style of the teacher, their teaching philosophy and ‘what works’. A continuing commitment 
to the use of punitive sanctions and a concern about RA being ‘too soft’ means that even in 
schools that welcome the use of restorative practice teachers persist in ‘a strong and rooted 
commitment to punishment as a proper response to wrongdoing’ (McCluskey et al., 2011, p. 
113).  
It is easy to comprehend how a culture of high stakes accountability leads to obvious forms of 
power and intimidation which can easily overrun the reparative potential of restorative 
practices. However, Lustick’s (2017a) equating of restorative ideas on accountability with the 
concept of the panopticon suggests more subtle forms of power play. Through a Foucauldian 
lens, the famous prison model is used to suggest that the restorative conference is not 
relinquishment of power, but a distribution of that power among all participants, the result of 
which is the exertion of continuous subtle forms of surveillance. Lustick points out that in 
restorative terminology, pupils are only allowed to return to the classroom once they have 
entered restorative practice with those they have harmed. Therefore, it is only through 
participation in the panopticon of the restorative school that re-entry can take place. For 
marginalised pupils typically dominated by punitive policies, lack of agency coupled with 
additional surveillance technologies means ‘more opportunities to be controlled and 
discriminated against, this time in the guise of democracy and social justice’ (p. 306). 
 
17 In his study of the application of healing justice in three traditional communities, Sawatsky (2009) 
describes two modes of transformation: the pluck-and-choose model and the wholesale conversion (pp. 
247–248). In pluck-and-choose, I simply pick whatever is desired from a practice to suit my needs. 
Notably, this avoids calls for structural change or changes of heart. In contrast, wholesale conversion 





Transforming the mindset associated with traditional discipline is critical to attaining a 
restorative culture. One of challenges significant to its achievement is in re-thinking 
terminology surrounding the practice insofar as it carries linguistic power over the positioning 
of participants. I have stated before how the use of the term ‘justice’ has been questioned 
over its appropriateness, yet in the professional and academic literature, professional terms 
taken from the judicial system endure. Use of terms such as statements, witnesses, and 
testimony, drawn from the legal world, help to technologise restorative conferences in ways 
which make them appear consistent, rational and, crucially for schools, a legitimate approach 
to behaviour management.18 The continued use of use of labels such as ‘conference’ or 
‘conferencing’- formal meetings for consultation – are peculiarly business-like in their 
intention, carrying the gravitas of that mature arena, and adding to an impression of 
proficiency and security. Other expressions like ‘practitioner’ give the impression of someone 
involved in a highly skilled job (the Cambridge Dictionary suggest a medical practitioner),19 
while a ‘facilitator’ points towards someone involved in a business organisation. In very many 
schools the phrase ‘restorative practice’ is reduced to the more memorable acronym, ‘RP’. In 
contrast to the effect of using more judicial language, the use of RP removes its more 
corporate image, making the practice seem user-friendly, and straightforward. In a study 
exploring the perceptions and experiences of UK secondary school pupils towards restorative 
interventions, ‘pupils are aware of the terminology “RPs” and know what to expect when it 
comes to the process’ (Cooper-Johal, 2016. p. 75).20 However, as I have explored, notions of 
‘restorative justice and restorative practice’ encompass a very broad range of practices. 
Together with problems of terminology relating to ‘restorativeness’ (Bolitho, 2012, p. 62), 
critics state that teachers have very little real understanding of what counts as restorative 
practice. 
 
18 The term ‘technoligization of discourse’ has been used to talk about the way in which discursive 
practices are intentionally shifted to engineer social change (Fairclough, 1995). 
19 Definition taken from the Cambridge Dictionary website [Online]. Available at: 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/practitioner (accessed 31/07/18). 
20 Acronyms are often used as a way of making businesses, or brands, easier to remember, such as IBM 
(international Business machines) or BT (British Telecom). Acronyms can also be used to distance a 
brand from its tainted image, for example, Le Crédit Lyonnais was rebranded LCL following financial 
scandal. In most cases, the abbreviating of a company’s name is done by the general population long 
before the rebrand takes place. Particularly, where the brand appears frequently in daily life, and most 
importantly in homes like KFC. This can serve to make the brand seem friendly and approachable, even 
part of the family (Morse, 2010). A notion that BT took advantage of with its iconic ‘friends and family’ 





2.2.7 Implications for Ethical Relationships 
How does restorative practice counteract these claims? Despite the rise of psychological 
theory to explain how restorative practice works, and how effective it is, proponents agree 
that there is further work to be done in understanding its value for schools (Vaandering, 2011). 
A common answer is to increase the number of rigorous evaluations surrounding the 
effectiveness of restorative practice (González et al., 2019; Moir and Macleod, 2018; Shaw and 
Wieranga, 2002). It is a tactic that makes sense since teachers appear to be asking what 
restorative practice looks, feels, and sounds like, in a school. This is hardly surprising: 
proponents state that attempting to describe the restorative experience ‘is as elusive as 
explaining the organic, sacred process of growth that occurs within a seed when given 
optimum soil, water, light and warmth’ (Vaandering, 2014, p. 509). While I am fully supportive 
that teachers should be responsible for what they do, looking for accountability and standards 
in such a necessarily uncertain practice tends to develop and enforce what Gavrielides (2008) 
describes as conceptual fault-lines. These fault-lines describe existing tensions between 
abolitionist or pragmatic visions of restorative justice, in other words, theoretical and practical, 
that result in restorative justice being described as ambiguous and inconsistent.  
Shifting the idea to schools, Vaandering (2011, p. 312) discusses how a conception of fault-
lines is responsible for identified inconsistency and confusion associated with restorative 
practice in an educative context. There are those that see restorative practice as a completely 
new approach to educative practice, a new paradigm that replaces all previous adversarial 
approaches. Equally, there is the practical approach that sees restorative practice existing in 
parallel with punitive codes of practice. There is disagreement about whether restorative 
practice is seen as a process or as an outcome. Some see restorative practice as only 
concerning individuals involved, others as a community approach that supports and 
encourages participants. Yet shifting to a restorative and relational framework that is capable 
of a behavioural culture change at all levels of the school community requires more than 
careful attention to the evaluation of individual practices. At a fundamental level, it has to be 
able to reconceive ideas of relationality, transformation and justice. This requires a deeper 
exploration than simply establishing the architecture of school-based restorative practice. 
Rather, it requires a move away from examining the degree to which restorative practice is 
effective, towards whether it is in fact ethical.  
I am not alone in perceiving that there is an inherent ethical knowledge to be gained through 
restorative practices. From the very beginning, proponents of restorative practice have been 





make a substantial contribution to thinking about conflict in schools and help to promote 
social justice in education’ (McCluskey et al., 2008b, p. 199). This is further represented in the 
values of restorative dialogical practices which consist in a set of core ethical principles 
mentioned above: connectedness, caring, value, and belief. In this respect, restorative practice 
reflects my earlier discussion on an ethics of teaching; that it is through language – words, 
actions, and attitudes – that restorative practice reflects a teacher’s knowledge of both what is 
ethically important as a part of their professional practice, what they want their pupils to 
achieve related to principles of right or wrong, and how they can facilitate this learning. As I 
noted earlier, Character Education suffers from the idea that while children may know the 
right answer, they may not have any intention, desire, or capacity to develop that virtue 
themselves. As such there is a danger that restorative practice too ‘goes through the motions’ 
in that pupils may have command of the language but no real developing ethical capacity. In 
this sense, the guiding principles of restorative conversations, for example, risks being less an 
embedded ethical alignment, and more a type of charter mark or standards agenda to which 
one can apply a tick box approach. As such, questions that once revolved around what works 
now hint at something richer. Revolving around language (why should facilitators be wary of 
how language used during a restorative conference affects the process of the conference), 
relation (how can we make it possible for people from such opposing starting points to 
consider how we can be made better) and social transformation (what are those broader goals 
associated with producing a more civil society) they suggest that for restorative practice to 
connect, and make sense to teachers, the primary purpose of further enquiry must be centred 
not only on what kind of on-going education becomes evident in the embedding of restorative 
practices, but importantly, what is ethical about doing so.  
My general purpose, here, in highlighting the significance of the ethical, when considering 
what must be important to researchers of restorative practice, is to draw attention to how 
context, power, and authority, affect expectations of human relationality. In the following 
chapters, I shall show that the dialogical, transformational, and relational aspects of being 
human is the bedrock of certain kinds of philosophical thinking. While researchers within the 
social sciences must necessarily start with philosophical questions, it is the way in which 
educational philosophy pursues this questions that is at once very different, and not as clear-
cut  - as a close look at the following quote (taken from the opening chapter of a book 





Working restoratively is about ways of being and doing […] if we live together in a 
learning community, our behaviours and relationships must reflect a deep 
knowledge and understanding of what it takes to be in cooperative relationships 
and to work within the boundaries that provide safety for all (Thorsborne and 
Blood, 2013, p. 31). 
There is more than a hint here of the themes present in continental philosophy. Unlike the 
analytic tradition, continental philosophy favours human experience over logic through 
language in order to answer important human questions, primarily the problem of existence. 
This is an understanding that it is quite hard to be a human being and that we are aware of 
this. This is not to look at the problem of existence theoretically ‘who am I’ or ‘what do you 
mean to me’, to be solved like a maths problem, but to have a first-person involvement in the 
matter.  
That there is something profoundly philosophical about restorative practices that keeps being 
missed, and whether such thinking is useful to those who are interested in ideas of ethical 
relation and behaviour management practices, in a way that addresses the failures of 
implementation, guides my discussion through the remaining chapters. While the empirical 
literature is extensive, the underlying questions arising from such research cannot be 
addressed empirically. Indeed, research of this kind, of conceptual clarification, of justification, 
and of value, are said to be the bedrock of philosophical study in that philosophers are 
interested in ‘basic ideas or concepts (including knowledge, understanding, truth and 
goodness), and how they relate to each other’ (Standish, 2010, p. 7). The purpose of 
conducting this kind of scholarship, with these types of questions in mind, is not to construct 
another stratagem, or find what is effective. It is to bring to the forefront: what matters most, 
and why. This endeavour is referred to as bringing ‘clarity to thought’ (ibid.). This is less an 
answer to what is going on now, rather a turn towards building ‘a sense of how they ought to 
be’ (ibid.).  
My turn to educational philosophy, 21 therefore, is not to find what works, but what is most 
desirable. Without this recognition, research into restorative practice becomes detached from 
any ethical perspective, leaving no set of value or ideals with which to critically engage with 
agencies who may ‘seek to use “education” for their own material or political ends’ (Biesta, 
 
21 Fulford and Hodgson (2016) make a distinction between research in philosophy of education, and 
educational philosophy. The former being research about education, and its processes, the latter 





2007, p. 21). It is this that will ultimately strengthen restorative practices, fortifying its aims 
within a ‘democratic quality of society’ (ibid.). It follows that if I am to address these concerns 
in a helpful way I need to attend to philosophy, and philosophical writing that does not 
perceive of restorative practices as exclusively redemptive but as an engagement that seeks to 
problematise, even disrupt entirely, what is seen as the purpose of such aims. In the next 
chapter, I argue that it is only through non-empirical methods of reading, writing and thinking 
that I can genuinely afford a rethinking of the dominant performative rhetoric and that will 






Chapter 3  
In Place of Methodology 
3.1 What is a Philosophical ‘Method’?  
In the previous chapter I aimed to summarise the origins of restorative practice in schools, its 
distinguishing principles, and practices. In describing its rise as an alternative to traditional 
forms of behaviour management, or as a pedagogy, I established that in addition to its warm 
welcome, theorists and practitioners consider the implementation of restorative practice to be 
a challenging process. Recent attempts to address the tensions within restorative practice 
have focussed on broadening its theoretical base, reframing its purpose as contesting 
authoritative, hierarchical, school cultures. I believe that restorative practice, as it relies on a 
relationship-based, dialogic framework, is rich with educational and ethical, possibility. In this 
chapter I want to introduce how significant philosophical works can bring to the foreground a 
clearer, ethical, understanding of restorative practice – as it concerns the key restorative 
concepts of dialogue, self-transformation, and interpersonal relation – that will help to clarify 
its critique as a ‘soft option’ for teachers. The way in which I will begin to examine what is 
ethical about restorative practice invites a richer conception of language, encompassing an 
ethics of responsibility, and the sense of oneself as a moral agent that is present in ordinary 
language philosophy. Before I turn to this, I ask: how does presenting this kind of philosophical 
framework, to be detailed in the latter half of this chapter, allow for an ethical methodological 
alternative in the current culture of high-stakes accountability? 
3.1.1 Problems of ‘A Standard Pattern’ 
Thus far in this thesis, I have followed what might be considered a fairly ‘standard pattern’ 
(Standish, 2010, p.10) to the production of research by discussing the origins of restorative 
practice and providing a review of pertinent literature relating to its place in schools. As I have 
stated, I will not be going on to discuss possible research methods, nor to collect data that 
might expand the evidence-base of restorative practice research. While not all evidence-based 
research is hypothesis testing (some interpretive forms of research, such as narrative research, 
adopt a more inductive, non-hypothesis-testing approach), the particular modus operandi, 
perceived in much of the literature that I have acknowledged in the previous chapters, is an 
approach rooted in the epistemological tradition of empiricism (Cohen, 2018). Based on 





phenomena, an empirical method would state that there must exist a particular 
methodological expertise that is required to analyse that data, to produce codes and 
transcripts with which to analyse content, and therein to draw up a particular theory for this 
type of discourse.  
Good practice, informed by a comprehensive evidence-base, lies behind the notion of 
professional responsibility that constitutes the current code of conduct for teachers in England 
(Smeyers and Smith, 2014). Notions of measurement, evidence gathering, and accountability 
are also replicated in the field of educational research where a focus on ‘rigorous experiments 
evaluating replicable programs and practice [is considered] essential to build confidence in 
educational research among policy makers and educators (Slavin, 2002, p. 15).22 None of this 
is to deny the use of scientific, empirical literature or the use of data in educational research. 
This is truly needed to provide guidance over ways of working out strategies that are valuable 
for school communities. Moreover, schools do indeed require data to demonstrate a measure 
of effectiveness that satisfies the need for accountability. However, it is argued that there 
exists too great a focus on ‘what works’ (Biesta 2007) at the expense of what is moral and 
ethical (Pring, 2005; Carr, 2000). For instance, Jenny Ozga (2017) states that while quantifiable 
indicators will assume greater importance and significance, due to their straightforwardness, 
they are inadequate for describing real-world complexity, and give a distorted picture of 
children’s learning. Others go further in damning the supposed straightforwardness that a 
performance culture brings to educational research, equating its reduction to a normative 
process that ‘obscures differences, requiring everything to be commensurable with everything 
else’ (Smeyers, 2013, p. 2). The point to be made here, in my attention to the classroom, is 
how educational practice and educational research have both become somehow performative, 
and in doing so, have severely limited the opportunities for practitioners to make their own 
judgements over what might be considered worthwhile. Failure to consider what is ethical is 
especially pertinent for research into restorative practice where data-driven research, to find 
what works, inevitably limits this to what is most effective. This idea lies behind understanding 
the source of confusion behind restorative practice’s failures of implementation and 
 
22 For instance, I earlier stated that in assessing the value of embedding restorative practice, Barnet 
Youth Offending Services (2008) concluded that, despite the emergence of positive outcomes, more 
reliable measures of assessing the relevant information should be introduced in order to understand the 
extent to which the educational body’s aims and objectives have been achieved. The report’s language 
of criteria, and checklists of effectiveness, service and satisfaction, together with its recommendation 
for a more standardised measures for quantitative analysis, are indicators of how investment in 





engagement, and which is explained as ‘the continuing dilemma of changing school practice’ 
(Shaw, 2007, p. 134).  
3.1.2 Problems of Ethical Knowledge 
I do not wish to suggest that ethical knowledge should be left to chance, nor that it should be 
the sole preserve of those undergoing professional, reflective practice (Finefter-Rosenbluh, 
2016). Therefore, before I outline the philosophy that will allow those engaged in restorative 
practice to make these kinds of judgements, I want to address the notion that there is nothing 
problematic about thinking of ‘a philosophical method’, or of the introduction of this chapter 
as being ‘in place of methodology’. I have used both phrases to signal an already existing 
tension around what educational philosophy is, what philosophers of education do, and 
whether they can answer queries about ‘method’ like their counterparts in social science 
(Fulford and Hodgson, 2016; Ruitenberg, 2009; Standish, 2009). My discussion of empirical 
research is not to create a ‘false dualism’ (Pring, 2000, p. 247) between modes of research but 
to recap the main points from my first two chapters. That is to say, the performative 
discourses used to frame both restorative practices, and its influencing methodologies, can be 
taken in a very particular way, and that a philosophical method entails a broader conception of 
both education and educational research that is not limited to ‘what teachers should know, to 
what they should be able to do, and potentially even how they should be’ (Biesta, 2015, p. 3 
italics authors own). In this regard, the idea of a philosophical ‘method’ represents a more 
holistically professional outlook rather than the idea captured by evidence-based approaches 
that restorative practice consists of ‘a set of skills to be picked up “on the shop floor”’ (p. 4). 
A second major problem is that in framing my philosophical argument within what is ethical, I 
am in danger of overlaying restorative practice with an existing moral or ideal theory in a way 
that replicates precisely the instrumentalism that I am seeking to critique. This is because, 
firstly, these types of theories have been developed to affect very different levels of, and 
contexts for, such decision-making, and secondly, that ‘top-down applications of monological 
ethical theories are incompatible with many human beings’ moral psychology’ (Levinson, 2015, 
p. 18). This is why I wish to suggest that while turning to philosophy may be a necessary 
condition of finding what is ethical in restorative practice, it still requires ‘judgement about 
what an educationally desirable course of action requires’ (Biesta, 2015, p. 5). Levinson’s 
description of phronetic equilibrium as reasoning that flows from contextual knowledge and 





of describing the way in which being ethical requires situational thinking (what course of 
action is required for these students at this time) rather than universal, reasoning.  
What kind of judgement do we need in a philosophical method? A succinct way to describe 
this is to consider how the philosopher, Martin Buber, can be drawn on to describe the way 
researchers, and teachers, can make a situated judgement about what is educationally 
desirable:  
I consider a tree. 
I can look upon it as a picture: stiff column in a shock of light, or splash of green 
shot with the delicate blue and silver of the background. 
I can perceive it as movement: flowing veins on clinging, pressing pith, suck of 
roots, breathing of the leaves, ceaseless commerce with earth and air – and the 
obscure growth itself. 
I can classify it as a species and study it as a type in its structure and mode of life. 
I can subdue its actual presence and form so sternly that I recognise it only as an 
expression of law – of the laws in accordance with which a constant opposition of 
forces is continually adjusted, or of those in accordance with which the 
component substances mingle and separate. 
I can dissipate it and perpetuate it in number, in pure numerical relation. 
It can, however, also come about, if I have both will and grace, that in considering 
the tree I become bound up in relation to it. The tree is no longer It. I have been 
seized by the power of exclusiveness (Buber, 2013, p. 6). 
Here, Buber attempts to describe both ‘experience’ and ‘encounter’ with the tree. Through 
‘experience’ the tree (our data), is put to some purpose, it is analysed, classified, and theorised 
about. Through these processes of research, and education, we capture ‘the language of 
learning’ (Biesta, 2004), popular today as a process that helps children to learn particular 
things in particular ways. Nevertheless, in the quotation’s final lines, we are introduced to the 
notion that it is through encounter or ‘relation’ with her subject, that the old, familiar mode of 
purpose is disrupted. In this way, Buber articulates the vital, yet sometimes overlooked notion 
that the purpose of an activity does not operate solely on the acquisition of technical systems, 
an ‘impoverished way of talking about and understanding education’ (Pring, 2005, p. 205), but 
is actually constituted by that purpose. As I mentioned in relation to Character Education, 
Aristotle (1999) called this latter act phronesis, or, practical wisdom, defined as ‘a mode of 





2000, p. 138) in order to reach the ‘good’ that is constitutive of a morally worthwhile form of 
human life’ (ibid.). What emerges from the literature on ethics in teaching is how current, 
dominant educational discourses have greatly reduced the element of phronesis from the 
method and practice of teaching. If we think again about education’s emphasis on qualification 
or performance, we narrow its purpose before we have even begun our engagement. In doing 
so, education is a teleological practice, a practice that is confirmed by its end. 
My third problem is that in writing of a sense of purpose in educational research I appear to 
have drifted back to tensions in education. This is not entirely accidental since questions of 
what is needed in education have profound implications for what is needed in educational 
research. Let me explain this further. Regarding the ‘forms of educational action’, (Biesta, 
2015, p. 7), education differs from other fields in that that is always an internal relationship 
between means and ends. While I may judge, at the outset, the information that is required to 
pursue my question, the question of what we seek to achieve returns again and again. This 
judgement is not only what is required of ethical teaching but equally disrupts both the 
conduct of the research and the phase of writing it up (Fulford and Hodgson, 2016). Although 
both are part of the philosopher’s method – I could not have written the preceding chapters 
without these modes – Fulford and Hodgson describe the philosopher’s use of literature, and 
its greater depth of reading it demands, as enabling the potential to form the nature of the 
question (p. 146). In its place, part of the method forming the nature of philosophical research 
is the notion of writing-as-research, and reading-as-research; both of which have as their 
starting point ‘an educational concern that is pursued and analysed through the very act of 
reading and writing philosophically about it’ (p. 152). In other words, there is no division 
between the conduct of philosophical research and its writing up; indeed, we [philosophers] 
read to inform, and we write to work it out (p. 151). Unlike the researcher who identifies a 
philosophical tradition (such as constructivism, or positivism) and then proceeds with her 
method, the philosopher must ‘view philosophy’s place as integral to the research as she 
proceeds’ (p. 37). The future of her research is thus, not settled, but open to flux as she moves 
through the points of her scholarship. In other words, philosophers of education often don’t 
know what they think until after they have written it (Standish, 2010). Both reading and 
writing become the means by which the philosophic thinking is done.  
Little wonder the question of method in philosophy is ‘a vexed one’ (Standish, 2009, p. 315), 
stoking anxieties over its actual and perceived relevance (Biesta, 2010). The challenge then, is 
to attempt to describe, as Claudia Ruitenberg (2009) avers, ‘the various ways and modes in 





systematic, purposeful and responsive’ (p. 316). What is clear, in this, is that my philosophical 
method must be shaped not only by the questions, or themes, guiding the research but 
ongoing engagement with the literature, call it a dialogue, as it proceeds to evolve. The idea of 
dialogue is an important one, drawing attention to a further dimension of educational 
philosophy that is less tangible, and not limited to the production of text. This is the suggestion 
that ‘the academic article is not only a contribution to knowledge but to a public conversation’ 
(Fulford and Hodgson, 2016, p. 162). Encompassed within this idea is the ancient 
understanding of philosophy ‘as a matter for dialogue or conversation’ (Smith, 2009, p. 438). It 
is through the manner of continuing conversation that the protagonists of the dialogues of 
Plato (or the Socratic dialogues, as they are also known) try to find out more about moral 
issues. This is not with the eventual aim of solving the problem; Smith (2009) cautions us 
against the expectation of a ‘record of philosophical achievement’ (p. 438). Rather, dialogue 
itself is to be regarded as an enterprise that is ‘generally educative [and] educative for the 
particular quasi-embodied people involved’ (ibid.). For Socrates ‘as he appears in Plato’s 
dialogues, the process of discussion is essential for preparing human beings to lead a moral 
life’ (Rembert, 1995, p. 97). In considering Smith’s (2009) written, classroom-based dialogues, 
or, what is shown by the self-reflecting dialogue that philosophers engage in when asked to 
think about how they do philosophy,23  further emphasis is given to the impression that ‘there 
is no readily discernible ‘method’ [for educational philosophy]: it goes where it goes’ (p. 438).  
But what is it that philosophers do? If I am not conducting experiments, interviewing 
participants or handing out questionnaires, then where does my ‘data’ come from? To answer 
this, I need to think carefully about what counts as reading, and what counts as writing. Critical 
of the usual standard approaches that treat reading as solely effective, efficient, and selective 
(I am thinking here about the ‘reading for speed’ course that I took early in my research) and, 
writing as merely concluding, reporting, or writing-up, my philosophical ‘data’ consists in 
literature and relevant artistic works such as art, film and music. This thesis, therefore, makes 
use of these different types of textual pieces. As for what sorts of texts might be taken as 
suitable for determining the size and shape of my response to the questions posed by 
restorative practice, then I must follow the maxim that ‘a measure of the quality of a new text 
is the quality of the texts it arouses’ (Cavell, 1979b, p. 5). Therefore, let me return to my 
 
23 Fulford and Hodgson asked contributors to their book to analyse their practices of reading, and 





identified key themes, and the kinds of philosophical works that have the potential to re-think 
what is understood as restorative practice. 
3.2 My Philosophical Method 
3.2.1 Dialogue 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the compelling presence of critical thinking about voice in 
restorative practice, as it pertains to issues of power and coercion, indicates a strong 
understanding of the need to take account of the problem raised by language. As a concern 
with voice and language is central to failures associated with implementation, it is central to 
this thesis. Briefly, pupil voice, defined as ‘every way in which pupils are allowed or 
encouraged to voice their views or preferences’ (Cheminais, 2008, p. 6), is rooted in the 
development of Article 12 and 13 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(United Nations, 1989), who provided the initial justification that taking notice of pupil voice 
was fundamental to anyone working with young people and children. The act of listening to 
the views of pupils, with the aim of their becoming co-participants with adults in transforming 
the school, and its community, has led to the identification of three categories of pupil voice 
activities. These are those systems that allow pupils to articulate their views (school council), 
those activities that encourage pupils to show leadership (leading a learning walk), and those 
that offer peer support (circle time, buddying and mentoring).  
Nevertheless, pupil voice has suffered from accusations of ‘manipulation, decoration and 
tokenism’ (Whitty and Wisby, 2007, p. 306). Driven by a quasi-consumerist environment, the 
coalescence of pupil voice, with satisfaction, has driven criticism of pupil voice as less a 
conversation around student experience and more a tick box approach to measurement (Hall, 
2017). Outside of behaviour initiatives, schools too have often found that pupil voice can be 
often misappropriated or misaligned. Researchers sometimes find little evidence that these 
acts of pupil participation or evaluation lead to any significant changes in the teaching 
practices of educators, particularly when they work against traditional teacher-pupil relations 
or where they do not fit within the dictates of school improvement (Keddie, 2015). The 
emphasis on giving voice to pupils, which then becomes tokenistic, is a common accusation 
levelled at schools (Standish, 2004; Hatton, 2014; Blair and Valdez, 2014). And while 
opportunities for hearing pupil voice have increased in volume, so has concern that what 
pupils have to say about teaching and learning may be feared as personally challenging or as 





The centrality of dialogue in restorative practice, as well as the concerns that characterise 
matters of voice, encompassing both its use of specific vocabulary, formal and informal 
structures, means that an attention to language and the ethical importance of doing so 
permeates this thesis. I begin in Chapter 4 by exploring the phenomena of scripted restorative 
practices. I do so by offering a critique of practitioners’ use of scripts, a resource that is used to 
facilitate the restorative conferences ensuring its smooth running and commitment to 
restorative thinking. The pertinence of this has led me to bring the work of the American 
philosopher Stanley Cavell and his inheritance of the work of John Langshaw Austen (1975), 
turning to Cavell’s critique of Austin’s theory of the performative utterance to draw attention 
to what happens when language is so heavily systemised that it becomes a performance.  
Ordinary language philosophy provides me with a way to understand how an understanding of 
how we use language highlights restorative practice’s ‘non-ordinary’ or ‘ideal’ use of language. 
Cavell’s engagement with ordinary language philosophy sees traditional philosophical 
problems as rooted in misunderstandings philosophers develop by distorting or forgetting 
what words actually mean in everyday use. In this, language is professed to go on holiday 
(Wittgenstein, 2009). A set of circumstances that leads to ‘a state of inexpressibility, of words 
not matching our needs’ (Cavell, 2005a, p. 220). Feeling that this was problematic, ‘what we 
ordinarily say and mean may have a direct and deep control over what we can philosophically 
say and mean’ (Cavell, 2002), Cavell’s first philosophical works were an attempt to make 
central again language’s ‘apparent vagueness, imprecision [and] superstition’ (Cavell, 2005a, p. 
8). This involves returning words from their metaphysical to their ordinary use and a proper 
appreciation of the things we do with language. Ordinary language philosophy’s careful 
attention to human expression shows us how language can be seen ‘as an ancient city’ 
(Wittgenstein, 2009, §18); multiform and sprawling, the functioning of words is not static, but 
varied and dynamic. The ordinary is not merely a subset of what we say and do, it is what we 
say and do. Cavell’s attention is towards reclaiming the use of everyday language that resists 
carefully set out definitions but reflects our basic human self. Drawing on Cavell’s (2005a) 
writing on performative and passionate utterance, I argue that it is only through making room 
for negative emotion, or silence, that we can see an opening up of the possibilities present in 
restorative practice 
In associating Cavell with the term ‘education’, it must be said that Cavell does not directly 
address the problems of the education system or schooling, nor generates ‘anything like an 
“educational theory” (Saito and Standish, 2012, p. 2). Nevertheless, Cavell’s consideration of 





concerned with interest in one’s experience expressed as a willingness to find words for it. In 
this regard, Cavell’s ‘educative’ work is to bring a broader sense of what is restorative to 
school-based restorative practice that moves it away from a prescribed list of standards and 
towards a deeper sense of what is ethical about doing so. The centrality of language is not only 
evidenced by the prominence of ordinary language philosophy, but the method with which it is 
interrogated. While the scenes of restorative dialogue used to frame each chapter are 
fictions,24 each scenario describes a stage of the restorative conference that not only 
introduces the chapter, it sustains its argument by providing a problematising for how 
structured dialogue, between two parties makes it possible for those from opposing starting 
points to consider the means by which conflict can be resolved. Cavell’s thoughts on scepticism 
and Shakespeare’s King Lear (Halio, 2005), as well as the importance of improvisation, 
manifest an ethical concern with the ordinary that highlights how finding the right words for 
oneself is more than simply a matter of taking those of another. 
3.2.2 Self-transformation 
Literature in school-based restorative practice often remarks on transformation as it pertains 
to whole school cultures. Nevertheless, it cannot be overstated that restorative practice is for 
most teachers a way of bringing about real changes to disruptive pupil behaviour. For this 
reason, in Chapter 5, I explore the significance of telling one’s story, one of the hallmarks of 
restorative practice’s ability to allow pupils to reflect on their behaviour, to empathise and to 
take responsibility for their actions. Our own story is said to be part of our holistic life 
narrative, one that changes with time and experience. My argument explores the 
requirements that are needed for story to effectively address the past, and that when told and 
listened to, become acts self-transformation. From an ethical perspective there appears to be 
little amiss with this reasoning. However, as the previous chapter explains, a rounded, ethical, 
examination of what is meant by freedom in voice means more than conforming to accepted 
practices, but of disrupting thinking that surrounds them. 
To lay this foundation, I want to present a somewhat different, disruptive idea of what it 
means to tell one’s story. This is one that leans away from therapeutic conceptions of what 
story achieves – towards reframing story as a destabilising, somewhat alien encounter with 
one’s self. The ‘method’ by which this is realised disrupts accepted thinking around what 
 
24 While imaginary, the script for the scenario is based on a number of sources consisting in real 
published exemplar scripts for schools (Thorsborne and Vinegrad, 2008), filmed examples of restorative 





philosophical writing looks like, drawing on Cavell’s notion of ‘philosophy as autobiography’ 
(Saito, 2009). This different account to writing about oneself opposes ‘the performativity of 
disclosing one’s self […] where ‘language is trapped in the narrow and fixed framework of the 
narrator’ (p. 254), trying instead to connect an idea of the self with something that is genuinely 
therapeutic. Continuing with the ‘story’ of the restorative conference, I want to show how this 
task requires a finding one’s language in which one undergoes a rebirth, or reconceptualisation 
of the self.  
As a potential illumination, Chapter 5 discusses Cavell’s (2010) autobiography, showing how 
the recovery of his voice in philosophy is tantamount to the recovery of his story. I explore 
how Cavell’s story, his lived experience, becomes a path to a philosophical identity. Drawing on 
Henry David Thoreau’s Walden Pond (2004) and the essays of Ralph Waldo Emerson (2003), 
both help me to understand the connection between notions of lived experience, and self-
transformation through what Cavell often refers to as ‘Emersonian moral perfectionism’ 
(Cavell, 1990). This is not a version of the often repeated trope of the modern age, known as 
finding yourself, or a moral theory that encompasses ‘some pre-existing gold standard of 
correctness’ (Rudrum, 2013, p. 65), but a way of being that argues against contemporary moral 
philosophy’s presentation of a rigorous programmatic ethics, preferring instead to show the 
ways and means in which we are drawn to moral acts. It embodies a continual striving that we 
must take responsibility for ‘even if we know we are never to arrive there’ (ibid.).  
I also consider what it means to not only tell one’s story but to see and hear it played out. As a 
further ‘methodological tool’, I turn to Cavell’s defining of ‘a genre of film, taking the claim to 
mean, most generally, that they recount interacting versions of a story, a story or myth, that 
seems to present itself as a woman’s search for a story, or of the right to tell her story’ (Cavell, 
1996, p. 3). Critical appreciation of film has been put forward as a compelling argument for a 
method of study which will aid the process of moral growth (Collier, 1964).25 Like critical 
reading, critical film-viewing is a way of analysing components of a text, and the choices made 
 
25 For example, by showing students documentaries on the use of atomic weapons against Japan at the 
end of World War II, or the role of the United States in Vietnam, educators hope to engage students in 
deliberative activities that will encourage them to adopt certain moral, or political stances (Stoddard, 
2009). The teaching of these controversial events is anticipated to further learners’ ability to elicit social 
awareness, and change. Film has also been used as an illustrative tool with which to represent moral 
theory. Using the example of the ‘two boats’ scene from Christopher Nolan’s Batman film The Dark 
Knight (2008), Alexis Gibbs (2017) explains how short clips like these can be used with students to 






during its creation, that allow learners to become ‘habitually inquisitive, well informed, trustful 
of reason, open-minded, flexible, fair-minded in evaluation, honest in facing personal biases, 
[and] prudent in making judgments’ (Facione, 2011). This approach, while useful for its 
teaching of moral theory, is not the approach I have taken here. The notion of film as 
philosophy not only sees film as a source of philosophical knowledge, but also as a way of 
doing philosophy (Smuts, 2009). The World Viewed (Cavell, 1979a), Cavell’s first major work on 
film, distinguishes the movie from other art forms as important for its ability to exist in a state 
in which ‘its highest and its most ordinary instances attract the same audience’ (p. 5). In other 
words, film has a democratising appeal unlike no other medium; anyone can watch a popular 
Hollywood film, and as a result participate in conversation about what they have just 
experienced. Cavell calls this feat a ‘rise to the occasion of recognition’ (p. 5), stating that 
conversation arising from the inspirational impact of film, rather than in its more traditional 
context of moral theorising, is truly educational. As Sinnerbrink (2014) states:  
The way movies express thought, at once evanescent and enduring, presents a 
singular challenge to philosophy, which has been traditionally bound to (static) 
abstraction and (context-insensitive) generalisation. Indeed, the encounter 
between film and philosophy opens up a space of mutual interaction or dialogue 
between images and concepts that might enable us to explore different ways of 
thinking or indeed different ways of doing philosophy (Sinnerbrink, 2014, p. 51). 
In highlighting this, it might also be said that the democratising appeal of film stops what 
Cavell refers to as philosophy’s ‘arrogation of voice’, that is its want to speak for others. Saito 
(2004) states that only a reader’s interrogation of the text, amounting to an attunement 
between the three – author, reader, and text – can achieve the required neutrality to 
counteract this fated tendency. The use of film can be considered both a method and the 
epitomisation of this ethical concern. The films that I draw on, both in Chapters 5 and 6, show 
us that perfectionism is born from crisis. Tying this to a sense of disruption, and alienation – of 
becoming an outsider to oneself – the sense of the ethical that is evoked here offers a broader 
conception of transformation that surpasses the confines of the restorative conference.  
3.2.3 Ethical Relationships 
Given the amount of positive literature heralding the adaptation of a relational school culture, 
proponents have not let go of the questioning around to what extent these practices are 
harmful, even unethical (Drewery, 2016). This is not simply a reference to the often-recognised 





the absorption of the intentions of restorative practices into a punishment-oriented culture. It 
is instead a specific appeal to explain the moral duties behind how a restorative conversation 
has the potential to bring pupils, who were previously not in any kind of relation unless 
perhaps opposing positions, into respectful relationship. In this, a concern with relationships 
and ethical relationships is integral. As I will point out in Chapters 4 and 5, ethical relation is 
implicit in language. How we can express ourselves is important not only in how we ordinarily 
use words, but the degree to which we experience the world in the same way as another. 
Cavell calls this act of doubt, fraudulence, or the problem of scepticism (Cavell, 1979b). Unlike 
other philosophical traditions, Cavell aims not to solve the problem of scepticism, of whether I 
can know your mind, but to discover it; to make what is ordinary, uncanny.  
Continuing the argument made in Chapter 4, that the quality of what we ordinarily say and 
mean is indicative of our humanity, Chapter 6 moves to exploring the problem of other minds 
through further presentations of acknowledgement and exposure. By mapping this set of 
thoughts onto restorative practice’s determination to reduce participant to ‘known’ quantities, 
I explore how this repression puts our self-possession at stake. The philosophy of Martin Buber 
(2014; 2013) and Gabriel Marcel (2010; 2002; 2001), whose writing on responsibility, relation 
and ethical dialogue provides a further means of understanding the distance between 
restorative approaches and more common, punitive ones, provides a kind of map, or 
touchstone, for the inherent uncertainties of encounter. Indeed, Buber’s recognition of ‘the 
significance of the dialogical principle in the sphere of education’ (Buber, 2014, p. vii) 
acknowledges that the purpose of dialogue is to educate, and the purpose of education is to 
bring people into conversation. 
Finally, visions of conversation, of ethical relation, and of coming together (again) and 
community lead me to Cavell’s second book on film, Pursuits of Happiness (1981). Consisting in 
seven genre-defining films they are taken to define what Cavell terms the ‘comedies of 
remarriage’. Built on the inheritance of Shakespearean comedy, these films focus on the 
relationship of a somewhat older couple following a rupture, or crisis, in their relationship. 
Cavell’s self-identified conventions of the genre – a shared history, easy conversation, renewed 
desire in joint interests, relocation to a rural idyll – is married to a reading of how this couple 
are gradually made to reveal themselves to each other and themselves. In doing so, this aspect 
of coming together through conversation (the etymology of which is to break asunder) allows 
me to foreground what is the core of one’s personal ethical journey: a dialogical process that 
shines a light on language itself as ‘something inherent in meaning, and, hence, in the 





Saito, 2017, p. 3). In Cavellian understanding, the way in which restorative practice offers 
participants the chance take part in these kinds of conversations is paramount for the 
intelligibility of the self to others and may be read as ‘the communal or even political 
dimension of the perfectionist outlook’ (Mahon, 2015, p. 632). I will argue that it is the 
restorative conference’s provocation to perfectionism, rather than a return to a previous 
settled state, that establishes what is needed for genuine ethical relation. 
3.3 Statement of Originality  
In the fifteen years since restorative practices began to have a strong presence in educational 
thinking in the United Kingdom, most of the contribution made by research has focussed on 
gathering and evaluating evidence that supports best practice guides for implementing 
restorative justice practices in schools. Where research has been more theoretical in its 
approach, acknowledging problems raised by critiques, advice offered is grounded in reframing 
strategic thinking amid models of innovation. While the literature is comprehensive, seemingly 
providing a full description of what it is to be restorative, including a multitude of definitions, 
there is a deep-seated tension, some missing gap, that presents itself as a concern with ethical 
practice and ethical relation. 
The originality of my research into restorative practice lies in locating the source of its 
anxieties away from current cultural and instructional work, explaining it as a deep, 
philosophical mistrust with what we do with language. I argue that this mistrust is partly due 
to the ways in which schools have become very pressurised places in recent years but that a 
richer appreciation of the work of ordinary language philosophy, while challenging, will 
provide a deeper basis for exploring the implications of a restorative practice framework 
beyond domains of behaviour management and school culture. Through a rigorous exploration 
of the concepts and ideas thrown up by a selection of philosophical works of interest, I will 
demonstrate how paying attention to how and when language is instrumentalised, as 
illustrated by the work of philosophers who have written about language and relationships, 
can offer a new perspective on restorative practice that addresses the concerns of the 
empirical literature.  
I maintain that how we use language cannot be understood as the accumulation of a specific 
lexicology. It instead constitutes work on the self that is transformative for both the subject 
and her society. By re-connecting the individual with her community, and by imbuing her 





tone, we can resist the notion of a functional aspect of restorative language. If, as understood, 
ordinary language philosophy is committed to the (on-going) recovery of voice from 
suppression or denial, then this signals a much greater ethical significance for restorative 
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Chapter 4  




MS SHAH, learning mentor at Highfield Primary School. 
NAZREEN, a year 6 pupil. 






A classroom inside the school. In the middle there is a small 
circle of chairs with more pushed up against the wall. At one 
end there is a squashy sofa with brightly coloured cushions and 
a box of toys and books. A sign on the wall states: ‘Welcome to 
the speaking and listening room’. Other educational posters are 
on display. Despite this, the general effect is quiet and 
calming. A bank of windows shows a corridor with doors leading 
to other rooms. Ms Shah, Nazreen and Nicky are sitting on the 
chairs. It is lunchtime. Ms Shah takes a folder out of a 
cupboard. Opening the folder, she puts it on the table in front 




Welcome everyone. As you know, my name is Ms Shah, and I am 
going to be your facilitator today for the restorative 
conference. Thank you for making an effort to attend. I know 
that you are missing out on your 
lunchtime/breaktime/assembly/other activity. This is a difficult 
and sensitive, and your participation here will help us deal 















Okay. This is the way that conflict is handled in a restorative 
conference and how I can help you as the facilitator.  
(Points to a display on the wall)  
Option 1 – someone tells the other person what to do; option 2 – 
you let your teacher decide what to do; option 3 – you decide 
yourselves what should be done. You have decided on option 4 – 
that means I will lead the process and help you both to solve 
the problem in a way that makes you both happy. The conference 
will focus on why you girls (got into trouble) on (Wednesday) 
(during your Maths lesson) and involving (Nicky), and you, 
(Nazreen). We are not here to decide if anyone is right or wrong 
but what you should do. We want to explore how people have been 
affected and see whether we can begin to repair the harm that 
has been done. If at any stage of this conference you no longer 
wish to participate, you are free to leave, but if you choose to 
do so, the matter will be dealt with differently by the school. 
Do you have any questions? No? First, it is important that we 
lay down some ground rules that will allow the process to work. 
This is called our Respect Agreement.  
(Reads from the poster) 
Allow the facilitator to lead the meeting; Tell me if you don’t 
think this feels fair; No name calling; No interrupting; Be 










It’s where you say what the other person has said. 
 
MS SHAH 




I don’t know. 
 
MS SHAH 
What was that? 
 
NAZREEN 
Nothing. It doesn’t matter. 
**** 
4.2 The Scripted Model of Restorative Conferencing 
To recap, a school-based restorative conference is defined as ‘a facilitated meeting, with 
parties in conflict, which seeks to encourage the perpetrator(s) to accept responsibility and 
find ways to repair the harm caused’ (Bitel, 2005, p. 70). Proponents state that conferences 
provide a better, more long-lasting commitment of the time necessary to respond to violations 
against people and to reintegrate the wrongdoer back into her community (Claassen and 
Claassen, 2015). As opposed to punitive approaches, where pupils are made to behave well 
out of fear of punishment, conferencing is praised for its ability to create a space for pupils 
that, regardless of the final agreement, is vital to the notion of achieving reparation to relation 
(Aertsen and Peters, 1998). Above all, its primary evaluations show that developing the 
conferencing model changes thinking from ideas of managing behaviour to managing 
relationships (Thorsborne and Vinegrad, 2008). In doing so, restorative conferences ‘capture 
the basic philosophy of restorative practice’ (p. 10). 
In schools, conferencing highlights those aspects of the school system that have contributed to 
the wrongdoing. Burssens and Vettenberg’s (2006) research found that, of the eleven 





restorative group conferences eased or even eliminated tensions within a class or school and 
normalised the school situation’ (p. 12). For example, there may be a long running history of 
conflict between pupils from the same community that has an adverse effect on creating a 
safe school culture. To counteract this, conferencing addresses these dynamics through 
opening up long standing negative feeling. As a result, pupils’ psychological and emotional 
mental states are repaired, and feelings of security and self-assurance are restored (Westrup, 
2015; Shaw & Wierenga, 2002).  
According to the International Institute for Restorative Practices (IIRP, 2010), conferencing that 
follows the scripted model is highly recommended.26 During the conference, Mrs Shah will 
observe four key sequential stages: introduction, story, acknowledgment, and agreement. A 
detailed script gives structured sentences with blanked out lines for inserting the participants’ 
names, for example. It also includes questions specific to the wrongdoer, and questions that 
are specific to victims. Questions such as ‘what were you thinking at the time?’ and ‘how do 
you feel about what happened?’ scheduled at the right moment allows the participant to 
reflect on the array of emotions experienced from the conflict, prompting her to reveal 
information about self-concepts and relationships with others that encourage remorse, and/or 
healing (Claassen and Claassen, 2015). By encouraging, and indeed relying on scaffolded 
dialogue, pupils can deal firsthand with solving their own issues, reducing the alienation and 
disengagement that a punitive response may incur (Umbreit et al., 2007). Proponents argue 
that the active participation required of conferencing strategically teaches alternative 
behaviours and side-steps the performance of penalties that might otherwise do little to 
improve pupils’ social skills (Drewery, 2004). 
Model scripts have long been a part of student disciplinary panels in other educational 
contexts (Karp, 2009). These sorts of scripted practices are recommended where colleges or 
universities wish to institute arbitration prior to reaching a more formal conclusion. There is 
much that is reasonable in developing a systematic and technical language with which to 
transfer the principles of restorative practice and with which to make it sound appealing to a 
variety of audiences. The use of language in these types of model scripts is very important for 
establishing a tone of authority, raising awareness and expectation (Cooper-Johal, 2016). In 
the opening scenario, these characteristics are implied using phrases such as: ‘the person 
 
26 The Australian model of conferencing makes use of a script. The New Zealand model runs a 
somewhat different course and makes no use of a script. In the UK, much of the current guidance for 
schools encourages the use of scripted processes (see for example, Restorative Justice Council (2015), 





responsible for’, ‘harmed party’, ‘a focus on the incident’, and ‘any further questions before 
we proceed’. Scripts of this sort do not only give detailed guidance on structure and 
organisation but also set conditions on the overall tone, style, language, and restorative 
terminology. This is done partly in order ‘to create a secure framework’ (Burssens and 
Vettenburg, 2006), but also to ensure that there are ‘no surprises’ (Thorsborne and Vinegrad, 
2008, p. 17) that will adversely affect emotional dynamics. Umbreit et al., (2007) use the 
metaphor of an onion to provide a useful way for thinking about how boundaried dialogue has 
its place within restorative conferencing. They state that just as ‘the skin of an onion protects 
its interior [and] makes possible the growth within’ (p. 30), so too scripts ensure the safety of 
the environment and respectful interaction.  
Scripts, therefore, allow professionals to behave in a manner that maintains responsibility 
while allowing the young person a voice in what happens. Its emphasis on equitable dialogue 
and a democratic approach is stated to generate greater social support in facilitating the highly 
nuanced level of oral language competence that is required from young people (Riley and 
Hayes 2017; Hayes and Snow, 2013). In my opening scenario, pupils are used to the idea of a 
‘conference script’ that confers the facilitator’s well-meaning intentions, and the use and 
simplification of its principles but, as yet, there is little evidence of democracy, pupil voice, or 
active participation. What is going on? 
I want to begin by examining the use of specific language that is designed to direct participants 
towards producing certain aspirations and attitudes. Westrup (2015) argues that scripted 
conferencing’s focus on direction and linearity imparts a feeling of pupils’ stories as smooth 
and well-practiced, as if ‘[knowing] what the outcome will be in advance’ (p. 133). Restorative 
practice is grounded in the ability to engage in dialogue and for many obvious reasons some 
children will find this difficult. Children may have delays in receptive language (understanding 
of language) or expressive language (use of language). They may have a speech disorder, they 
may stammer or stutter, or they may be learning English as an additional language. Careful 
dialogical scaffolding, of the kind where a child learns from her parent how to communicate 
with others takes many years and extends well into adulthood (Macready, 2009). The nature of 
conferencing in schools, together with the lack of resources with which to find it, rules out 
such amounts of time thus making scripts a skill-building short-cut to establishing interrelation. 





1) That order of speech is one of the critical factors in determining positive 
outcomes;  
2) That deviation from the script is to let the process go ‘awry’ and therefore to 
risk a loss of control of proceedings; 
3) That the script and the preparation entailed in presenting helps facilitators in 
managing strong emotions from participants such as extreme anger. This will 
interfere with the reconnection and healing that needs to happen (Thorsborne 
and Vinegrad, 2008, pp. 26–34). 
I will return to develop each of these points in due course. However, let me state that my aim 
here, in making a connection between aspects of restorative practice in its more heavily 
scripted forms, is to draw attention to what happens when language is so heavily systemised. 
Technologising language in this way risks losing the personal relationship that is characteristic 
of two people in real dialogue (Buber, 2013). One that requires a responsibility from its actors 
to engage with its precepts on an emotional level. In this circumstance, those taking part in the 
restorative conference would receive a sanitised version of engagement that lacks the basis 
with which we can really know one another, this being our emotions or feelings. Thus, the 
ability to know what really happened between victim and offender is dependent on that 
deeper, emotional level of knowing, and not merely through the doing of restorative justice. 
Consequently, restorative conferences are accused of taking place in a second language 
environment where expressions of wrongdoing and remorse, though sincere, are, at best, 
misinterpreted (Westrup, 2015), and worst, ethically harmful (Snow and Sanger, 2011).  
Since schools often evaluate the successful impact of restorative conferencing with a reduction 
in wrongdoing, there is a great pressure to ensure that conferences must resolve the conflict. 
This pressure has been referred to as a ‘restorative stick’ (McCluskey et al., 2008b, p. 203), a 
practical counterargument to the notion that implementing restorative conferences, either to 
prevent exclusions or to reintegrate pupils, is a time-consuming process that is affected by 
several variables, and which when compared to punitive approaches can look ‘soft’. By default, 
scripted conferences have an in-built outcome by asking the following three questions: What 
happened? Who has been affected by your actions? What do we need to do to move forward? 
Critics are very clear on the notion that rather than providing a new values-based paradigm, 
the management of pupils functions as a hindrance to restorative philosophies (Karp, 2009) 
through its invisible preservation of state power (Zermova, 2006; Bolitho, 2011). Additionally, 





ethical harm could the effect of reducing relation-building to the level of a skill-building 
exercise, through establishing a framework for speaking and listening, have on pupils such as 
Nicky and Nazreen?  
I want to take this further, suggesting that the consequences of corporatising educational 
language, the de-personalisation to lived experience that doing so brings about, alongside 
facilitators’ use of scripts, threatens to undermine some of the very tenets of restorative 
practice’s ‘philosophy’. To do so, I turn to J.L Austin’s theory of performative utterance taken 
from How to Do Things with Words (1975), a compilation of his 1955 William James Lecture 
delivered at Harvard University, and published posthumously in 1962. Austin’s work took on 
the challenge of examining a theme central to ordinary language philosophy: how what we say 
and mean may have a direct and deep control over what we philosophically say and mean. My 
aim, in making a connection between Austin, and later in this chapter, Cavell’s critique of 
Austin’s theory (Cavell, 2005a), is to draw attention to what happens when language is so 
heavily systemised that it becomes a performance. A subsequent section of this chapter 
orients the reader to Cavell and passionate utterance as it applies to ideas of risk, and freedom 
in speech. I close by discussing how scripted practices can be a misguided reproduction of 
relational inequalities present in traditional punitive forms of behaviour management. 
4.3 Austin’s Theory of Performative Utterances 
I begin with a necessary account of Austin’s reflection on a positivist philosophical claim, that 
language exists to describe, or ‘constate’, something. These utterances that Austin calls 
constatives convey a statement about the world that can be said to say something about that 
world and are always verifiable. A constative utterance may be: ‘Nicky and Nazreen have fallen 
out’ if there are clear criteria for ‘falling out’, and Nicky and Nazreen can meet them. Failed 
constatives, on the other hand, are those that are false, unclear, or where the referent does 
not exist. 
Austin insists that this view of language, as predominantly a tool of constative assertion, is a 
mistake. In making this proposition, he draws our attention to a problem when thinking about 
a set of utterances that are not constatives, nor nonsense statements. Firstly, they do not 
describe or report something, and neither are they considered true or false. Secondly, the 
uttering of the sentence ‘is a part of, the doing or performance of an action, which again would 






(E. a) 'I do (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)' - as uttered in the 
course of the marriage ceremony.  
(E. b) 'I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth' - as uttered when smashing the bottle 
against the stem. 
(E. c) 'I give and bequeath my watch to my brother' as occurring in a will. 
(E. d) 'I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.' (Austin 1975, p. 5). 
Austin’s attention to what would not ‘normally be described’ in this category of statements is 
key. In a variety of cognate ways and constructions, they illustrate that in Austin’s view, 
constatives do more than merely say something, they ‘do something’ (p. 12). For instance, in 
the above example ‘I do take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife’, I am not merely 
reporting on a marriage, I am doing something. In such examples, participants are actually 
marrying, or naming, giving, or betting. These actions, or performances, occur by saying certain 
words, not by performing another outward action ‘of which these words are merely the 
outward and audible sign’ (p. 13). 
Characterised by the use of ‘humdrum verbs in the first person singular present indicative 
active’, this category of constatives is named by Austin as ‘performateries or performatives’ (p. 
12), a term derived from ‘perform’ – ‘the usual verb with the noun “action”’ (p. 6). Other 
examples include appointing someone to a position, inviting, offering, promising, warning, 
threatening, apologising, thanking, protesting or congratulating. Nevertheless, for 
performatives to work, it is not simply a case of uttering the words: ‘I marry’, or ‘I bet’. As 
Austin points out, someone might do that and it might not be agreed that in fact there had 
been a marriage, or a bet. Austin asserts that that as well as the uttering of the performative, 
in order for the action to be successfully carried off, ‘a good many other things have as a 
general rule to be right and to go right’ (p. 14). In observing the appropriate circumstances that 
might ensure the successful functioning of a performative in speech, Austin devises a set of 
circumstances that are happy or felicitous and to which the performative must adhere if they 
are ‘to be right and to go right’ (p. 14). This set of circumstances are commonly known as his 








(A1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional 
effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain 
circumstances, and further. 
(A2) The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the 
invocation of the particular procedure invoked. 
(B1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and 
(B2) completely. 
(T1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts 
or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any 
participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have 
those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and 
further 
(T2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently (Austin, 1975, pp. 14–15). 
Figure 2 Austin’s felicity conditions 
4.3.1 The Felicitous Conference 
Before I proceed with my argument it is important to note that felicity conditions are not a 
prescription for setting out a specific requirement for a performative to take place; it is more 
that Austin observes ordinary language and tries to give an account of, or to describe, what is 
going on. I will expand on this point later. However, for the moment let me draw a connection 
between Austin’s felicity conditions and the scripted model of restorative conferencing. I argue 
that performance of the script, and the specific order of sentences within that script, is part of 
its felicity – the doing the restorative conference. To illustrate this, Figure 3 contains examples 
of the types of restorative questions asked of wrongdoers. Figure 4 contains questions for 
victims: 
What happened? 
What were you thinking about at the time? 
What have you thought about since the incident? 
Who do you think has been affected by your actions? 
How have they been affected? (Wachtel, 2013, p. 7). 





What was your reaction at the time of the incident? 
How do you feel about what happened? 
What has been the hardest thing for you? 
How did your family and friends react when they heard about the incident (Wachtel, p. 
2013, p. 7)? 
Figure 4 Questions for victims 
As Austin’s felicity conditions depend on their order, so it is with the language and questions in 
the restorative conference. If facilitators follow the script correctly, and without deviation, 
victims should be in possession of the ‘correct’ answers. Just as it would be inconceivable to 
Austin to consider his felicity conditions complete without speakers ‘[conducting] themselves 
subsequently’ (p. 15), so the conference participants must do so similarly. This is very 
important in one of the crucial moments of the restorative conference, the acknowledgment 
and apology phase, as shown in Figure 5:  
Now that you’ve heard from everybody about how they’ve been affected by what you’ve 
done, is there anything you want to say to … (the victim), or anyone else here? 
Do you accept their apology? What else needs to be done (Thorsborne and Vinegrad, 2009, 
p. 29)? 
Figure 5 How to prompt an apology 
Including an apology within the script indicates to observers that offenders have begun to 
acknowledge harm and show remorse. If the script has been adhered to, authors say ‘most 
victims will be satisfied with acknowledgement and apology and less concerned with material 
reparation’ (Thorsborne and Vinegrad 2008, p. 26). 
Scripts, with their inherent ideas of role-playing, bring to mind the notion of performance, and 
the successful functioning of performatives in speech, the implication of which is particularly 
pertinent if we consider the notion of the script as key to performance. In illustration of this, I 
refer to Amanda Fulford’s (2009) critique on the extensive use of scaffolding devices, such as 
writing frames, in relation to another educational issue: that of academic writing. Fulford 
makes the argument that the writing frame is responsible for diminished critical thinking. 





And here is the very root of the problem for the writing frame: that it determines 
the content of a student’s writing, not enabling the expression of her sense of 
what is important, her ideas, but rather of another’s. What needs to be noticed 
here is that it is not prescribed formal structure that it itself the problem. Precise 
formal structure, such as the poetic forms of the sonnet or the haiku, can be the 
very medium for an intensification and release of thought. What is most 
problematic about the writing frame, by contrast, is not so much that it 
establishes structure, but that it channels content in particular ways that limit the 
possibilities that […] education should open up (Fulford, 2009, p. 226). 
Fulford’s intent is to show how sustained use of writing frames controls the writer. By forcing 
her thoughts, and observations, through a narrow linguistic, and cognitive, path, the writing 
frame allows for a kind of performance in writing. Ostensibly this enactment ensures a 
felicitous outcome for the writer. By adhering to the frame’s direction, the writer is 
guaranteed to reproduce the appropriate academic convention necessary to achieve the 
grades/marks that represent a successful outcome. However, Fulford is in no doubt that this 
act of creating a voice can itself lead to a kind of voiceless-ness. By controlling, directing, and 
limiting her thoughts, the writing frame leads to a de-based form of voice that manifests as a 
denial of the self, and the possibilities of self-creation, through the suppression of the 
individual’s desire to speak for themselves.  
I will say more about this further on, for as I have not provided the groundwork just yet. For 
now, let me state that while it is interesting to link Austin’s felicity conditions to the direction 
that facilitators ‘stick to the script’, this notion is ultimately redundant. Rather than 
prescriptions for setting out a specific condition for performatives to take place, felicity 
conditions must be regarded as observations. This is because Austin’s distinction between 
constatives and performatives, on which the felicity conditions depend, is later collapsed from 
Austin’s own acknowledgment that it is not always easy to distinguish performative utterances 
from constatives. Austin states there are ‘many senses in which to say something is to do 
something, or in saying something we do something and even by saying something we do 
something’ (Austin, 1975, p. 94). This ‘messiness’, referred to as Austin’s ‘crisis’, comes about 
when acts purported to have been performed by performatives can be socially contested, as I 
will explain.  
So far, I have referred to statements that can be classed as ‘explicit’ (Austin, 1975, p. 32) 





verb before the clause – ‘I warn you’ et cetera. Unambiguous in their expression, explicit 
performatives contract with ‘implicit’ (ibid.) (or primitive) performatives, utterances that 
demonstrate that what the speaker has in mind has not been specifically indicated by their 
language. To prove this, Austin singles out the use of the imperative ‘go’ (ibid.), which can be 
uttered as an order – ‘I order you to go’ or perhaps merely as advice: ‘Don’t go there’. Another 
example given is – ‘there is a bull in the field’ (ibid.), which similarly might be taken for a 
warning or as a description of the scenery. In these circumstances, perhaps the performative 
conditions could be evoked, but only if there is something else in the scenario that states 
whether the utterance is indeed performative. In other words, do I take it to be an order, or 
not? Do I take it as a warning, or not? It appears that in the case of Austin’s performatives, 
rather than being reduced to a simple cases of binary speech acts, Austin’s hypotheses 
conclude that performatives can only be successful if recipients are given the opportunity to 
infer the intention behind the literal meaning. Plainly, the performative act must be 
determined by the receiving, as well as, the uttering side. 
Austin’s collapse between constative and performative categories is important for 
understanding the conditions of possibility that exist within the scripted model of restorative 
conferences, and how they can be negated. His example of the phrase ‘I apologise’ shows us 
the phrase depends upon much more than adherence to its felicity conditions; it depends 
upon a truth claim, one that is well chosen as being accepted by the utterer, and by another. 
One pupil’s recitation of ‘I apologise’, as a rite of performance, and not when they are sincere 
in their thoughts, will of course undermine the apology’s original intention. In these 
circumstances, Austin says there is an insincerity or unhappiness infecting the utterance; to 
perform the act of apologising when we are not sincere is parallel to saying: ‘I apologise, and I 
do not’. Defeated by internal contradiction, he describes this as: ‘a self-stultifying procedure 
[…] one assertion leading to another assertion, one performance to another performance’ 
(Austin, 1975, pp. 51-52).  
Austin’s problems with performatives see him replace the performative/constative divide with 
a more general theory of speech acts. This identified the criteria for identifying utterances as 
the locutionary act (what is said), the illocutionary act (what is done in saying something) and 
the perlocutionary act (what is done by saying something). Where Austin concentrates on 
expanding on the illocutionary act (how words do things) it is Stanley Cavell’s development of 
the perlocutionary forces of utterances, and his reference to these speech acts as ‘passionate 






4.3.2 Wheels of Performance 
Restorative practice calls for a participatory and democratic approach that empowers pupils 
through the sharing of experience. Nevertheless, there is clear evidence that when language is 
used in a highly programmatic way, then the feel of the conference reduces the process to 
merely ‘performances of restorative justice, in which both youth and staff are engaged in 
demonstrating competency as members of a restorative community without actually engaging 
deeply in the process’ (Lustick, 2017a, p. 304). It is of little original value to remark on the fact 
that to apologise truthfully requires an appropriate sincerity of feeling. However, these ideas 
of performatives and performance show us that the well-chosen utterance leads to a 
precedence for performance over feeling. Austin’s observation on unhappy performatives 
directs us to see that utterances, spoken through scripts, where the utterance is not well 
chosen, and inappropriate, proposes little more than a ride on a self-stultifying wheel of 
performance. Pupils engaging in restorative conferencing are at risk of unhappy performatives. 
In many cases pupils may have to follow a script. They may do so freely or they may do so for 
fear of being made subject to traditional, punitive measures. That they do so at all, in the 
scripted model, obliges the pupil to engage with a performance that conflicts with 
opportunities present in the aims of restorative conferencing. Put another way, the question I 
am raising here is whether the scripted model can offer the kind of effective, and honest, 
dialogue that ultimately leads to more appropriate behaviours, or, if in their very performance, 
scripts serve to emulate the punitive sanctions that the restorative conference aspires to 
replace.  
A good example of this is contained in the scenario that frames the opening of this chapter. 
There is no doubt that Ms Shah is an experienced facilitator and knowledgeable about how 
restorative practices works in her school. Yet, her introduction of the restorative conference is 
heavy with expectation. The hope is that the girls will go through the conference, that they will 
adhere to the rules, and that most likely, there will be a resolution of the problem. We see this 
in her well-rehearsed citing of the ‘respect agreement’, but most of all in the way in which the 
girls appeared resigned to what will happen. In a practice that is based on dialogue, Nicky and 
Nazreen barely utter a word. Of course, we might say that the opening construes the 
necessary setting up of restorative ideals, in the same way that a teacher will ‘teach’ the 
method first before letting her class practice by themselves. There are two arguments against 
this. Firstly, restorative practice sees itself as a relational pedagogy, therefore establishing the 
essence, we might say the philosophy of the conference, without visible relationship-building 





inherent lack of agency and power imbalance present in restorative practice. I return here to 
the point I made in Chapter 2, that ‘fault lines’, exposed by Gavrielides (2008) and latterly 
Vaandering (2014), are detrimental to the realisation of restorative practice and its results. 
Drawing on Austin’s performatives in this way demonstrates the conference itself as an 
infelicitous performative, a tool for shaping and moulding pupils in line with a culture of 
punishment; its transparency a sop to superficial claims for pupil-centred learning, and pupil 
voice.  
4.4 Cavell and Passionate Utterance  
As I have stated earlier in this thesis, Cavell’s reconceptualisation of ordinary language 
philosophy has little to do with philosophy as a method of analysis, or with linguistics. Indeed, 
Cavell’s approach is to state, quite simply, that in addition to undertaking empirical and logical 
analysis of language’s structure, it is vital to also ask ‘what is it that we (humans) do with 
language? How is what we do part of what we say, and can we mean what we say? These 
motivating questions are stated as being concerned with ‘less how we know what we say and 
mean’ (Cavell, 2002, p. xviii), and more of ‘what it betokes about our relation to the world, and 
others, and myself’ (ibid.). In other words, to bring words back to their everyday use, and to 
bring knowledge of the world back to ourselves. With regard to Austin, the idea of what is 
meant in what we say allows us to ‘see and say, know and acknowledge what matters – that is 
to say, in the Cavellian idiom, to note what is important’ (de Vries, 2011, p. 463).  
Austin’s material on the performative utterance (together with Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations) provide the catalyst for Cavell’s drive to pursue these fundamental ideas. In The 
Claim of Reason (Cavell, 1979b), Cavell states the implications for Austin’s procedures on 
moral philosophy, to wit: that reading Austin affords a ‘sense that the human voice is being 
returned to moral assessments of itself’ (p. xvi). This is seen in Austin’s discussion of ‘the more 
awe-inspiring performatives’ (Austin, 1975, p. 9). These examples, such as ‘I promise’, or ‘I do’ 
(take this woman), are exemplary in that the action that results is not ‘merely the matter of 
uttering the words’ but that the person ‘should have a certain intention, viz to keep his word’ 
(p. 11). Austin’s image of the solid moralist surveying ‘the invisible depths of ethical space’ (p. 
10), paves the way for a richer understanding of an ethical self, morally implicated in the 
words we use. It is therefore unsurprising that Cavell takes issue with Austin’s subsequent 
treatment of the perlocutionary speech act – what is done by saying something, and the issue 






Any, or almost any, perlocutionary act is liable to be brought off, in insufficiently 
special circumstances, by the issuing, with or without calculation, of any utterance 
whatsoever and in particular by a straightforward constative utterance (Austin, 
1975, p. 110). 
The statement leaves Cavell puzzled. As I have shown, the felicity conditions prescribed by 
Austin are no guarantors of whether a performative can be said to be happy. This is because 
the happiness, or unhappiness, of performatives are not the sole responsibility of the 
individual speaker, but also the recipient. A case in point: it is true that I may try to apologise, 
but whether the apology is accepted is not of my doing, but the concern of the receiver. By the 
same token, this applies to the perlocutionary act. Can we really know, by saying something, 
what it is we have done with our words? As Cavell remarks, ‘an individual’s intentions or 
wishes can no more produce the general meaning for a word than they can produce horses for 
beggars, or home runs from pop flies, or successful poems out of unsuccessful poems’ (Cavell, 
2002, pp. 38–39). Coming to terms with perlocutionary utterances, to know what kinds of 
perlocutionary acts I can bring about, ‘is part of knowing what I am doing and saying or am 
capable of knowing and saying’ (p. 174). Taking in terms of our learned, moral responsibility 
towards each other, this kind of education is ‘part of knowing what an ethical judgement is’ 
(ibid.). 
Cavell’s discussion of the passionate utterance, therefore, represents his extension of Austin’s 
insufficient exploration of the ethical considerations that frame the perlocutionary. Even more 
importantly, it responds to Austin’s lack of care and attention to the emotional aspects of our 
language. Given its premise as a vehicle with which to eliminate conflict, restorative 
conferencing is certainly an emotive issue. In utilising the vocabulary of emotion, particularly 
of passion, it is important to acknowledge that the term ‘passionate’ in passionate utterance 
might be misconstrued. To talk passionately has the potential of being solely recognised by 
fiery speech and high emotion. This is not so: while Cavell holds that expression of emotion 
excites emotion, Cavell’s choice of Carmen, for instance, uttered ‘as far as humanly possible 
expressionless’ (p. 184), allows us to infer that passionate utterance is representative of the 
‘ordinary exchange’. The definition of ordinary exchange requires caution. A judge’s uttering of 
the words ‘you were wrong’ (p. 177) in a court of law is not in the context of passionate 
utterance given that it operates within a framework of penalty. Indeed, what might be 
considered ordinary for Cavell are those judgements directed from one person to another that 
involves the recognition of an individual that is distorted by the performative. Unlike Austin’s 





passionate utterance. This is firstly because, as Cavell notes, perlocutions do not work like 
performatives in that we cannot precisely identify what has been done. We see this difficulty 
in the following examples, provided by Cavell: 
I’m bored. 
You know he took what you said as a promise. 
Monster, felon, deceiver! (Donna Elvira said to Don Giovanni). 
Carmen, I love you. (End of Don Jose’s Flower Song). 
They say that I (or: Perhaps I; or: I would not wish to) anger, mortify, charm, 
affront encourage, disappoint, embarrass, confuse, alarm, offend, deter, hinder, 
seduce, intimidate, humiliate, harass, incite you (Cavell, 2005a, pp. 177-178). 
Let us consider the last example, which consists in a list of verbs quite like that present in 
Austin’s description of performatives. In that previous formula, those verbs are seen to 
operate within their felicity conditions, meaning, they do what the speaker intends. Cavell 
explains that these cases cannot perform in that way. To illustrate, saying ‘I frighten you’ in 
order ‘to frighten you’ would not make sense. For the statement to be happy, meaning for you 
to be frightened in this manner, ‘I would be exercising some hypnotic or other ray-like power 
of you, you would have lost your freedom in responding to my speech’ (p. 172). A more 
convincing statement would be: ‘I frightened you, didn’t I?’ Whether one is frightened, 
angered or alarmed requires not only my expressing myself to you, but some other 
information that is lacking. Clearly to have a perlocutionary effect, to begin to seduce or 
persuade ‘indicate that some urgency of passion is expressed before and after the words’ (p. 
173) and for which there can be no ‘structuring apparatus’ (Munday, 2011, p. 289). Austin’s 
growing difficulty in defining performatives delighted Cavell for its exposure of ‘the messiness 
of the relationship in which different kinds of utterances fail to sit comfortably within 
“constative” and “performative” categories’ (Munday, 2009, p. 61). 
4.4.1 The Conference as Invitation to Improvisation 
To see this ‘exchange’ as an extension of Austin’s theory of the performative, Cavell provides 
analogous conditions for the successful functioning of perlocutionary objectives.27  
 
27 In the original text, Cavell presents his analogous conditions for the successful functioning of 





Analogous Perloc 1: (Perlocutionary Condition 1) 
There is no expected conventional procedure and effect. The speaker is on his or 
her own to create the desired effect 
Analogous Perloc 2a: 
In the absence of accepted conventional procedure, there are no antecedently 
specified persons. Appropriateness is to be decided in each case; it is at issue in 
each. I am not invoking a procedure but inviting an exchange. Hence:)  
I must declare myself (explicitly or implicitly) to have standing with you (be 
appropriate) in the given case. 
Analogous Perloc 2b: 
I therewith single you out (as appropriate in the given case). 
Analogous Perloc 5a: 
(The setting or staging of my perlocutionary invocation, or provocation, or 
confrontation, backed by no conventional procedure, is grounded in my being 
moved to speak, hence to speak in, or out, of passion, whose capacities for 
lucidity and opacity leaves the genuineness of motive always vulnerable to 
criticism. With that in mind :) 
In speaking from my passion I must actually be suffering the passion evincing, 
expressing, not to say displaying it – though this may go undeciphered, perhaps 
wilfully by the other), in order rightfully to 
Analogous Perloc 5b: 
Demand from you a response in kind, one that you are moved to offer, and 
moreover 
Analogous Perloc 6: 
Now (Cavell, 2005a, pp. 180-182). 
The above conditions depict the idea of ‘passionate utterance’ as an invitation to exchange 
between participants. This examination of human response is misleading since there is 
something more serious at stake. We know from the felicity conditions that Austin left room 





autonomy.28 Nevertheless, where Austin sees refusal as signaling the end of the act, and 
therefore the end of the matter, Cavell perceives refusal rather differently. With this in mind, 
he adds a final irregularity to his catalogue: 
Analogous Perloc 7: 
You may contest my invitation to exchange, or at any or all of the points marked 
by the list of conditions for the successful perlocutionary act, for example, deny 
that I have standing with you, or question my consciousness of the passion, or 
dismiss the demand for the kind of response I seek, or ask to postpone it, or 
worse. I may or may not have further means of response. (We may understand 
such exchanges as instances of some region of moral education.) (Cavell, 2005a, p. 
182). 
Rather than indicating the end of performance, as Austin does, Cavell perceives the act of 
refusal as becoming part of or heralding the beginning of another. In this mode of exchange, 
Cavell tells us, ‘there is no final word, no uptake or turndown until a line is drawn, a 
withdrawal is effected, perhaps in turn to be revoked’ (Cavell, 2005a, p. 183). To elaborate, in 
the case of performative utterance, refusal or failure to carry out the conventional procedures 
are reparable. If the purser cannot marry you, for instance, then the captain will. Cavell turns 
our attention to a moment in the opera Carmen and the line ‘No, you do not love me’, sung by 
Carmen to Don José’s ‘Carmen, I love you’.29 With performatives, there is always a decision 
over whether something is happy. In the perlocutionary act, the interpretation is part of the 
exchange. Carmen has been singled out, but it is an offer that she is at liberty to deny; she 
refuses to acknowledge it. This simple protestation, Cavell claims, is a pure truthful, constative 
that is characteristic of passionate utterance. The failure to single out puts ‘the character of 
our relationship, as part of my sense of identity, or of my existence, more radically at stake’ (p. 
184). The re-establishment of emotion in speech is an attitude that Austin remained ‘skittish’ 
(p. 156) about, but without which ethical statements cannot be fully identified. It is in absence 
of this expressive side that Austin’s theory is in danger of running counter to its spirit. Perhaps 
we can say that, in finally distinguishing this mode of exchange from Austin, the following:  
 
28 In the felicity conditions (A1), Austin states that ‘there must exist an accepted conventional 
procedure having a certain conventional effect’. 






A performative utterance is an offer of participation in the order of law. And 
perhaps we can say: A passionate utterance is an invitation to improvisation in the 
disorders of desire (Cavell, 2005a, p. 185). 
Passion, therefore, is redolent not of over-expression, or over-emphasising, as Cavell states, 
but of the demand for a response. This is very telling for the restorative conference, signalling 
that passionate utterance ‘requires (so far) exchange, not mediation or arbitration’ [or even 
facilitation] (p. 177). 
Returning to the scenario, and to the idea of the conferencing as heralding a peculiar kind of 
silence, let me look at what kind of ‘invitation to exchange’ is made. Ms Shah asks, ‘is that 
right?’ ‘Yes/yeah’ reply the pupils. Is agreement part of the script? How are these pupils really 
experiencing the situation? Ms Shah’s attempts to engage with the students feel like efforts to 
persuade them to follow through with the conference. Her next attempt, ‘can we agree to 
this’, is met by a nod. I have suggested the instrumentalism that surrounds pupil voice actively 
marginalises it instead. Ayers (cited in Wisdom et al., 1946) adds that such expressions need 
not even be uttered. Cavell does not deny this, but adds that the inability to say something, to 
involve assertions, may come from being silenced, ‘from not wanting to say something, or not 
sensing the right to say something’ (Cavell, 2005a, p. 179). Hence, the assertion ‘I’m bored’ 
places a demand on the listener, an acknowledgement of the obvious perhaps, but 
nevertheless one ‘that I might be unwilling or unable to make’ (ibid.), being by their nature as 
representative of some sort of a conflict or risk, to the speaker, in the uttering. Cavell chooses 
the expression ‘I’m bored’ since it argues for ‘the primacy of expression over emotion’ (p. 178). 
In the scenario, Nicky says she ‘doesn’t know’. This informal expression is used when we don’t 
have the answer to something, for example, ‘I don’t know [what you want]’, but also when we 
are not sure, or as a precursor to disagreement, ‘Oh I don’t know, it doesn’t seem like that to 
me’, or annoyed – ‘I don’t know!’. Nicky doesn’t sound visibly distressed. Yet, her utterance 
has the effect of momentarily stopping Ms Shah in her tracks. Her uncertainty, an expression 
of disordered desire, demands a response.  
Each utterance, Cavell states, brings forth two paths: ‘the responsibilities of implication; and 
the rights of desire’ (p. 185). In bringing attention to the path of desire, Cavell takes a step 
towards emphasising the importance of the sort of language that ‘takes Austin’s picture 
beyond performance as ritual’ (Cavell, 2005a, p. 185) to one that leans towards the role of 
passion as disordered desire. We cannot say for certain what Nicky needs to hear but clearly 





next line Nicky retracts her opening. Perhaps thinking of the warning that the school would 
revert to punitive discipline, she replies: ‘Nothing. It doesn’t matter’. What might have been 
the consequence of fully exploring Nicky’s doubt? Perhaps it might lead into the kind of 
conference envisaged by the school, but perhaps it won’t. Perhaps it might lead to nothing at 
all. For Cavell, it is precisely this uncertainty that is unmistakably part of an ethical education. 
Again, I am not talking about a curricularised, moral education, of the sort I mention in my first 
chapter, but a richer, deeper understanding of ethics. Cavell states that while speech is not 
everything, nevertheless, in what follows I want to show how a limited verbal response, driven 
from a lack of freedom, brings to attention the notion that speech that is forced, or reigned in, 
is a hostile, and degrading form of power.  
4.4.2 Risky Conferences and King Lear 
I intimated above that the performing of scripts in restorative conferencing could be critiqued 
using the same arguments used to address criticism of scaffolding techniques, and the ways in 
which such techniques may suppress pupil voice (Fulford, 2009). Despite the advocacy for a 
broad approach to restorative practices that encourages all to be included in the community, 
an essential criterion in the decision to hold a restorative conference is that there be identified 
wrongdoers and victims. In this, training manuals encourage schools not to consider 
conferencing with pupils who deny misconduct, or involvement, in an incident. It is the case 
that only after the pupil admits responsibility – conferences should not be held in order to 
determine guilt – that a school can judge whether a conference has the potential to benefit its 
participants. The facilitator will also ask if pupils wish to proceed.30 This question is asked to 
emphasise the voluntary nature of the conference, and to affirm the commitment of pupils to 
reaching a collaborative decision. Acceptance of these roles confirms that pupils acquiesce to 
their portrayal as offender, or victim to identify the harm caused by misconduct. 
Nevertheless, it is the nature of schools, and of relationships between pupils, that a definition 
of the wrongdoer is far from simple. Described as a person who does something bad or 
illegal,31 schools must also consider that the pupil identified as the wrongdoer might also 
perceive of themselves as a victim. Given this premise, it is also impossible to claim that one 
 
30 Thorsborne and Vinegrad suggest the following phrase: ‘you can leave the conference at any time 
you like, but if you do, you need to know that what you did will be handled differently by the school. Do 
you understand this?’ (Thorsborne and Vinegrad, 2008, p. 34). 
31 Definition taken from the Cambridge Dictionary website [Online]. Available at: 





can ‘know’ all of the events that led up to the wrongful act under scrutiny. Nevertheless, the 
positioning of one or more pupils as the wrongdoers is accepted in order for the conference 
script to progress. In many scenarios this will be the pupil who has initiated verbal or physical 
aggression, or as in the case of the opening scenario, the pupil who has committed a wrongful 
deed. 
What does it mean to force voice when it would rather remain silent, and what does this 
herald for our subjectivity? To unpack this, I turn to Cavell’s (2002) close reading of the 
opening act from The Tragedy of King Lear (Halio, 2005). Lear wishes a public show of love, to 
his court, from his three daughters. In return for their flattery he will give them a portion of his 
kingdom: 
Lear: Tell me, my daughters,  
(Since now we will divest us both of rule,  
Interest of territory, cares of state)  
Which of you shall we say doth love us most  
That we our largest bounty may extend (Halio, 2005, p. 102). 
The show is undoubtedly a performance for the benefit of Lear’s court and his flatterers, and, 
due to its nature, the king appears confident of their replies. Lear’s eldest daughters, Regan 
and Goneril, have no difficulty with accepting the nature of the routine, or of Lear’s bribe (they 
are willing to humour and flatter in exaggerated terms). The third daughter, and youngest of 
the three, is Cordelia. Unlike her sisters, Cordelia refuses to participate in Lear’s charade. This 
is not through any perceived defiance, or contrariness, that might be easily understood by an 
audience. Cordelia simply refuses to perform in this way. She does not consent to agreement, 
or as Cavell would put it: she dissents in criteria32 (Cavell, 1979b): 
Cordelia: Nothing, my lord. 
Lear: Nothing? 
Cordelia: Nothing. 
Lear: How? Nothing will come of nothing. Speak again 
Cordelia: Unhappy that I am, I cannot heave 
 
32 In talking about a particular thing there is an extent to which one has to conform to the language 
community. There are to be agreement in criteria about what that thing is, such as a ‘conference’, or 
‘teaching’. While these criteria are often implicit, our assent or dissent, meaning what we agree or 





My heart into my mouth. I love your majesty 
According to my bond, no more nor less (Halio, 2005, p. 104). 
What is happening here when Cordelia claims she has no talent for putting her heart’s feelings 
into words? What does her dissent consist in? In this instance, her refusal to acquiesce to her 
father’s demand for performance is borne from sincerity, and also from refusing to 
acknowledge the impossible. Lear does not want truth from his daughters, a notion that 
Goneril and Regan are happy to provide. However, as Cavell reads it, Cordelia really does love 
her father, and ‘to pretend to love where you really do love, is not obviously possible’ (Cavell, 
2002, p. 290). All Cordelia can do in this situation, all she can do, is hope that the quality of 
love contained in her ‘nothing’ will be enough. For Lear this is not sufficient; he desperately 
wants the charade to continue. Cordelia, however, cannot ‘heave her heart into her mouth’ (p. 
104) – she cannot give him the performance he craves. Lear, enraged at her refusal to speak 
from the same script as her sisters, brutally casts her out. 
Lear: Here I disclaim all my paternal care 
Propinquity, and property of blood 
And as a stranger to my heart and me 
Hold thee from this for ever (Halio, 2005, p. 105). 
Our examination of the perlocutionary aspects of speech has told us that there is no 
conventional form for identifying whatever passionate utterance is, except that it involves a 
recognition of another and the aspect of emotion that it categorises. The publicly grandiose 
speech making by Cordelia’s sisters is not for Lear’s ears but for that of the court. Their work 
done, there is little in the way of parlay with their father. In contrast, Cordelia’s ‘nothing’ is too 
ordinary, too little. We only begin to comprehend it through what it does, namely to first 
single out and secondly, demand from [Lear] a response in kind. Through Cavell we understand 
that the sisters’ speech is characterised by the performative; Cordelia’s ‘nothing’ is passionate 
utterance. Given the notion that passionate utterance is in recognition of another and 
‘recognising a person depends upon allowing oneself to be recognised by him’ (Cavell, 2002, p. 
279), the consequences of Lear’s un-recognition is disastrous. The loss of his sanity and the 





significance of Cordelia’s words.33 
Despite Cavell’s insistence that there is a necessary contrivance in producing a reading of this 
play to fit certain motivations, there are important implications of the Shakespearian analogy 
for scripted restorative conferences. In scripts, we have seen that the public act of apology is 
hugely important. The resulting emotional fracture from not doing so has been problematised 
by advocates of restorative practice as either the fault of the participants – the victim’s 
disregard for purely symbolic repair – that ‘the participants are not able to read other’s 
emotions accurately’ (Thorsborne and Vinegrad, 2008, p. 44), or of the script: ‘that some key 
issues have been missed or that the conference process has been somehow skewed’ (p. 44). 
Nevertheless, in the idea of Cordelia’s ‘nothing’, we appreciate what scripts lack the foresight 
to see, and which Cavell might ask us to recognise as ‘a systematic recognition of speech as 
confrontation, as demanding, as owed [to you], each instance of which risks, if not costs, 
blood’ (Cavell, 2005a, p.187). 
Cordelia’s risk-taking has terrible consequences, but it is also legitimate and truthful. Words of 
control, of focus, purpose and direction, mislead us into seeing performance as passionate 
utterance. Where Austin shows us that a language of performatives flattens emotional 
response, giving us one performance after another, Cavell’s reintroduction of passionate 
utterance, as risk in speech, leaves us more open, more fully, human active participants: it is 
the transformation of script into dialogue. Drawing on Cavell’s perspective illuminates Ian 
Munday’s (2010) discussion of how contentious issues are handled within the classroom. 
Moral education, Munday states, requires the constant exchange of expressive engagement. 
Suppression of such conversation, which can be characterised by the formulaic approach to 
this kind of teaching, does not consider how language is the mode in which we figure, and re-
configure our moral outlook. If, indeed, pupils are not permitted ‘to find out where they stand 
– to give or withhold assent’, then there is a moral education that is reduced to ‘a cold, 
bloodless form of theorising’ (p. 291).  
As I outlined, the psychological theory of emotion that proponents use to explain how 
restorative practice works points to a recognition of the passionate in speech. There is much 
 
33 This has rich resonances with Cavell’s ideas of ventriloquism, plagiarism and vampirism in relation to 
the concept of voice (Cavell, 1996). In this chapter, I have started by pursuing Cavell’s attention to 
passionate utterance; however, these are also features of a genre of film Cavell names the ‘melodrama 
of the unknown woman’ in which the woman has her words either forced on her, or stolen entirely. I 
will develop the analogy in Chapter 5 but suffice to say that the connection between the pupils in the 





relevant literature on the understanding and use of pupils’ emotional responses to establish a 
connection with other. Furthermore, it is expected that sharing feelings of loss, anger, fear, 
loneliness or frustration through the conference process ‘will allow for the gradual 
transformation of those negative feelings into relief, hope, understanding, empathy, optimism 
and even enjoyment’, hallmarks of the ‘transformative nature of the restorative approach’ 
(Thorsborne and Vinegrad, 2008, p. 33). The aim of the restorative conference is to help those 
pupils recover from these undesirable emotions (Burssens and Vettenburg, 2006). In this case, 
facilitators are advised to ‘coach’ certain participants whom they regard as ‘emotionally stable’ 
to help manage group dynamics. However, in the scenario, the only reference to pupils’ 
emotional state is Ms Shah’s hope that the pupils are made ‘happy’ by the outcome. There is 
certainly no mention of difficult emotion such as the loss, anger, fear, loneliness or frustration 
that is noted by the literature. Visibly difficult emotions have the effect of disrupting 
classrooms, and the teaching that is attempting to take place. There is no doubt that scripted 
preparation will help facilitators gain confidence when managing strong emotion from 
participants. Allowing matters to get out of control, on the other hand, presents not only a 
safety issue to consider, it is said to ‘interfere with the reconnection and healing that needs to 
happen’ (p. 34). Added to the pressure of an achievement culture in education, negative 
emotion is an unwelcome intruder, at odds with league table success, targets and high-
performance stakes, which all exude a basis of positivity at their core.  
In saying this, I am not suggesting that Ms Shah’s introduction was unprofessional. However, 
upholding professional standards is not the same as attuning oneself to the personal relational 
and ethical aspects of teaching. The introduction of the conference and recitation of the 
respect agreement may seem like a simple ritual before the real meat of exploring the 
wrongdoing, but as Van Manen (2016) suggests, it can be filled with ‘psychological and 
pedagogical significance’ (p. 17). Moments like these usually occur when adults are required to 
act pedagogically but it is also a matter of acting pedagogically and with responsibility, even if 
that action consists in holding back. Perhaps Ms Shah might have held back when Nicky said 
she didn’t know what summarise meant. Given the importance placed on this verbalisation as 
almost the only place where dialogical exchange between the pupils takes place, would it have 
been more pedagogically responsible for Ms Shah to follow the point? Certainly, highlighting 
the scenario’s only response to a difficult emotion – Nicky’s uncertainty, as unresponsiveness, 
presents an ethical issue, a ‘going through the motions’ of what is means to be restorative. We 
are therefore prompted to notice that the ‘restorative script’ led by Ms Shah, is derivative of 





4.5 Cavell and Scepticism 
To elaborate on this issue, I need to return to Cavell’s reading of King Lear. Cavell titled his 
interpretation of the play ‘The Avoidance of Love’ (Cavell, 2002, pp. 267–353). As we have 
seen, ‘avoidance’ refers to Lear’s aversion to Cordelia’s love (avoidance that is mirrored by 
Gloucester and his illegitimate son Edgar). His turn away from her gaze is due to the same 
reasons that he abdicates his throne; he cannot bear to be seen. Imagery drawn from vision, 
together with the dominance of language that emphasises looks, or stares, throughout Lear, 
represents the wider significance that sight, or being seen, is tied to recognition. Recognition, 
encompassing self-recognition, is an insight that comes to Lear late in the play, and with tragic 
circumstances. Lear’s obsession with avoidance is precisely an effort to avoid self-recognition. 
What lies behind this act? Let us look to the opening scene again, specifically Lear’s reasons for 
staging a love-contest that is itself a charade that marks a way to portion out his Kingdom that 
would establish his favourite child in the pivotal position. In accordance with the laws of 
kingship that rest on displays of power, and convention, Lear has assumed a way of singling 
out Cordelia that assumes she would play along. To be clear, Lear knows his child loves him, 
and that he loves her. Yet his asking is based on not on the expectation of exchange – his bribe 
accounts for that, but on performance; he wants to look like a loved man. Therefore, what 
follows is a tragic display of misrecognition. Lear is terrified of the (truthful) love Cordelia is 
offering. Lear’s act of mis-recognition, and the actions that follow, are shown by Cavell to 
exemplify the avoidance of acknowledgement by opening an analysis of the devastating effect 
of shame: ‘for shame is the specific discomfort produced by the sense of being looked at, the 
avoidance of the sight of others is the reflex it produces’ (p. 278).  
In drawing out the illuminating nature of shame, as being linked to avoidance of others, 
Cavell’s philosophical acuity links the discussion to the extended philosophical treatment of 
modern scepticism, and world-alienation. Its reference here is pertinent since Cavell’s brand of 
scepticism has been written about with reference to assessment (Standish, 2013), strong 
accountability measures (Granger, 2003), pupil disengagement (Johannson, 2010), and even 
the demands of doctoral supervision (Waghid and Davids, 2013); in order to take issue with 
the reductive, behaviourist approach to education that currently prevails. Scepticism in its 
classical sense refers to the Cartesian attitude to submit objects to doubt: How do I know that 
this is a table? How do I know that you are telling the truth? How do I know that I am not 





culminating in his famous philosophical argument cogito ergo sum,34 sought to prove that 
there is, in fact, something real out there through the production of shared criteria: ‘I am, I 
exist, is necessarily true each time it is expressed by me, or conceived in my mind.’ The 
consequences of Descartes’ legacy, his separation of mind and body, is described as leading to 
the inevitable detachment between subjectivity and objectivity, between facts and values, 
between what we know ‘in the mind’ and what we see is ‘out there’. The later work of 
Wittgenstein can be read as providing a solution to the problems of scepticism. Where 
Descartes asks how can I know that this is a table? Wittgenstein counters that the very act of 
asking presumes a background (of ordinary life) that allows us to interpret the question: 
How could human behaviour be described? Surely only by sketching the actions of 
a variety of humans, as they are all mixed up together. What determines our 
judgment, our concepts and reactions, is not what one man is doing now, an 
individual action, but the whole hurly-burly of human actions, the background 
against which we see any action (Wittgenstein, 2009, §567). 
The above passage reveals that to understand anything at all about speech acts, we have to 
believe an equally large number of other things. Austin embodies this in his example of the 
goldfinch (Wisdom et al., 1946). If two people wondered, ‘how do I know this is a goldfinch?’, 
then the reply might be ‘by its red head’. If one were to object that this is not enough, that 
there are plenty of birds with red heads, then they would need further claims of knowledge. In 
this, Austin refers to a rule book (a book on birdwatching) by which one can agree that the bird 
they are watching is indeed a goldfinch. For example, if it has a black stripe, or a yellow throat. 
In other words, Austin is not establishing a set of criteria to determine what a goldfinch is, but 
what it means. 
4.5.1 Scepticism and Criteria 
The notion of criterion or ‘specifications a given person or group sets up on the basis of which 
[…] to judge (assess, settle, whether something has a particular status or value’ (Cavell, 1979b, 
p. 9) is presumed by readers of Wittgenstein to rebuff scepticism by establishing the existence 
of certainty. Cavell on the other hand argues criteria cannot solve scepticism, indeed a correct 
understanding of scepticism shows itself as incontrovertible. There is no rulebook that governs 
one or the other way in which I may apply my judgement. For Cavell, it is precisely the creation 
and practice of meaning in language, which calls to attention what it is we do with our 
 





language, that engages him in one of Wittgenstein’s most famous examples, ‘that the criteria 
of pain (outward criteria of course) are how we know with certainty that another is in pain’ 
(Cavell, 1979b, p. 7). The sceptic’s requirement for data demands concrete evidence of pain, 
for example, if your face is contorted or if you tell me that you are in pain. But as this chapter 
discusses, emotion can be feigned and lies told. In that case, whereas I can surely know that I 
am in pain, how can I know that you are in pain? Our very separateness means that it is 
impossible for me to know your pain in the way that you do. For Cavell, the exposure of our 
limitation is the condition of our humanity. Since I must always act based on insufficient 
evidence, of insufficient knowledge, Cavell is able to develop what he calls ‘acknowledgement’. 
The first-person expression of pain is not an expression of knowledge but a condition upon 
which someone else may have knowledge. It is your knowledge of your pain that makes a 
claim on me: 
It is not enough that I know (am certain) that you suffer – I must do or reveal 
something (whatever can be done). In a word I must acknowledge it, otherwise I 
do not know what “(your or his) being in pain” means. Is. (This is “acknowledging 
it to you.” There is also something to be called “acknowledging it for you”; for 
example, I know you want it known, and that you are determined not to make it 
known, so I tell (Cavell, 2002, p. 263). 
Knowing that you are suffering does not mean establishing evidence for certainty, nor is Cavell 
arguing for our always having sympathy or understanding, or whatever it is my claim requires. 
Instead, my acknowledgement is my response to that claim, it is through knowing what the 
other comes to in our ordinary dealings. That acknowledgement is vital to our behaviour is 
confirmed not only by its successes ‘but evidenced equally by its failure’ (Cavell, 2002, p. 264). 
The failure to acknowledge presents something more behaviourally confusing, portending 
instead ‘the absence of something’ (p. 265), say, a callousness or indifference or blank. The 
expression of this behaviour is ironically, its suppression, or twisting, which leads to one’s 
‘[losing] possession of the region of the mind which that behaviour is expressing’ (p. 265). This 
is the link between scepticism and tragedy highlighting, as it does, that my relationship with 
you is always haunted by the possibility of broken trust, betrayal or isolation, or simply the 
incapacity to attend to you properly (McGinn, 1998). Letting myself be judged thus requires an 
awareness that is based on uncertainty of the other, of knowing what your pain is only by my 
knowing what my pain is. Avoidance, in Cavell’s reading of Lear, leads from his argument that 
tragedy is borne out of the failure of its protagonists to allow themselves to be acknowledged. 





allow Cordelia to be other than him. The result is that she becomes an object, theatricalised, 
and thus dehumanised (Dahl, 2010). As Cavell concludes: 
How is acknowledgement expressed; that is how do we put ourselves in another’s 
presence. In terms which have so far come out, we can say: By revealing 
ourselves, by allowing ourselves to be seen. When we do not, when we keep 
ourselves in the dark, the consequence is that we convert the other into a 
character and make the world a stage for him (Cavell, 2002, p. 333). 
Cavell’s idea of acknowledgment is inherent in his case for passionate utterance in that it seeks 
to articulate the serious concern of making oneself, and perspective, visible to the world. To do 
so accordingly, involves the knowledge that at any point my demand might be rebuked. As 
Cavell states in his seventh condition for perlocutionary exchanges, my invitation can be 
contested. Therefore, what is certain for moral development to take place is that such 
exchanges cannot be planned, or scripted: we cannot solve the condition of scepticism.  
Cavell explains that knowing, in this instance, is ‘numerical’, in that it relates to the idea of 
certainty. This takes in ‘the major condition of the sceptic’s argument, viz., that the problem of 
knowledge about other minds is the problem of certainty (Cavell, 2002, p. 258). In the 
restorative conference, the problem of scepticism is solved. The script serves to guide its 
participants through a kind of negotiation but there is nothing (supposedly) to reveal, nothing 
to leave hidden. The facilitator’s preparation is exactly to make sure that nothing, not even 
what is divulged in the participants’ stories, is left to chance. The important point for Cavell is 
that Wittgenstein has not written a rule book; Philosophical Investigations does not consist in a 
series of instructions for the reader to follow. Rather, in its description of language’s 
difficulties, it requires from us a willingness to learn ‘how to use words in certain contexts […] 
and without a safety net, without any guarantee, without universals’ (Laugier and Ginsberg, 
2011, p. 42). Neither can ordinary language claim for itself a better position, for to do so would 
give in to the sceptic’s argument. Rather I must rely not on data, on a set of criteria, and on 





That you grant full title to others as sources of that data – not out of politeness, 
but because the nature of the claim you make for yourself is repudiated without 
acknowledgement: it is a claim that no one knows better than you whether and 
when a thing is said, and if this is  not to be taken as a claim to expertise…then it 
must be understood to mean that you know better than other what you claim to 
know (Cavell, 2002, p. 240). 
Cavell’s writing on ordinary language scepticism lays the groundwork for much of his writing 
on the nature of the human condition. As the scenario shows, there is often nothing much at 
all to show for our educative practices, much less those that are named restorative. The simple 
point to be made here is that the impetus for the restorative conference arises from what we 
don’t know, and cannot claim to know, and that is what these pupils thought and felt at the 
time of the harmful incident. It is the conference that gives Nicky and Nazreen the opportunity 
of making themselves visible to the world, their dialogic exchange with each other is that 
which distinguishes what is good or right from what is wrong and harmful. The scenario is 
pedagogically significant since it sets up dialogical limits of the conference, and of their 
relations with each other. Thinking about restorative conferencing as a series of scripts to be 
acted out and the kind of language that is used to write these, puts forward that pupils who 
partake in scripted conferences are being guided towards a readily observable behavioural 
outcome, and hence that this conception of scripted restorative practice is unnecessarily 
programmed or mechanistic. Tightly bound planning, by default, reverts to the creation of 
certainty, a curtailing of necessary freedoms that is in opposition to the effects of the difficult 
and undecided. Such planning fashions not opportunities for voice, but a stage for 
performances to take place. Moreover, the presence of such linguistic constraints elides the 
possibility of restorative conferences to provide an ethical education. Still, how to present 
these ideas in the restorative conference where the notion of settling risky behaviour and 
providing solutions to problems is the governing concern. 
4.6 Making Room for Freedom: Re-thinking Language in Restorative 
Practice 
Schools that practice restorative methods have found conferencing to be an effective method 
by which to manage serious and damaging pupil conflict. By focussing on ameliorating the 
behaviour of the wrongdoing pupil, as well as paying close attention to their victim(s), 





Vettenburg, 2006, p. 8). By repairing not only material damage caused by conflict but also the 
psychological, relational and emotional states of pupils, restorative conferences promise to 
stabilise a disruptive classroom environment that is damaging to teaching and learning. To this 
end, the scripted model of conferencing is seen as important for removing serious risks 
associated with frank speaking. Knowing the boundaries within which schools work, denying 
the script as training, or indeed of any conditions of speech that encourage the development 
of supportive structures in order to risk and draw blood is thoughtless. However, there 
remains a critical question on the degree to which such scripts are educative. In drawing on 
Austin’s felicity conditions, and Cavell’s writing on passionate utterance, I make the claim that 
scripts represent real danger of denial and repression. In the drive to find solutions, voices are 
silenced. 
This is not as easy as saying that the use of scripts inevitably leads to performance and that 
performances cannot be ethical, a conclusion that Cavell himself avoids by addressing the 
problem of ‘performance, or performability of [King Lear]’ (Cavell, 2002, p. 294). In his writing, 
Cavell shows how the notion of performance remains a central concern in the idea of emotive 
passion in speech. Of course, while performance is the one aspect that breathes life into these 
characters, ‘performance cannot contain the totality of a human life’ (p. 295). This is presented 
in the way in which Cavell chooses to think through the motivation of characters such as Lear, 
or Cordelia, being understandably dependent on the way those characters are performed. It is 
here that Cavell plays with the possibilities for identity, and particularly of how we work those 
identities out. Skilbeck’s (2014) fruitful exploration of the dramatic classroom reflects on the 
ways in which drama or dramatic dialogue as an educational activity opens the possibility of 
perspective. This is not through a sole focus on the content of speech but towards a 
recognition of its expressive character. This is the sum of passionate utterance; it is not to 
mistake the words of characters for my own, but to allow those words to make a claim upon 
me.  
While Cavell does not, cannot, escape the associated configurations of the perlocutionary 
realm, there is instead an ‘invitation to improvisation in the disorders of desire’ (Cavell, 2005a, 
p. 185). That is to say that the price to pay for moral development runs the risk of further 
disagreement. Cavell’s passionate utterance provides vital, enriching room for human life to 
flourish, most notably in its concern for dissent. Refusal to participate, avoidance, silence – all 
are of fundamental significance to our individuality but are too often regarded as unwelcome 
interlopers when it comes to the subject of behaviour management. In providing an 





ready-made solution to indiscipline. One that removes responsibility from its actors to engage 
with its precepts on an emotional level. Despite advocates’ well-meaning intentions, the 
simplification of conferencing, through scripts that are used to market the practicality of 
restorative practice, is highly misleading. The application of market values and legal jargon to 
educational terminology is part of this conundrum. The reduction of encounter to that of 
‘intervention’ or ‘business transaction’, is one that can be replicated, packaged, bought and 
sold, as an easy solution for schools struggling with indiscipline in its complicated and 
innumerable forms.  
Attention to expression shows that words used in this way become just another part of the 
‘tool-kit’, to be wielded correctly, blunted and dulled by constant use, as opposed to that 
which is sharpened by our moral responsibility. I refer here to the 19th century American 
essayist and philosopher, Henry David Thoreau’s account of his borrowing an axe from a 
neighbour in order to chop wood and build his hut. His returning of the axe, sharper than 
when he first borrowed it, is shown in Cavell’s reading to be an allegory for the way in which 
we use language (Cavell, 1992). The casual bandying of words, or constant, unthinking 
repetition of a script, is to dull the axe’s blade. However, to really consider language, to 
revitalise its meaning or to do or take something new from reading, is to sharpen it. Our 
responsibility to keep on sharpening the axe is the responsibility we have to our language and 
to our community. That restorative practice is closely allied to performativity, as opposed to 
simply performance, makes it more difficult to acknowledge and articulate how things go 
wrong in people’s lives, including in the lives of school children. We must make room for the 
negative: for silence, for refusing to speak, for talking out of the script. Without this ethical 
aspect, we are left with ‘une langue de bois […] a tongue wooden in its inability to utter or 
alter its expression as occasion demands, but doomed to repeat itself’ (Cavell, 2010, p. 88). In 
showing what might be achieved by understanding the performative aspect of language, 
Cavell’s performance, his voice in philosophy, steers us towards the educational implications of 
participating in scripted restorative conferences. This is the notion that tight adherence to a 
concept such as a script removes our autonomy with language. Further, limiting our freedoms 
with language, and our responsibility to the words we use, closes down our capacity or need 
for recognition from others producing cold and bloodless theorising, of those that speak not in 
truth but, to paraphrase Shakespeare in that glib and oily art.  Together with his writing on 
passionate utterance, Cavell’s writing calls on schools to place its participants within a 





In order to conclude my thoughts on what passionate utterance is, or why it is so important, 
there is a little more to be said on the matter of Cavell’s drawing on the term ‘improvisation’ in 
reference to the disorders of desire. Although we can still see that scripts do have a role to 
play, we should consider how restorative practitioners might make room for improvisation and 
how they then might reinforce the idea of unpredictability in relation to another. One such 
way of representing how dialogic interaction benefits from a quality of improvisation is to 
consider it metaphorically as jazz music. I want to briefly draw on literature that places value 
on the place of improvisation in educational settings. For instance, in recent years literature 
examining the interaction of jazz musicians with each other (Lewis, 2013; Hickey, 2009), and 
the emergence of jazz as a model for critiquing teaching mathematical strategies (Neyland, 
2004), has proved useful when searching for a metaphor that provides us not with ‘logical 
reasoning, but insight and imagination’ (Neyland, 2004, p. 8). In rejecting previously 
established jazz methodologies and historical systems to instead focus on the art of listening, 
Lewis’ model of deep listening enables restorative practitioners to see how they might position 
themselves not as authority figure but as improviser. As such, her central role turns away from 
being one who facilitates pupils towards prepared outcomes, towards one who must ‘listen 
and reflectively respond’ (Lewis, 2013, p. 257). Lewis’ exploration of the activity of 
improvisation as an engagement with the music appears to reflect ‘a dialogical relationship 
between improviser and musical entity’ (ibid.). Through establishing dialogue, Lewis concludes 
how the improviser can be ‘surprised’ by an idea she has heard and musically follow the 
impression in a new direction. Lewis claims the dialogical interplay between improviser, music 
and herself as facilitator allows improvisation to be ‘more than a private, self-referential 
language’ (Lewis, 2013, p. 257). Indeed, to take part in the dialogue as a member opens 
musical awareness up as ‘a puzzle […] revealing itself with pieces that we were both hearing 
for the first time, the whole of which neither of us knew’ (ibid.). Lewis’ blurring of boundaries 
between listener and performer, of listening to the player and ‘speaking’ back to them is, she 
states, descriptive of a dialogic relationship that is in recognition of the ‘Other’(ibid.).  
According to the study of improvisation as a cognitive process, improvisation first requires an 
internalisation of the patterns and models. It is only after establishing a solid level of 
musicianship that players can experiment with form and structure, making it the music they 
want to hear and play. Might I have outlined a compelling argument for practitioners to begin 
such conferences script in hand and at a certain point, perhaps after the introductions and 
explanations, put these down so that ‘passion’ can be injected? Or perhaps I am saying that 





the conference by ear, extracting certain phrases from memory like common riffs in an 
improvisation pattern? Despite the belief of its benefits to pupils, improvisation itself presents 
a risk. Is it possible to safely teach, or guide, someone through a complex task that requires no 
preparation? Is it ethical?  
There are some considerable barriers implicit in this thinking. Jazz as a metaphor for 
mathematics teaching speaks of a more cautionary approach. Like Lewis, and Fulford, Neyland 
(2004) critiques current educational approaches as following a ‘linear planning model [where] 
the outcomes of the production process are set in advance, and the system […] is monitored 
and controlled to ensure that these outcomes are achieved’ (p. 10). In this the traditional, 
linear model is contra to the way that most experienced teachers work in the classroom, which 
can be more accurately dubbed to follow a ‘complexity model’ (p. 11).35 By adapting his 
teaching framework to the complexity model, teachers and students are portrayed not as 
walking through pre-determined linear outcomes, but together becoming a learning 
organisation that ‘[lays] down a path while walking’ (ibid.). A complexity model is indicative of 
how restorative practitioners may still use scripts to teach themselves, and their pupils, while 
still facilitating free improvisation.  
However, a complexity model, no matter the number of contributing parts, still insists on a 
conception of education in narrow technical terms. To suggest an alternative, re-thinking of 
improvisation, I turn back to Cavell and his connection to jazz. In his autobiographical writing 
Cavell recounts his early experiences with playing lead alto saxophone in a swing band (Cavell, 
2010). His greatest source of musical inspiration, Tim Gould (1998) writes how the method of 
Cavell’s philosophy is derived from writing described as musical in its composition. Not only is 
its style an expression of his philosophical project, but the expression of his voice highlights 
that processes of thinking and learning are not linear, very often we are made to return to the 
beginning to re-run a particularly elusive concept. Not everything follows from everything; 
unpredictability has an unpredictable value.  
A discourse of knowing what is said and what to say is discussed by Cavell. In showing what 
might be achieved by understanding just what to say and how to say it, I draw on his use of the 
term ‘perfect pitch’ (Cavell, 1994a). We associate the term with a musician’s extraordinary 
ability to hear and reproduce notes perfectly correctly. Cavell makes much of the fact he was 
 
35 Taken from systems theory, a complexity model is described as a multi-component system in which 






not born with a musician’s perfect pitch. However, he finds equivalence in the sound of 
philosophy, hearing a musical performance that is by way of Austin, ‘in its own way, with the 
possession of an ear, was surely part of its attraction and authority’ (Cavell, 2010, pp. 321-
322). Cavell’s writing, his voice in philosophy, is pitched to communicate his thinking as 
perfectly as possible. In dialogue, that sense of perfect communication necessitates finding a 
version of perfect pitch. Not easy since ‘the feature of perfect pitch is apt to be the hardest to 
recognise, and the most variously or privately ratified’ (Cavell, 1994a, p. 47). Cavell hears it in 
his mother’s pitch-perfect response to a young couple shopping for a wedding ring at the 
family pawn shop; a white lie over the authenticity of her own emerald, delivered lightly to 
spare the duo some frustration. He hears it in his father’s statement at the dinner table, the 
Jewish belief that there is one moment in every twenty-four hours in which God grants a wish, 
a wish he was composing at that very moment. Finally, Cavell summarises his impressions as 
‘the title of experiences ranging from ones amounting to conversions down to small but lucid 
attestations that the world holds a blessing in store, that one is in Emerson’s and Nietzsche’s 
image, taking steps, walking on, on one’s own’ (ibid). These illustrations may be considered as 
trivial for such a grand idea, but in doing so, Cavell makes a point about philosophy or teaching 
as mattering only in its orientation towards the other and what in that moment will please her 
to hear. Good practice will always be alert for tone, gesture and tempo in dialogue. 
Accordingly, the restorative practitioner will find space to alter the predetermined path, the 
perfectly scripted path, where she listens for perfect pitch.  
That restorative practice facilitates dialogue for those affected by wrongdoing and those 
responsible for wrongdoing is an important principle. That this facilitation requires 
supplementing by scripts is practical in its outlook. Nevertheless, tight adherence to the script 
will contribute to supressing ‘healthy, caring communication which fosters nurturing 
relationships’ (Vaandering, 2014, p. 78). In the ongoing pursuit for creating a more relational 
culture the music of jazz improvisation shows us how unrehearsed activity, thinking on our 
feet, allows us to attune to another and in doing so to reveal a relationship based on reflective 
response. It is the possibility of doing something new or different while remaining true to 
habitual patterns. Understanding the place of improvisation and the incorporation of risk 
taking suggests a commitment to speaking for oneself or ‘daring to say’ (Cavell, 1994b, p. 114). 
For the restorative practitioner, who gladly adopts such strategies as an antithesis to 
traditional, authoritative forms of behaviour management, such risk-taking confirms a 
commitment in her confidence to teach, to repair harm, to know and to perfectly pitch that 





philosophies: intellectual quality, connectedness, support, and value. We see that the 
transformative nature of restorative practice, that the mediating aspects of institutional 
culture hope to espouse through didactic scripting, is a ‘poor distortion, an impersonation of a 
genuine educative experience’ (Doddington, 2015, p. 11). Perfect pitch, with its emphasis on 
dialogue, always reveals an orientation to the other that cannot be derived from plotting a 
precise and predictable path. Despite the mandate that conferences should not harm 
participants, certainly there should be no huge surprises that jeopardise safety, ‘dialogue 
should not be so orchestrated that there is no room for the unexpected, for it is precisely the 
unexpected that frequently leads to significant exchanges among participants’ (Umbreit et al., 
2007, pp. 32–33). 
My argument is that it is this aspect of unpredictability, challenge and risk, tempered by our 
ability to pitch perfectly, that reveals what must be central to the restorative conference. 
Cavell’s ideas around passionate utterance show how our responsibility to words, to the 
language that we use, is the gateway to a richer inheritance of ideas through which we can 
build notions of self, and voice. This is unmistakably more than the pupil’s wish to align herself 
with the values of restorative conferencing, in other words to volunteer herself as accepting 
her role in the script. It is rather to offer her assertion as exemplary in some way, testing this 
against the responses of others, and testing her own responses against what those others 
themselves say. Cavell considers this issue of voicelessness, ventriloquism, and the forcing of 
voice in greater depth in his readings of Hollywood film (Cavell, 1996; 1981), and his 
autobiographical writing. In the next chapter, I will continue examining themes of one’s 
emerging voice: how it is shaped through the telling of one’s story, and the role of the 






Chapter 5  
Striving for Stories: Disruption and Self-Transformation 
5.1 Scenario 
SCENE TWO  
 
“Tell me the story” 
 
MS SHAH 
Okay Nicky, I’d like you to tell me the story of what happened.  
 
NICKY 
Well, I accidentally knocked my bottle of water over the table. 
I think I forgot to put the lid back on. Suddenly, she starts 








Okay. Like I said she ripped up my work for no reason. 
 
MS SHAH 
Nazreen, can you summarise what you heard Nicky say. Please 
start your summary with “you said”. 
 
NAZREEN 
You said you accidentally knocked your bottle of water over my 











I feel angry cos everyone was looking, and my work got ruined.  
 
MS SHAH 
Nazreen, please say what you just heard Nicky say. 
 
NAZREEN 
You said you feel angry and you said that everyone was looking, 
and your work was ruined. 
 
MS SHAH 
Nazreen, I’d like you to tell me your story. 
 
NAZREEN 
Nicky always stops me from working. She’s always talking or 
getting up and getting me into trouble. When she knocked her 
water over my work, she just laughed. 
 
MS SHAH 
Nicky, can you summarise what Nazreen just said. Please start 
the summary with “you said”. 
 
NICKY 
You said that I always stop you from working. You said that I’m 
always getting you into trouble and you said that I knocked the 
water over and laughed. 
 
MS SHAH 
Nazreen, how do you feel about what happened? 
 
NAZREEN 
I was really angry and frustrated. I didn’t mean to rip her work 
up, it just happened. 
 
MS SHAH 







I feel upset. I shouldn’t have done it, but she shouldn’t have 
laughed at me. 
 
MS SHAH 
Is there any more information that we need to know? (Nazreen and 
Nicky shake their heads “no”). Do you think that the other 
person has recognised what you have both experienced related to 
this conflict? 
 
(Nazreen and Nicky say “yes”). 
**** 
5.2 The Human Capacity for Story 
Anthropologists tell us that the narrative urge is encoded in our DNA, that fundamentally we 
humans are story-telling apes (Sanders Pollock, 1948). A primal, symbiotic exchange between 
teller and listener, telling stories imparts the essential learning tools of life, knowledge, 
feelings, culture, and morality. Philosophers acknowledge the human aptitude for storytelling 
as a fundamental structure of human meaning making, ‘a metacode, a human universal’ 
(White, 1990, p. 1). Stories are used as moral guides, in the case of the Bible parables, or 
fictional aids to help us live through other more fantastical lives. In life, we understand our 
actions through fitting into stories (Kerby, 1991). These stories are then tied together, 
becoming a construction of narratives that inform continuity in an individual’s life (McIntyre, 
1991). This is much more than merely saying that we communicate through stories, for as 
Randall and Kenyon (2004) state: ‘to be a person is to have a story. More than that, it is to be a 
story’ (p. 1). Jerome Bruner’s (1986) approach to narrative theory has been proposed as a way 
of understanding cognition, including memory and identity. A deeply rooted structure that 
underpins thinking, narrative, comprising both the story content and the story telling, can be a 
creative act used to fuel holistic, humanistic pedagogies that are capable of not merely passing 
on information, or innovation, but inviting learners to become different (Keehn, 2015; Willis 
2011).  
While oral tradition and storytelling cultures have been used for thousands of years and have 





the idea of story has recently found its way into many disciplines that open up forms of telling 
about experience that not only looks at the content, but asks why was it told in that way, and 
to what effect (Kohler-Reissman, 2008). The strong endorsement given to narrative is 
especially important in the social sciences where a persuasive intention to ‘think of the 
continuity and wholeness of an individual’s life experience’ (Clandinin and Connelly, 2000, p. 
17) make up the discipline of life story analysis. Against this density, and richness, of related 
experience, the conventions of narrative analysis provides a helpful means with which to 
address ‘the messiness of human experience in order to infer the meaning of actions, 
motivations, cause and effect, connections’ (Schiff, 2012 np). An artificial composite, the 
vagaries of story, for example, repetition, fragmentation, or forgetting, are subtly manipulated 
in favour of the desire to create a transportive story that holds value for the listener. This is 
because, unlike their empirical counterparts, such researchers are interested in humans and 
their relationships, both with themselves and their environment. 
There is another aspect to story and relation, besides the human ability to transcend great 
violence, which is entrenched in our capacity to learn. This is grounded in the work of Carl Jung 
(1991) whose identification of a series of primary archetypes in world mythologies argues that 
fairy stories are symbolic expressions of the child’s inner experience. Techniques such as 
listening to stories, oral re-tells, role-paying, and school-based writing lend a deep appeal with 
which to understand the events and actions of one’s life that ‘help the child to understand the 
world [in which] they live, and to establish a relationship between what they know and 
experience’ (Yazici and Bolay, 2017, p. 815). Indeed, observations of children as young as two, 
with the help of experienced tellers, suggest that they are able to tell stories of their past, of 
entertainment and affirmation (Miller, 1997). By drawing on the interface between our own 
personal stories, and folktales or traditional stories, children can identify with the kinds of 
carefully planned and sequential familiar patterns that aim to teach good and evil 
(mythmaking structures) and that decisions have consequences (Humadi Genisio and Soundy, 
1994).  
The common language of myth, as reflective of human experience, has been used to bring 
together both the educational and the therapeutic encounter. Literature, in the form of story, 
myth, or metaphors, is used to represent conflict, its distance enabling those suffering from 
trauma to safely explore potential solutions to problems. Using myths and tales to represent 
some aspect of problem-solving and development, Gersie and King (1992), developed practical 
advice for teachers, therapists and counsellors working with adults in post-trauma 





and counsellors working in schools with a focus on the role of the facilitator. In small group 
workshops, pupils are encouraged to make connections based on their experiences, to engage 
in personal reflection, and to take the opportunity to share and assert their experiences with 
others. 
5.3 Story in the Restorative Conference 
Drawing on the rich literature permeating the human capacity for story, proponents of 
restorative practice can state that it is one’s story that allows pupils the capacity to express 
moral agency, and to make meaningful choices. When narration falls on deaf ears, or is made 
incoherent through ability or attitude, victimisation continues. Therefore, by integrating 
aspects of story into a coherent meaningful narrative, not only does the speaker make sense, 
but the disparate parts are integrated into a whole that is, narratively speaking, personally 
satisfying to the listener. In subtle nuances of direction, facilitators can shift the focus onto, or 
into, these ‘normative’ (Urban Walker, 1998, p. 128) aspects, meaning we can teach what is 
right or wrong by asking ‘children to agree with us on our views of the story’ (Savage-
McMahon, 2010 np). Unlike the idea of behaviour management, which is largely about 
compliance, restorative practices influence behaviour change through fostering an ‘ethical and 
a relational action’ (Drewery and Kecskemeti, 2010, p. 111). 
The link between story, healing and transformation, in restorative practice takes on a more 
nuanced sense when considering the etymology of ‘restorative’. Originally from the French 
restoratif, its modern meaning contains the impression of vitality, new strength, and 
revivification. This interpretation points to healing that centres on the recovery or re-creation 
of the self and the possibilities that this offers. Given that restorative practice is distinguished 
primarily for its restoration to relation (meaning to rebuild, repair, or return to an original 
state) this further concept conveys something of the way the practice can produce a 





marginalised in positions of power once more.36 This is seen in Cavanagh et al’s., (2014) study 
of the implementation of restorative conferencing in a large American high school whose 
Latino/Hispanic students were at risk of the school to prison pipeline. The use of restorative 
practice’s creation of story, or testimony was found to ‘legitimate their voices’ (p. 566) by 
representing the reality of their experiences. The engagement of the school’s teachers and 
community with these stories resulted in a ‘Culture of Care’ (p. 575) that ensured several 
actions taken to address the issues raised, foremost of which were those that actively changed 
the culture of the school by decreasing discipline referrals and increasing restorative practices. 
For Cavanagh’s students, the production of alternate stories was based on acknowledgement 
and is related to the understanding that language and stories are the shapers of our reality. In 
inviting the other into useful dialogue, different perspectives based on other experiences are 
brought forward rather than being silenced. This involves being taught the skill of focussed 
reflection through ‘appreciative inquiry’ (Drewery and Kecskemeti, 2010, p. 105). In this the 
facilitator adopts a position of ‘respectful curiosity as opposed to making assumptions’ (ibid.), 
and by using a ‘patient and persistent exploration of the meanings that others make of the 
same event that requires attention to the effects of different ways of speaking’ (ibid.).  
Cavanagh’s work recognises that, despite the emphasis on telling the story, the production of 
story in a culture of accountability is often difficult in restorative conferences where tacit 
assumption presumes that the role of the facilitator is to control process and procedure. Let 
me consider this by returning to the continuing scenario between Nazreen, Nicky and Ms Shah. 
It is interesting to note that although there is a great deal of honesty, and emotion, in how 
both pupils attempt to re-tell events surrounding their conflict, their dialogue lacks the 
freedom that my previous chapter regarded as characterising the potential for ethical relation. 
Instead, what emerges as the story, ‘what to ask whom, and when’, are ‘matters of judgment’ 
for the teacher (Hopkins, 2004, p. 99). Not only must she connect various fragments of a story 
into a suitable chronology, she must also ascertain the veracity and reliability of what is being 
told. For example, Ms Shah draws out her pupils’ stories using detailed ‘social markers’ from 
 
36 This is also influenced by research in the field of indigenous educational research, the connection 
between the effect of such silencing, and the enforcement of troubling national narratives, has been 
keenly written as leading to the dismantling of indigenous knowledge, and of an aboriginal defined 
sense of self, beliefs, rights or truths (Stock et al., 2012). Storytelling, therefore, provides an appropriate 
and culturally sensitive technique’ (Lessard et al., 2018) that ‘focuses on the privileging of indigenous 
voices and stories/yarns as a means of changing health outcomes for indigenous people and their 
communities’ (Geia et al., 2013, p. 13).  Their processes of deconstruction, including for instance, the 
questioning of dominant stories, weakens the grip of negative, unhealthy dominance, and leads to a 





her script: for example, ‘Nicky, I’d like you to tell me the story, Nazreen, how has the conflict 
affected your emotions? Can you tell me more about that?’. While useful for prompting her 
pupils, questions or statements of this manner allow the facilitator to reflect what she has 
heard in a way that retains the essence of the statement, but without the angry or accusatory 
manner in which it might have been presented. Proponents call this type of verbal structuring 
re-framing, likening its purpose to that of a picture frame. When the story is full of blame, 
insults or accusation, the framing of the picture is big and thick, meaning that the central 
picture is unlikely to be seen (Hopkins, 2004). Pursuing a course of re-framing allows the 
facilitator to push back at the old frame allowing for the creation of meaning that will 
‘transform an otherwise destructive event into a teaching and learning situation’ (Claassen and 
Claassen, 2015, p. 3).  
The skill by which the facilitator directs the emerging stories is considered a positive act of re-
storying and derives from a socio-constructivist approach to teaching and learning (Drewery 
and Kecskemeti, 2010). Popular in schools in that it encourages learners to use language to 
bring into being new knowledge through building on previous experience (Steffe and Gale, 
1995) social-constructivism does not only bring ideas or impressions into focus, it has 
important implications for how relationship, and identity are framed. To explain, let me take 
Martin et al.’s critique of ‘the generic structure of conferencing’ (Martin et al., 2009, p. 221) 
which critiques restorative conferencing’s focus on the construction of an account that renders 
story as ‘flat’ and ‘ideational’.  
Looked at in terms turn-taking, what is significant here is that the Convenor 
initiates virtually all exchanges and introduces virtually all explicit evaluation, to 
which the young person responds compliantly a word or phrase at a time. The 
result is an interpretation of the recount determined by the Convener – it’s the 
Convener, not the young person, who controls what the recount means (Martin et 
al., 2009, pp. 235–236). 
In my scenario, this is represented by the significant difference in how the pupils speak, and 
how Ms Shah speaks. The absence of any kind of feeling of appreciative inquiry and 
accompanying prosody of speech questions the act of story as meaningfully healing or 
transformative.  
Martin et al., suggest that the practice of ‘deconstructive reflection’ (ibid.) should be used in 
order to look carefully at how story is conceptualised in the restorative conference and 





good teaching and learning. However, this is not the kind of deconstruction of authorship, or 
disruption of hegemony, that I am thinking about producing here. In contrast, I want to think 
more purposefully about the ‘socio-ethical’ (Waldegrave, 2012, p. 3) layers that telling one’s 
story might encourage. How might the instruments of storytelling, namely their dedication to 
chronology, borrowing from therapy, and use of account, and facilitation, reflect thoroughly on 
restorative practice’s own socio-ethical responsibilities? Hence in this chapter, where story is 
expected to follow a pre-existing structure, I draw on Cavell’s autobiography Little Did I Know: 
Excerpts from Memory (2010) that together with a reading of Emersonian moral perfectionism 
(Cavell, 1990) rejects a teleological understanding of a final ideal state. Where story is 
considered to be a therapeutic endeavour, I turn to Cavell’s idea of the arrogation of voice as a 
questioning of philosophy’s right to speak for humanity and which entails a form of work on 
the self (Cavell, 1994a). Where story is more straightforwardly an account of what has 
happened, I present Cavell’s reading of account, and accounting, in Walden Pond, presenting 
the notion that more is at stake in recovery of voice than simply caring for the self. Finally, in 
disrupting the facilitator, I want to show that a concern with voice and with citizenship is 
illustrative of entering an educatively, ethical relationship with others in which one’s teacher, 
or facilitator, represents a continual self-questioning regarding the oldest of matters: how shall 
I live? 
5.4 Disruption of Chronology 
5.4.1 Autobiographical Writing 
Given what we know of the theorisation of narrative forms, what is expected of 
autobiographical writing? Originating from the Greek words for ‘self’, ‘life’, and ‘write’ (Smith 
and Watson, 2001), autobiography is a style of writing that has been around nearly as long as 
history has been recorded. A historical overview of the study of autobiography can be traced 
from St Augustine’s Confessions (1961), although the term autobiography as a genre was not 
coined until 1809 when Robert Southey attempted to describe the work of a Portuguese poet 
(Anderson, 2001). Stated to be a notoriously difficult genre to define, due to the thinking that 
there are no limitations on how a life can be revealed, be it through the recording of a 
memorable period of life, essay, diary, or travelogue (Bates, 1937), its commonalities can be 
grouped together in distinctive characteristics. Schwalm (2014) characterises autobiographical 
writing as signifying a retrospective, autodiegetic narration that undertakes to tell the author’s 





given historical, social and cultural framework. This classic idea of autobiography leads 
Anderson (2001) to cite Phillipe Lejeune’s definition of autobiography as a ‘retrospective prose 
narrative produced by a real person concerning his own existence and focusing on his 
individual life, in particular, on the development of his personality’ (2001, p. 2). The classic 
first-person subsequent narration told from the point of view from the present, and 
epitomised by Rousseau and Goethe is its most classic shape. While often claiming to be 
factual, or real, autobiography remains in nature an imaginative construct whose self-
fashioning is described as: 
An oscillation between the struggle for truthfulness and creativity, between 
oblivion, concealment, hypocrisy, self-deception and self-conscious fictionalizing, 
autobiography renders a story of personality formation, or Bildungsgeschichte’ 
(Schwalm, 2014 np). 
 Autobiography’s focus on the self lends a secularisation and temporalisation of experience 
that invites, as per the Confessions, the construction of its subject ad exemplum. This spiritual 
mode of autobiographical writing divides the life into ‘clear-cut phases centred round the 
moment of conversion’ (Schwalm, 2014 np) offers up a new self. Hence, autobiography 
enables the narrator to look at the past from a different perspective and to use this knowledge 
as a means towards self-growth and practical change in which the longing to tell one’s story 
and the process of telling conceptualises ‘both a sense of reunion and a sense of release’ 
(hooks, 1989, p. 158).  
5.4.2 Cavell’s Story 
From the perspective of trying to understand story in restorative practice, autobiography as a 
site for psychological introspection, a sense of historicity, and a problematic relationship with 
authenticity is worth exploring in relation to Stanley Cavell’s autobiographical work Little Did I 
Know: Excerpts from Memory (2010).37 In doing so, I do not want to strive for an extensive 
literary analysis of presentations of Cavell as self and subject, but instead want to show how 
close reading of certain passages show points of disruption with restorative practice’s idea of 
self-realisation through the establishment of linearity as safety. Disrupting this is a central part 
of self-representation in Little Did I Know and is fascinating in the work’s representation of 
complex handling of chronology which I have illustrated in Figures 6 and 7: 
 
















Figure 7 (Visual extract: Cavell, 2010, pp. 10–11) 
Figure 6 attempts to show the way Cavell’s entries are dated in chronological order, the 
stamping of which allows Cavell a form of temporal anchor with which to describe the current 
events of the day (for instance we begin ‘July 2, 2003’ with an announcement of impending 
heart surgery). Cavell states that the obvious point in dating the times of writing are to keep 
Contents 
Part 1 (July 2 through July 17, 2003)                                                                                                  1 
Catheterizing the heart. – What is a life in brief, and perhaps not so brief? […] Sacramento 
and pawn shops […] 
Part 2 (July 20 through July 28, 2003)                                                                                             54 
Is it the wrong religion or the wrong age that has marked me for inclusion? […] Back and 
forth between Atlanta and Sacramento […] 
Part 3 (July 29 through August 15, 2003)                                                                                       96 
I bury a bottle in Sacramento.- The hum of the world.- What is an impression? […] Back to 
Sacramento, Back to Atlanta […] 





apart ‘two necessary temporal registers in a narrative’ (p. 60), that is, ‘the time of the depicted 
sequence of events and the time of depicting them’ (ibid.). Beginning with a specific memory, 
Cavell’s bargain with himself is to write whatever comes to mind, pursuing various memories 
that arise or continue to arise ‘however indecisive or inchoate’ (p. 60) as far as the initial 
impulse carries. Figure 7 shows another dated entry, ‘July 6th, 2003’, under which Cavell’s 
narrative is given such expression. Beginning his recollection aged ‘fourteen or fifteen years 
old’, he skips ahead in the next paragraph to the period of his PhD defence in 1962, later 
finishing with an anecdote of his father around the time of his tenth year.  
In this, Cavell’s double time stamp can be said to reflect the duality of the autobiographical 
person who is divided into the narrating I and the narrated I (Smith and Watson, 2001). This 
means that in the act of writing about what they know best, the unity of the I disintegrates 
into ‘both the observing subject and the object of investigation, remembrance, and 
contemplation’ (p. 1). There is one very clear and disconcerting aspect to this separation. Gone 
are the (perhaps) standard expectations of clear, straightforward prose that lead the reader 
from one occasion in time to the next sequential event. These often-repeated returns to the 
same occurrences are frequently and densely interspersed with other recollections from other 
ages with his developments in philosophy, both as it stands, and as it is currently being 
written. The oscillation between ground that has been covered and that which is yet to come 
along, together with, the extended passages of recollection and contemplation, the abrupt 
changes of register, and the haphazard, blended narration of events both contemporary and 
(semi)-remembered, provides a backdrop of continuing uncertainty and complexity that 
disrupts the reader from becoming comfortable in her reading.  
In ‘classic’ autobiography, the aim of narrative is to reach the ‘pseudo-static’ present point. 
This is firmly linked to the notion of the individual, who evolves by means of propulsion 
towards the narrative present, the pinnacle of their self-recognition. While narrative tells a 
story that is not necessarily dependent on the order of events, convention dictates that 
autobiography is mostly linear, or chronological. Such a narrative, Cavell writes, ‘strikes me as 
leading fairly directly to death without clearly enough implying the singularity of this life, in 
distinction from the singularity of all others, all headed in that direction’ (p. 4). Instead, Cavell 
is interested in ‘what Freud calls the detours on the human path to death – accidents avoided 
or embraced, strangers taken to heart or neglected, talents imposed or transfigured, malice 
insufficiently rebuked, love inadequately acknowledged – [that] mark out for me recognizable 
efforts to achieve my own death’ (p. 4). These detours are how Cavell explores, like a well-





surround him, signalling that it is not only the superior ‘interpreting’ position of the narrative 
present that remains paramount but each previous moment of experience. 
5.4.3 Story and Self-Care 
Even though the ‘duration’ (the time span covered) in fact remains the same, the disruption of 
temporal ground disrupts the moment of self-recognition conventionally unfurled as the end 
of storytelling. A straightforward account of a straightforward life will have its benefits, not 
least the assumption of death at the end. It is true that modernist writers have famously 
experimented with fragmentation in autobiographical writing, by subverting chronology and 
splitting the subject (Virginia Woolf), by writing an autobiography not of past events but of the 
future (Guy de Maupassant), by highlighting the role of language (James Joyce), or 
transforming fact into fiction (Marcel Proust). Cavell’s attempt at disruption manifests as a 
getting in the way of his own story as if blocking the course of a river from completing its 
journey to the sea, perhaps to explain something further or direct the reader’s attention to 
another work. What motivates this deliberate obfuscation? What is ethical in doing so? The 
answer to why we might favour Cavell’s approach lies in questioning how our story matters to 
us, and those around us. In this, I reminded of the Socratic ethic of self-care, in particular the 
famous dictum that the unexamined life is not worth living. Living an ethical life requires the 
ability to leave behind what is certain, and clear, to examine how shall I live?  
As a form of ethics, the notion that the aims of education involve a kind of therapy is not at all 
new. Those that cannot spend time in self -reflection are accused of failing to live a fully 
human life. Socrates repeatedly spoke of epimeleia heautou, or care of the self, to live a 
virtuous life: 
 Are you not ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth […] as 
possible while you do not care for […] wisdom or truth, or the best possible state 
of your soul ?”1 the importance of which is caring for the soul’ believing that it is 
the state of the inner life (or soul), that determines the quality of our life38 (Plato 
tr. Grube, 2002). 
Socratic ethics construed that proper care of the self is necessary to be able to care for others. 
In the late 20th century, educational interest in caring for the self led to the idea of self-esteem 
and the encouragement of positive self-image. Both assumptions have been fundamental in 
 





suggesting that teaching practice must be primed to create a strong therapeutic culture in 
education. By this venture, Cavell’s disruption of chronology is consistent with his growth, in 
other words, his caring for the soul:  
In my case the experiment of calling upon a steady companionship of philosophy 
in telling my life involved a decision, or it was coming accidentally upon the simple 
thought, to begin entries of memories by dating myself on each day of writing 
(not however on consciously doubling back for the purposes of editing or 
elaborating an entry), allowing me to follow a double time scheme, so that I can 
accept an invitation in any present from or to any past, as memory serves and 
demands to be served, that seems to have freed me to press onward with my 
necessity to find an account of myself without denying that I may be at a loss as to 
who it is that any time, varying no doubt with varying times, to whom or for 
whom I am writing. What is thus further left explicitly open is precisely what 
counts as the time of philosophy (Cavell, 2010, pp. 8–9). 
Many autobiographical narratives will claim as their impetus the freedom to grow, and change, 
yet there are few who ‘try to make the telling of their lives consonant with their philosophical 
commitments’ (Dumm, 2013 np). From the perspective of trying to understand Cavell’s psyche, 
bringing one’s past and one’s memories together involves making some sort of pact with 
himself. In autobiography, pact is usually referred to as the communicative act in which the 
identifying author (found on the book cover), the textual narrator and the subject-protagonist 
are bound in silent consciousness (Anderson, 2001). However, I do not think this is quite the 
pact that Cavell advances. There is a sense of deliberate alienation from oneself. Cavell sees 
himself at a loss that detracts from our own impending pact with this account, in that to 
author one’s life presupposes the assumption that one should speak confidently, and 
authoritatively, about such matters. While I have started with the notion that finding one’s self 
is concomitant with accounts that are shaped by an ingrained ‘unity and linearity’ (Smeyers et 
al., 2007, p. 61), I want to further this inherited disruption by exploring implications of the 
trust that we place in the articulation of one’s story, that is to say, one’s voice. The obvious 
indebtedness of this train of thought, to Freud, lends peremptory authority to the assertion 
that memory is linked to therapy, that therapy will initiate a recovery of the self, and therefore 
that entry into such will help to find an account of myself. That therapy provides the basis for 





5.5 Disruption of Therapy 
In attempting to write her own autobiography, the American author and social activist bell 
hooks (1989) discovers that ‘there was very clearly something blocking my ability to tell my 
story’ (p. 156). Afraid that this inability meant psychologically she was not ready to let go of 
her childhood experience; hooks realises she needs to find ‘some catalyst for that block to 
move’ (ibid.). For hooks, the spark comes in the form of an affair with a young man. hooks 
recalls that in his company she is able to recollect forgotten, even repressed memories. 
Likening her connection with him to a hypnotic state, she describes how the connections she 
forms enable her to lower her emotional barriers and enter fully into those past experiences.  
Her description of remembering in ‘a surreal dreamlike style’ (ibid.) are reminiscent of 
techniques of narrative therapy derived from Freudian psychoanalytic theory. From his 
experiments with hypnosis, Sigmund Freud developed a new kind of therapeutic treatment 
that allowed his patients the freedom to talk about whatever came to mind (Hall, 1954). Freud 
drew on varied narratives, including patients’ dreams, memories, thoughts and emotions, 
analysing the material to provide a psychological cure. Naming the process ‘free association’, 
Freud developed his theories in Studies of Hysteria (Breuer and Freud, 2004), famously 
concluding that symptoms of hysteria were symbolic representations of hidden, early, 
traumatic memory. During the twentieth century, the key tenets of Freudian psychoanalytic 
theories became extremely influential, challenging the ancient, paradigmatic pursuit of factual 
truthfulness in favour of a more meaningful narrative mode of cognition (Parry and Doan, 
1994). These two modes of thinking are ‘complementary yet irreducible’ (Bruner, 1986, p. 11). 
While the paradigmatic mode will seek to clarify or conceptualise what is true, the narrative 
mode provides meaning and connection in a way that reassures the listener ‘that things 
happen as they do because they take place in a moral universe’ (p. 3). Moreover, the 
meaningful temporal continuum that narrative gives to life intelligibility, suggested by thinkers 
such as McIntyre (1981), and Ricouer (1984), has allowed modern day narrative therapy to 
allow people to see the course of their lives as a series of personal choices.  
A theory of externalisation (White and Epston, 1990) serves to separate a person from 
oppressive effects of the problem. Taking the notion that reality is a social construct, 
influenced and communicated through language, a person’s stories and storytelling are used in 
order to bring forth specific experiences that promise to have healing potential. These so-
called ‘rich’ or ‘thick’ descriptions are stated to be the actuality of a person’s lived experience, 





narrative approach, much attention is paid to the multiplicity and complexity of experience. By 
the time we reach later life, the sheer volume of self-created stories that have accompanied 
the person means that she can only create a partial representation of experience. In addition, 
these ‘partial maps’ (p. 45) are at best selective, at worst, inaccurate. Representing story 
accurately, therefore, becomes less important than the making of a new story. By linking 
together selected life events, ‘like drawing connecting lines in a matrix of dots’ (p. 72), the 
story one chooses to tell makes no claim to be a mirror of life, but an independent artefact, an 
entirely new constructed entity. Therapy, in these terms, is not limited to a process of storying 
but of re-storying, a process by which ‘the co-creation of new liberating narratives’ (p. x) takes 
place.  
5.5.1 The Therapy of Cavell 
My notes on the background of narrative therapy are important for setting the rest of this 
chapter into context. Like hooks herself, the notion that telling one’s story is psychologically 
healing is a notion that Cavell inspires when during Little Did I Know he recalls memories of 
himself in therapy. Leaving Julliard, and his ambitions for a life of music, has Cavell wondering 
‘whether I might go to pieces’ (Cavell, 2010, p. 226). Cavell’s reading of Freud, and his tinkering 
with the idea of gaining entry to medical school to practise psychoanalytic therapy, lends 
strength to the idea of story as healing. This becomes more salient regarding his opening 
passage:  
The catheterization of my heart will no longer be postponed. My cardiologist 
announces that he has lost confidence in his understanding of my condition so far 
based on reports of what I surmise as symptoms of angina and of the noninvasive 
monitoring allowed by X-rays and by the angiograms produced in stress tests. We 
must actually look at what is going on inside the heart (Cavell, 2010, p. 1). 
While Cavell’s writing is characterised by his dense, lyrical prose and eloquence, it is 
uncertainty that is the true driving force for this complex, philosophical work. To state that 
Little Did I Know begins with doubt belies the seriousness of the situation. This is not merely 
due to the smaller, or larger, anxieties that undergoing a critical procedure confers. It is a very 
real possibility that on looking inside his heart, the sum of Cavell’s life choices will result in 
nothing more than a catalogue of ineptitudes, failures, and disasters. In Cavell’s idea of story, 
we are made to understand that a necessary condition for looking inside the heart requires an 





In facing down this supposition, Cavell states his autobiographical intention as a way to ‘begin 
learning whether I can write my way into and through anxiety by telling the story of my life’ (p. 
2). Throughout his autobiography he discusses the problems of uncertainty. These anxieties 
are multiple: from a dissertation that no one understood, the public acceptance of his 
philosophy, the task of revisiting the painful memories of a lonely childhood, in which he was 
left to fend for himself for much of the time, to the descriptions of his father’s rage and hatred 
that led the young Cavell to suffer ‘the moment I described as dating my knowledge that my 
father wanted me dead, or rather wanted me not to exist’ (p. 18). These stories cast a long, 
cold shadow over the whole of Little Did I Know, yet each visitation concludes with a kind of 
resolving, or ‘a gesture of redemption’ (p. 118). It is not the safety of a linear approach that 
allows Cavell to reorient himself but the sustained act of finding his story wherever and 
whenever that may be, as this memorable extract demonstrates: 
To recognize the end of the day and get to bed, I developed the ritual of eating a 
box of Oreo cookies together with a can of applesauce. But really the ritual is 
equally describable as an effort to stop myself from eating the entire box of 
cookies, a sequence of five (was it?) pairs, each pair stacked in a pleated pliable 
plastic cup, and from finishing the accompanying applesauce, having conceived 
the idea that this was not a sensible diet. I slowed the eating by inventing new 
ways of going through the cookies. One way was to nibble around the 
circumference of a cookie before finishing off the remaining rough-edged center; 
another was to twist apart the two wafers of each Oreo, eat of the sugary middle 
spread from whichever of the wafers it largely adhered to, intending to eat only 
that one of the double cookies. But each night I lost the battle to stop eating 
before the package and the can were emptied. I recognize that to this day I 
unfailingly at the end of a meal leave some portion of food, if sometimes quite 
small, on my dish – as if to reassure myself that I am free (Cavell, 2010, p. 107). 
If asked, how would any of us describe how we eat a cookie – would we present to our listener 
the level of interest, of expressiveness, and of attention to detail that Cavell provides? How 
many of us would go further, stipulating that Oreo-eating takes up important space within the 
story of our lives. To return to therapeutic practice, the professional ways in which the 
practitioner explores a client’s life experiences, with the intention of helping, are often 
surprising and unexpected. Furthermore, psychotherapy is described as dialogue with depth 
(Friedman, 1988). This illustrates the key aspect of therapeutic relational working in the sense 





deepest assumptions about life, raising questions about how we should live and what is 
meaningful to us. These are the kinds of questions, or thinking, which do not have ready 
conclusions, but which inspire us to contemplate together. Restorative practice draws on the 
psychoanalytic sphere to underpin its actions. The intention of the facilitator is to use the 
pupils’ story to carefully explore the wrongdoing that previously took place. However, the 
sense that the conference is a challenging therapeutic engagement is missing from the 
scenario at the start of this chapter. Where therapy is seen as incorporating qualities such as 
attentiveness, sensitivity, freedom, and honesty, the dialogue in the scenario suggests 
inhibition, coolness, mechanism, guardedness. Both Cavell and hooks demonstrate that this 
thinking can be at first unclear, irrelevant or confusing, until it gradually reveals itself. 
Attention to one’s story, therefore, as one’s experience, requires a willingness to recognise 
one’s lost-ness as moments of sickness or disappointment or self-destructiveness and to 
recognise that the moments of self-recovery, and of peace, lie in the familiarity of such scenes. 
The revelation this brings, and the associated relief, is that which enables lasting change to 
take place. 
5.5.2 Philosophy as Autobiography  
The notion that to pay attention to how we eat an Oreo is to live philosophically is one that 
risks absurdity. Indeed, what makes any of our ideas related to story, philosophy? In providing 
an answer, there is something else I want to bring out here, in connection to story and 
therapy, and that is the recovery of voice. This is not some version of a formulaic iteration of 
voice or of co-constructive narratives but a willingness to attend to the child’s voice once lost. 
To unpack this idea further, I need to turn to another narrative work by Cavell titled A Pitch of 
Philosophy: Autobiographical Exercises (1994a).39 Here, Cavell attempts to describe the way in 
which traditional, analytic forms of the philosophy of language has attempted to deny the 
expression of personal voice. Through a series of autobiographical vignettes, Cavell invites the 
reader to consider how personal and intimate storying of philosophers’ lives are ‘valuable 
sources of philosophical illumination’ (Colapietro, 2012, p. 123). Cavell writes clearly of how 
deeply probing autobiographical themes of identity such as persona and voice, names, and 
homes are inseparable from philosophical discourse. Indeed, Cavell states that ‘philosophy and 
autobiography are to be told in terms of each other’ and further that ‘I might summarise my 
life in philosophy as directed to discovering the child’s voice’ (Cavell, 1994a, p. 38). The allusion 
 





that Cavell draws, when referring to the child’s voice, lies at the end of this passage where he 
recalls Wittgenstein’s often repeated ‘parable of the turned spade’ in the Philosophical 
Investigations: 
How am I able to obey a rule?’ – if this is not a question about causes, then it is 
about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do. If I have 
exhausted the justification, I have reached bedrock and my spade is turned. Then I 
am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do” (Wittgenstein, 2009, §217). 
The conventional reading of this passage indicates that Wittgenstein’s argument is an appeal 
to what must be accepted, with regards the forms of life, that we cannot talk about following a 
rule but rather state ‘this is simply what I do’ as an end to discussion. Cavell instead pursues 
another line of interpretation that veers away from a ‘sense of antagonism or resignation’ 
(Cavell, 2010, p. 14). Instead, Cavell gives the passage an autobiographical presentation, 
viewing the passage as a fragment of dialogue between the self-image of a “teacher” whose 
spade is an implement of writing and “the pupil” who calls forth the reasoning of why this 
thing should be done, and not that. This ‘[scene] of instruction’ (Cavell, 1990, p. 64) revolves 
around acknowledging the silent voice that calls forth the utterance. It is a ‘discovery by way of 
recovery, of the child before whom we as adults, hence as in some respects, authorities stand’ 
(Colapietro, 2012, p. 124). Furthermore, Cavell’s self-identification does not simply rest with 
the silenced child or with the voice of authority. If the child is quite literally before the adult, 
then there must be a recognition of ‘the present, silenced grown-up who keeps himself or 
herself waiting, with hovering attention’ (p. 51). Therefore, what is at stake first and foremost 
is exposing the suppression or denial of voice at work in the background in order to show the 
ways in which it can be returned. Returning to the point over his dated entries, this manner of 
marking the separation of his thoughts is a way of refusing the stories that have already 
formed significance through conventional, unified, coherent narratives. Those stories are, 
Cavell feels, not his, but that which have been told or heard so often for him. Moreover, his 
voice, his story, doesn’t follow the confident voice of the pragmatist but the uncertain, 
quavering voice of the hesitant, the doubtful, and the unbelieving. Philosophically speaking, 
the call into question by the child – why must this be? – is not to find an answer, to reach 
bedrock as it were, but to expose the frailty and disturbance in the human condition that leads 
us to doubt our answers.   
Colapietro (2012) suggests that Cavell sees himself as the silenced child, depicted in poignantly 





not an easy one, but neither was his relationship with his mother. He recalls himself frequently 
caught between ‘his father’s continuing rages […] and her periodic silences’ (Cavell, 2010, p. 
21). Spending most of his time from the age of seven alone, Cavell experiences a sense of 
extreme isolation produced by his parent’s ‘locked speechlessness’ (p. 22). Due to his inability 
to speak openly, Cavell wonders if their unintelligibility with each other, and with him, is ‘as if I 
had not learned speech’ (ibid.). The passage of initiation into language that opens the 
Philosophical Investigations is therefore one we can never entirely leave. In Little Did I Know, 
Cavell repeatedly returns to these formative scenes. Cavell’s bargain to begin always with his 
earliest memories are by way of discovering and recovering voice. In returning to a voice that 
is indeed ‘indecisive and inchoate’ (p. 60), Cavell is the child from the investigations, ‘invisible 
to the elders […] attempting to divine speech for itself. Moreover, it is his figure of a child 
‘invisible to the elders among whom it moves […] and as in a position of isolation and 
unintelligibility so complete as to reveal childhood as such a state akin to madness’ (p. 22). 
Later in the passage, Cavell sets the terms for his recovery; the therapeutic task of philosophy 
must be ‘a matter of reinserting or replacing the human voice in philosophical thinking’ (p. 63) 
through a ‘desire to talk at once about the tone of philosophy and about my right to take that 
tone’ (pp. 3–4).  
The sustained act of finding oneself is illustrated as an awakening after trauma, as after 
Cavell’s being hit by a car when he was six years old. The result of the accident was to be 
permanent damage to his hearing, the repercussions of which Cavell was to feel for the rest of 
his life. Cavell likens his awakening with Proust’s own awakening of the narrator in his fictional 
autobiography A la Recherche du Temps Perdu. Cavell empathises with Proust’s condition of 
being lost, and not knowing where to find oneself. The juxtaposition of the two are such as to 
lead Cavell to ponder: ‘certain questions of ear that run through my life’ (p. 30), becoming 
‘questions of the detections of voice’ (ibid.). Does Cavell find an answer to those questions? 
Does he, through story, find an account of himself? To answer this, we need to look towards 
the very final page of his memoir. Cavell is visiting his father in hospital at the very end of his 
life. ‘Do you understand me?’ His father asks. ‘Am I making sense to you?’ ‘You mean can I 
hear you’. ‘Yes’. Cavell replies. Cavell’s father is uneasy, he calls the fuss made over him ‘ugly’. 
As the elderly man falls asleep, his position ‘appeared awkward to me’. Like so much of 
Cavell’s work, this out of place ending appears in its abruptness, ungainly, and uncoordinated. 
Yet as Cavell takes his leave from the reader, it is the we who are left awkward. Cavell’s 
account, as a ‘continuation of philosophy’s ancient ideas of leading the soul up and out of the 





Ordinary language philosophy recovers both voice and tone by disregarding metaphysical 
claims of language, instead showing but what language does. In Chapter 4, I confirmed this viz. 
Austin’s performative function of language where a marriage vow is not simply the description 
of the act but the act itself. Cavell takes this further, showing how the human voice is beset by 
doubt and at best the explanatory force of language, or passionate utterance, can only say see 
this event in this way and for these reasons. In Little Did I Know, Cavell sets the context for 
recovery of voice in autobiographical terms where experience so often comprises ‘the 
uneventful, the nothing, the unnoted’ (2010, p. 61), but in their very ordinariness, are 
‘exemplary of all, a parable of each; that is humanity’s commonness, which is internal to its 
endless denials of commonness’ (ibid.). The notion that one’s story has the capacity to be 
philosophically representative for all humanity is so outrageous as to be arrogant and yet 
Cavell plays on this presumption by naming this as philosophy’s ‘arrogation of voice’, and by 
making the claim that philosophy demand this (extra)ordinary dimension of experience. How 
does acknowledging this responsibility help us to better understand the place of story in 
restorative practice?  
Cavell’s exemplification, or illumination around the recovery of voice, illustrates a very 
different way of understanding the relationship between the self to self and the self with 
regards to the other. However, in our scenario, the implication is that if Nazreen’s feelings can 
become commensurate with Nicky’s, if their stories fit the rule following practices required by 
discipline, then the conference will have fulfilled its ethical obligation. Their relationship 
towards each other may show signs of change, but what of their relationships to themselves? 
As emotionally intelligent as these pupils might seem, there is no language with which to 
question the arrogance of conferencing; its instrumentalised sense of resolution through 
process. This is denied by a conception of relationship that tells them both what to say, and 
how to be as if, to paraphrase Cavell, to become an exemplary of the restorative condition. In 
disrupting authority, through abrupt shifts in chronology and therapy that prioritises one’s 
relationship with the self, Cavell shows that it is not the telling that is (philosophically 
speaking) therapeutic. Rather Little Did I Know reveals an understanding of story as requiring a 
continual form of self-questioning that ensures that what one says accords with how one lives 
(Hodgson, 2010b).  
5.6 Disruption of Account 
I began this chapter by suggesting that ‘account’ stood for a report or description of an event. 





defined as the requirement to forcibly explain a mistake, wrongdoing, or inaction, and hence 
to be punished.40 In this second meaning, ‘account’ in the wrongdoer’s story is made to stand 
for reasoning that is ‘an excuse, defence, justification or explanation’ for wrongdoing (Hayes, 
2006, p. 375). As such, it is apology and not account that is the apex of the conference, and the 
driver for personal change. Hayes (2006) states that for a restorative practice to be truly 
transformative, pupils must have the moral maturity to understand this difference. Indeed, it is 
often regarded as a failure of implementation that the kinds of account talk that are successful 
in moving the conference along are mistaken for genuine apology. I want to develop the 
assertion that account must stand for something more than the means to simply collect voice. 
Let me draw on his understanding of this term as one which takes account for the self, and 
which is also a call to account (in others), through Cavell’s writing in Senses of Walden (1992), a 
reflection on the 1854 masterpiece Walden Pond written by Thoreau and which Senses 
summarises as containing wild mood swings, periodic confusion, wretchedness, nervousness, 
and immense repetition. On the surface, Walden’s dense and poetic rumination on the 
vagaries of daily life in Concord, Massachusetts consists in numerous small observations on his 
dwelling, his village, and his neighbours that appear without relation to one another. What is 
interesting is that from the outset, Thoreau refers to his work as the keeping of ‘my accounts 
which I can swear to have kept faithfully, I have, indeed, never got audited, still less accepted, 
still less paid and settled’ (p. 125). What sort of private enterprise is he referring to? What is 
the relevance of his account?  
Cavell rightly surmises that there is word play going on here. It is not a private enterprise (in 
the strictly business sense); rather it is the enterprise (business) of his own (private) life – his 
experiment in living. Thoreau’s search for a natural environment in which to inhabit, his 
thoughts on Nature and his negative commentary on the ills of civilisation is to say ‘something 
about your condition, especially your outward condition or circumstances in this world, in this 
town, what it is, whether it is as necessary that it be as bad as it is, whether it can be improved 
as well as not’ (Thoreau, 2004, p. 114). It is part of the artistry of Thoreau’s work that all of 
Walden relates to this statement and that failure to grasp this nature of accounting not only 
misses its literary significance, but overwhelms the reader with the ‘boredom of emptiness’ 
(Cavell, 1992, p. 20) as behoves the mass of men [leading] lives of quiet desperation (Thoreau, 
2004, p. 117). This experiment in living is no less than his accounting for himself; what counted 
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for him, and what account he wanted to give to the neighbours in his life. It is this other idea of 
accounting, as one that holds his life up for the reader, and for himself, to audit, that takes 
precedence. Not only this, Walden is a call for every ‘writer, first or last [to find] a simple and 
sincere account of his own life, and not merely what he has heard of other men’s lives’ (p. 
111). The seriousness of Thoreau’s attempt, for Cavell, cannot be misinterpreted:  
This is what those lists of numbers, calibrated to the half cent, mean in Walden. 
They of course are parodies of America’s methods of evaluation; and they are 
emblems of what the writer wants from writing, as he keeps insisting in calling his 
book an account (Cavell, 1992, p. 30). 
Walden’s accounting, Cavell states, is a parody of American idealism which holds the aims of 
economy (also the title of the introductory chapter), and the life that gives ‘wealth and 
standing’ (Thoreau, 2004, p. 125), as its highest ideal. In illustration, Thoreau describes his 
disappointment with the lives and traditions of his neighbour and their endless labour that 
their grand plans for living make a claim to, stating that it appears ‘to me to be doing penance 
in a thousand remarkable ways’ (p. 114). To describe the work of the New England farmer as 
being without purpose goes against the notion of the honest, working man, who, if he works 
hard enough, will succeed. This deeply mythologised American success story is epitomised by 
Thoreau’s characterisation of John Field (pp. 266–272), an everyman who is nothing more than 
a serf of the soil for whom the physical self smothers the human potential for immortality.  For 
all his busyness, Fields’s toil is ineffectual; it ceases to have any real purpose in the world. 
Society is likened to a ‘wave’ (Emerson, 2003, p. 291). It never advances, never changes, 
instead it ‘recedes as fast as on one side as it gains on the other’ (p. 289). When this happens, 
either in philosophical enquiry, or in educational practice, ‘our thinking spins on ice and can 
make no progress; it needs to be returned to the rough ground, against which it can gain 
purchase’ (Standish, 2013, p. 56). This is hugely important for the kind of critique that 
associates the restorative ‘story’ with Hayes’ assessment of account as effective and 
accountable, and the end goals of such an approach. It implies that there is a way of doing this 
that looks like real work, but in its sameness of approach implies that there a procedure to 
follow that makes it felicitous. 
5.6.1 Story as Awakening 
There is another dimension to account that I wish to draw out here. By drawing attention to 
the presence of the cockerel in Thoreau’s chapter ‘Sounds’, the chanticleer who crows at the 





succession of endings, but as ‘this ongoing series of turning-points in the middle and midst of 
life’ (Standish, 2018, p. 431). The telling of one’s story is just such a turning point: the way in 
which I behave is unsustainable, it is therefore necessary to turn to face a new direction. If we 
are to reconceptualise what is understood as restorative, it is essential that ideas of story, as 
one that gives account, allows one to turn, and to keep turning. Thoreau calls this our learning 
to ‘re-awaken and keep ourselves awake, not by mechanical aids but by an infinite expectation 
of the dawn’ (Thoreau, 2004, p. 181). 
Understanding that this is what Cavell wants from story is key to unlocking the significance of 
his (educationally) disruptive writing. For Cavell, stories ‘are not about something else, 
something past or future to be called his living’ (Cavell, 2010, p. 52), they are ‘exemplifications 
or modes of philosophical life’ (ibid.). Through Cavell’s emphasis on awakening, story is 
conceptualised as both a-teleological: an endless journeying that ‘we repetitively never arrive 
at, but rather […] is a process of moving to, and from, nexts’ (Cavell, 1990, p.12). It is looking 
carefully towards the idea of transformation, without a final transformation, but also 
recognising the act of returning, and of remembering. It is the demand for experience to 
understand how ‘the person who was then Stanley Cavell, who became the next Stanley 
Cavell, and how that next one was, doubling back in time to another time, someone who was 
either prepared or unprepared to become the next Cavell’ (Dumm, 2013 np). This is our 
attained and unattainable self: an endless process of self-transformation, driven by an ethical 
and moral drive towards an infinite number of future, better selves. 
The notion that writing can ‘help’ this transformation in some way figures quite prominently in 
his autobiographical writing, and in the kinds of writers to whom he is drawn. In this, 
assistance is offered through the kinds of examples that show not only what one did, but how 
one lived. Recalling Oreos, this trend to showing how one should live is shaped as a turning 
away from the grand narrative to commit to the small and digressive. About this, Dumm (2013) 
comments that Cavell senses he is not an adequate judge of what is commonly thought to be 
obvious, or important, in what he writes and that this stance is consonant with being a 
philosopher of the ordinary, one who is grounded not in ‘intellectual certainty but in human 
convention’ (Mahon, 2015, p. 230). To figure this out, we need to return to the problem that 
Cavell has surmised quite clearly at the start of this journey. That is, to look closely at ‘what is 
going on’, through a series of notorious public events is a useless endeavour. In fact, to 
continue the passage I referenced earlier: ‘the sound of such a narrative would I believe 





5.6.2 The Gleam of Light 
That we are drawn to the small and the ordinary is signalled more clearly when, at the end of 
Little Did I Know, Cavell writes: ‘I had hitherto always passed by the title phrase “to have and 
have not” with a momentary qualm that I allowed to fade’ (p. 542). His phrasing is significant 
in its allusion to Thoreau’s contemporary, Ralph Waldo Emerson, who stated: 
A man should learn to detect and watch that gleam of light which flashes across 
his mind from within, more than the lustre of the firmament of bards and sages. 
Yet he dismisses without notice his thought because it is his (Emerson, 2003, p. 
267). 
Emerson calls the gleam intuition; Cavell perceives it as ‘stopping to think’ (Cavell, 1990, p. 20). 
This is Cavell’s way of presenting to us his understanding of ‘Emersonian moral perfectionism’, 
calling it ‘a dimension or tradition of the moral life that spans the course of Western thought 
and concerns what used to be called the state of one’s soul’ (p. 2). Or, put simply, an enduring 
conversation ‘about how we might live’ (p. 6). Cavell states that morality in perfectionist 
thinking is not calculated from a revised tax code or from Kant’s categorical imperative where 
if an act is bad or wrong, then it is bad or wrong no matter who you are (Cavell, 2005b). 
Rather, it is to take the words ‘to thine own self be true’41 with the acknowledgement that 
‘you had better have some standing with me with which to confront my life, from which my 
life matters to you, and matters to me’ (p. 50). The force of this kind of moral imperative is, for 
Emerson, tied up with ideas of refusing conformity and conformist thinking. In repeatedly 
urging the reader to follow their inner voice, and not some outer pressure, Emerson’s famous 
work urges us to be attentive towards the kind of moment that will spur on some kind of 
conversion within the self. These continuing conversions place us in a series of ‘nexts’ so that 
our journeying towards our better selves has no finality. Instead there is only potential or 
possibility, ‘unimposable’ and ‘unrewardable’, […] ‘one that we would all instantly see the 
worth of if we could but turn, revolutionise ourselves’ (Cavell, 1990, p. 10). The notion of 
telling one’s story without this richer perfectionist thinking lacks not only the impulse to be 
transformative now, but also our ongoing commitment to continue giving an account of the 
state of our souls. The essay ‘Circles’ (Emerson, 2003, p. 312) begins with such an appeal: 
 
41 Shakespeare uses this phrase in Hamlet Act 1 Scene III, where Polonius speaks these words as a token 





Our life is an apprenticeship to the truth. That around every circle another can be 
drawn; that there is no end in nature, but every end is a beginning; that there is 
always another dawn risen on mid-noon. And under every deep a lower deep 
opens (Emerson, 2003, p. 312). 
In Emersonian Moral Perfectionism, the moment of perfecting, of ‘talking steps, say walking, a 
kind of success(ion) in which the direction is not up but on (Cavell, 1990, p. 10 italics my own) 
registers a certain ‘ambiguity’ (p. 135) where the drawing of circles between the attained and 
unattainable self becomes ‘knotted’ (p. 10). It is this moment of ‘discontinuity’ (p. 135) that 
raises the question over what might bring someone from one circle to another. Cavell 
proposes that Emerson’s gleam of light, or ‘whim’ (Emerson, 2003, p. 270), is prophetic in 
providing the beginning that is required at such critical junctures (Saito, 2005). However, in 
accepting the sense of groundlessness that perfectionism requires, forward movement should 
not only become ‘an expression of rosy optimism toward the future, [it must be] accompanied 
by a certain rigour and stern willingness to commit oneself to the unknown out of a trodden 
path’ (p. 113). It is only by incurring a new loss that steps in perfecting can be attained (Cavell, 
1992).  
5.6.3 Story: Perfectionism and Finding as Founding 
As such, it is not the element of arriving that forms the emphasis for onward growth, but 
leaving that is represented by Thoreau’s experiment in living (Saito, 2005). Walden Pond is not 
a permanent home, a place for settlement, but a place where Thoreau learns how to sojourn 
that is to say, ‘spend his day’ (Cavell, 1992, p. 52). This aspect of perfectionism is characterised 
by Cavell as departure, unsettlement and ‘abandonment’ (p. 138). This distinction is important 
as Emersonian Moral Perfectionism does not rest on the notion that there is some 
philosophical ground that we are attempting to find once and for all. Our ‘foundation, reaches 
no further than each issue of finding’ (Cavell, 1989, p. 114) but is a recurrent finding that is not 
only an individual, therapeutic matter but is also the perfectionist task of ‘founding a nation’ 
(p. 93). 
Connecting moral perfectionism with Cavell’s recognition of America’s inheritance of a 
contentious history, the founding of a nation addresses one of Thoreau’s most important 
subjects: the establishment of an American Eden through participation in community. This is 
evident in Walden where Cavell’s commentary on community finds its awakening in ‘the purity 
of the Chanticleer’s call’ (Cavell, 1992, p. 39). Cavell refers to the chanticleer as Thoreau’s 





demands, and to find for itself a language, a community, a nation. The criteria for living a good 
life, one that asks how we should live, is not merely a silent ministration towards oneself, but 
the manifestation of ‘a need for a philosophical dialogue with others’ (Saito, 2005, p.137). 
When we succeed in this we succeed in taking ‘a small step—a half step—toward perfection’ 
(Cavell, 1994b, p. 50). The presentation of community that is in a state of flux is always without 
a final state of perfection but, as Naoko Saito draws out, with a strong focus on process that 
creates the potential for new possibilities (Saito, 2005).  
To turn again to the restorative conference, the teaching of Walden shows how to make the 
best use of its practices. Where the gleam of light can be a source of deviation in the pursuit of 
relational connection, where story can be emphasised as another way of growing without a 
fixed end, where pupils can learn to re-establish their relationship with the familiar, and where 
an education for citizenship places the utmost importance on the political concept of voice. 
Without this ethical presentation, restorative practice loses the ethical concept of 
transformation, becoming reminiscent of Emerson’s unchanging waves rather than a rippling 
pond. 
5.7 Disrupting the Facilitator 
As Thoreau underlines, storytelling gives an account of what happens, or has happened, in 
terms of its potential to transform, becoming more than an abstract chain of cause and effect 
that obscure the relationship between people. The underpinning moral perfectionism of 
Cavell’s work points to an ethical relation with the self to the self that is never finally attained, 
it is always in a state of transition, always looking for the transformative potential. A part of 
this work is one’s ‘responsibility or answerability to the other’ (Hodgson, 2010, p. 120) that 
asks how to account for human freedom without eliminating contingency or opting for 
predictability. Cavell and Thoreau’s point of view is characterised by taking seriously the fact 
that when we act we can never know the result of our actions on others. If we knew, we would 
not be free.  
Hence, both Little Did I Know and Walden recognise that there is no immediate knowledge of 
oneself, rather, our self-appropriation is through our stories. The creation of a restorative 
conference framework that better facilitates pupils with the appropriate attitudes, behaviours 
and values, is a tall order. In order to support this, how can those who facilitate conferences 
best ensure that they are apt role models, that they encourage meaningful participation in the 





one’s story reaches beyond the instruction of knowledge and skills? The question becomes 
more pressing since the facilitator is presented as standing at the crossroads of power, 
knowledge, and frank speaking. Therefore, appropriately guiding pupils through the 
conference is a crucial part of socio-ethical education to which pupils are exposed. Thus far, 
my concern has been to draw attention to the relation between the participants of the 
restorative conference, idealised by Nicky and Nazreen. In the next section, I will offer some 
thoughts on how establishing dialogue between pupils and facilitators is necessary for a 
developing ethical capacity. 
5.8 Socratic Parrhesia 
The restorative conference is not an autobiographical act, in the manner of Little Did I Know, or 
Walden, but a shaped, dialogical response. To redress this, I will be turning to Cavell’s close 
reading of the George Cukor film, Gaslight (1944), a psychological thriller set in late Victorian-
era London that contains scenes of such facilitation. Before I do, it would be prudent to my 
discussion to further expand vocabulary that will be adequate to the ethical challenges 
wrought by the technologies of restorative practice. Therefore, I want to introduce the ancient 
tradition of Socratic parrhesia (Foucault, 2001). Developed by Michel Foucault, parrhesia has a 
range of meanings which function in relation to the critique of democratic institutions and 
freedom of speech. Foucault explains: 
Parrhesia […] is linked to courage in the face of danger: it demands the courage to 
speak the truth in spite of some danger […] Parrhesia is a form of criticism, either 
towards another or towards oneself, but always in a situation where the speaker 
or confessor is in a position of inferiority with respect to the interlocutor. 
The parrhesiastes is always less powerful than the one with whom he speaks 
(Foucault, 2001, p. 16). 
In order for speech to qualify as parrhesia, Foucault points to certain conditions that must be 
met. These are: an imbalance of power between speaker and their audience; an obligation to 
speak the truth even where there is a risk to her reputation or her life and a deep reluctance 
for the truth to be heard because it may contain a critique of the current hegemony that forces 
the listener to take account for their actions. It takes great courage to speak out, and yet in 
always choosing to speak out what the parrhesiastes says and how she acts represents the 
ultimate acknowledgement of the ethical relation of the self to the self (Hodgson, 2011). That 





as ‘the kind of speech I have with myself when I plainly tell myself things I do not really want to 
hear, when I am faced with an agonizing decision, and I find the courage to face my fears’ 
(Papadimos and Murray, 2008). Thus, parrhesia ‘risks myself in order to be myself, 
authentically’ (ibid.) In the following discussion, I will show how Foucault’s analysis of fearless 
speech is relevant to the notion of learning to live well with others. Since Socratic parrhesia 
always takes place face to face with another, facilitators should not only teach pupils to 
practice parrhesia, they should also embody the kind of educative and democratic relationship 
with which one might find one's voice. The result of such listening ‘is a shifted orientation to 
how one thinks and expresses the relationship between one’s thought and action and a 
recognition of the ethical relationship between the two’ (Hodgson, 2010b, p. 151). My earlier 
thoughts on autobiography and philosophy suggest that this is a willingness to listen that must 
be commensurate with a willingness to be transformed. Let me explore what this might look 
like.  
5.8.1 Gaslight  
Gaslight draws its title from the many images that show the frequent flickering and dimming of 
gaslight.42 This key visual motif’s significance to the plot, concerning a young fragile woman 
(Paula Alquist) who is tormented by her villainous husband (Gregory Anton) has resulted in the 
naming of a psychological phenomenon known as ‘gaslighting’, or the deliberate means to 
drive another insane through psychological manipulation.43 The recurring repression of Paula’s 
voice forms the bedrock of her visible suffering in Gaslight. This is achieved by Gregory, a 
pianist who accompanies her singing lessons. Having persuaded Paula to marry him, Gregory 
insists they settle in Paula’s childhood home in London. However, Gregory is a jewel thief who 
has married Paula to live in the house in which he murdered her aunt some years earlier. 
Frightened that Paula may have some memories of her aunt that may reveal his identity, 
Gregory’s chosen mode of torture is to deprive Paula of words. In doing so, he begins a process 
of de-stabilising her personal powers of memory, and story, by means of stealing, or hiding, 
small personal belongings, playing on her fears of inheriting mental illness, and denying her 
proximity to others with whom she has a past association:  
 
42 Oxford dictionaries [Online]. Available at: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/gaslight 
(Accessed 19/1218). 
43 While I am certainly not accusing teachers of driving their pupils to madness there are strong lines of 





Gregory: You know, you are inclined to lose things.  
Paula: I am? I didn't realise that.  
Gregory: Just little things (Gaslight, 1944). 
When Paula finds a letter addressed to her aunt and apparently written by the murderer, 
Gregory interrupts her by snatching the item away. Later she recalls the incident as being 
significant, but to no avail: 
Paula: But that’s what you think, isn’t it? That’s what you’ve been hinting and 
suggesting for months now, ever since...the day I lost your brooch. That’s when it 
all began. No, no, no, it began before that. The first day here when I found that 
letter. 
Gregory: What letter? 
Paula: That one I found among the music from that man...Gregory: Yes, you’re 
right. That’s when it began...I can see you still, standing there and saying, ‘Look. 
Look at this letter.’ And staring at nothing. 
Paula: What? 
Gregory: You had NOTHING in your hand. 
Paula: What? (Gaslight, 1944). 
Seemingly unable to argue against Gregory, or to find anyone that can make her opinions 
count, Paula’s faith in her own mind, and in her health, reaches a crisis point when it appears 
that she is the only one that can hear the footsteps coming from the boarded up attic, or see 
the gas lamps fluctuating nightly in accordance with the obscure sounds she hears from above 
her bedroom (in fact Gregory is ransacking the third floor attic, determinedly trying to find the 
location of Paula’s aunt’s precious jewels which he believes are stashed in the house). 
Repeated disregard of Paula’s story, Gregory’s ‘process of controlled amentia is one that is to 
render the woman of Gaslight stupid, say self-stupefying, she does not know what the fairly 
obvious sounds of tramping are on the floor above, and she does not know why, hence soon 
not even whether, the gas lamp is obviously lowering in her room’ (Cavell, 1996, p. 51). The 
etymological connection of gas with the German geist, meaning spirit or mind, is signalled 
within the film as ‘not the loss of speech, a form of aphasia, but a loss of reason, of mind, as 
such - say the capacity to count, to make a difference’ (Cavell, 1996, p. 58). Paula’s subsequent 
confinement and isolation, denied conversation even with her neighbours, precedes a state of 
madness so extreme as to render ‘a state of utter incommunicability, as if before the 





waiting for the doctors to take her to an asylum, is that of a woman ‘de-created’, tortured out 
of a mind altogether (p. 49). 
Cavell does not use the words death or dying, denial of voice leaves a person still very much 
alive yet without their geist – Thoreau’s ‘immortal soul’. Paula’s hunched figure, as if about to 
fall over, is an arresting image and tells us much about how denial of voice is metaphorically 
linked to de-creation. Firstly, Cavell draws our attention to the narrative function given to the 
rising and falling of light in that gaslight appears to work in such a way that that when one 
lamp lowers or rises according to whether another lamp is being operated is ’a phenomenon 
drummed in by dialogue’ (p. 69). Paula is never shown to light her own lamp, instead ‘the 
woman’s supply of drawn off by the man’s unacknowledged need for it’ (ibid.). Secondly, that 
this figurative draining is known as psychic vampirism: the sapping of one’s life for the cause of 
another.  
5.8.2 Voice, Story and Self-Reliance 
Developing the theme of vampirism in correlation with Emerson’s essay, ‘Fate’, Cavell equates 
the ‘mutual, victimization, sapping of one another’ (p. 70) with adultery. Drawing on the Old 
English æwbryce, a breach of law(ful marriage), or stemming from the Latin adulterare ‘to 
corrupt’.44 the de-creation of the woman has corrupted the lawful bounds of marriage. It has 
become a measure of conformity ‘characterised by Emerson as voicelessness – or say 
hyperbolic inexpressiveness’ (p. 66). Cavell’s thoughts once more turn around ideas of moral 
perfectionism seeing the work of the individual to resist the pressure to conform. Acquiescing 
to public opinion is a waste of one’s life; moreover, consistency with past actions leads to 
stagnation. A tirade against the social pressures of the age, ‘Self-Reliance’ (Emerson, 2003) 
identifies the importance of not conforming to the expectations of the ‘crowd’. Instead, 
following one’s own path in order to find what is true, or good. is what it means to be fully 
human: 
The route to this alternative integrity is still creation, or what I might call 
metamorphosis – some radical, astonishing, one may say melodramatic change of 
the woman, say of her identity. But this change must take place outside the 
process of a mode of conversation with a man (of course, since such a 
conversation would constitute marriage (Cavell, 1996, p. 6). 
 






That Cavell references Emerson’s self-reliance with the way in which Paula is re-created leads 
me to the connection between voice, as an act of perfectionism, and story in the restorative 
conference. A detective named Cameron investigating the now cold case of Alice’s aunt, and 
suspicious of Gregory’s doings at night, gains both entry to the house and Paula’s confidence: 
Cameron: What’s up there?  
Paula: A whole floor of trunks and furniture. Is that what you meant? (Gaslight, 
1944). 
Cavell states that ‘a dog would have had no trouble’ (Cavell, 1996, p. 58) in making the 
connection between the absence of her husband, the lowering of the lamps, and the noises in 
the attic. However, Paula is scarcely in possession of her senses and thus requires a very 
specific kind of relation. Cavell describes Paula’s and Cameron’s conversation as a kind of 
‘therapeutic process’ (p. 57) in which her ‘knowledge dawns and the night of self-stupefaction 
begins to end’ (p. 51). Cameron’s insistence that she knows recalls the basis of Freudian 
narrative analysis according to which the client already possess the necessary information with 
which to help themselves. The influence of Freudian thought in Gaslight is palpable and 
resonates strongly in Paula’s cry that she is living in a dream: 
I couldn’t have dreamed it. Did I dream? Are you telling me that I’ve dreamed all 
that happened? Then it’s true. My mind is going. It was a dream. Then take me 
away, I can’t fight it anymore. It was a dream (Gaslight, 1944). 
Does this identification put Cameron in the position of psychoanalyst? Cavell would take issue 
with this. As a line of comparison, he takes up Freud’s reporting of ‘Dora’, a well-known case in 
his origination of psychoanalytic theory in which ‘Dora’ refuses his interpretation of her 
disorder. Criticising the ‘brutal insistence’ (p. 53) with which Freud demands that ‘Dora’ 
understand that her sexual problems are at the root of her ‘hysteria’, Cavell equates the issue 
of Freud’s guaranteed soundness of the psychanalyst’s self-confirming mechanism as ‘the theft 
of woman’s knowledge’ (p. 53). Of course, not all psychoanalysts are so Freudian in their 
approach. Proper deployment of technique, such as that noted by McIntyre (1981), would 
teach the difference between genuine self-denial and denial that is an ordinary part of speech. 
In Paula’s example, this is less about a proper deployment of psychological technique then it is 
Cameron’s ear for ordinary language:  







Cameron: Are you sure you don’t? (Gaslight, 1944). 
Much like Dora, Paula resists Cameron’s assertion for knowledge with denial. However, 
Cameron’s desire for Paula’s story is, unlike Freud’s approach, not a way of learning about the 
patient for an arbitrary end goal, but of learning from. This is not a process of knowing, but of 
attending, a term that draws out the origin of the word therapist from the Greek therapeutes, 
or ‘attendant’ (Smeyers et al., 2007). The effect of this attention on Paula is gives the audience 
something like the first glimpse of her story:  
Paula: No. How could he be? (Gaslight, 1944). 
The story of blindness to her husband’s activity reveals itself in the realm of a few very 
ordinary words. One might say that she has finally worked out the presence of her husband. It 
is more likely that she has with Cameron’s care, the freedom to voice what she has known all 
along – what has been in plain view. There is nothing that is difficult or sophisticated about 
Paula’s language, yet the conversation between Paula and Cameron is mediated by the 
ordinary agency of language thus revealing the extraordinary nature of the human condition 
for transformation. Paula’s passionate recovery of voice, her cogito (her refutation of self-
doubt) is her reintroduction to a language of her own. To perform for a public, to be visible as 
a star (light) is a source of energy that births her once again into existence. Her 
metamorphosis, or creation, that takes place outside of the boundaries of her marriage is the 
assertion of cogito that ‘puts a close to sceptical doubt’ (Cavell, 1996, p. 48). If Gregory’s task 
was to drive her mad, and the recovery of voice was a way out of that madness, then why does 
Paula still proclaim her insanity? Why shouldn’t she?  
Paula finally delivers proof of her existence; her memory and mind are intact, telling Cameron 
‘I want to speak to my husband. I want to speak to him alone’, or as Cavell put it, ‘now I exist 
because I speak for myself’ (Cavell, 1996, p. 47). Of course, this is Paula the non-conformist 
and self-reliant. She casts off her metaphorical bounds as she confronts her husband confined, 
literally, in ropes. To him she delivers Gaslight’s most powerful lines, what Cavell’s calls her 
aria of revenge: 
Are you suggesting that this is a knife? I don’t see any knife. You must have 
dreamed you put it there. Are you mad, my husband? Or is it I who am mad? Yes! 
I am mad. If I were not mad I could have helped you. But because I am mad, I hate 





rejoicing in my heart without a shred of pity, with glory in my heart (Gaslight, 
1944). 
Paula’s aria is an excellent example of fearless speech in that the self-relation of the 
parrhesiastes is not dependent on some sort of verifiable evidence but is an ethical and 
spiritual relationship to the self (Papadimos and Murray, 2008). To think this through I must 
recall Cavell’s ideas on Cartesian scepticism. From Descartes, our modern epistemological 
framework takes its evidence when all possible doubt is removed: omne illus verum est, quod 
clare et distincte percipitur.45 Cavell suggests that the sceptic’s desire to refute misses the 
necessary strangeness or unknown-ness with which we, as humans, must operate. Returning 
to Foucault, rather than presuming that one can act and speak objectively from a place of truth 
free from the dilemmas of power, ‘the parrhesiastes speaks from within the situation and does 
not pretend to occupy a space that is epistemologically neutral and free from constraint’ 
(Foucault, 2001, p. 16). This does not result in the denial of knowledge, but of 
acknowledgment, or the gift of transformation.  
The key point to be made about Paula’s aria, therefore, is that recovery of voice is consistent 
with recovery of one’s story. To be human is to be forever changing and developing – to stay 
with the film’s own motifs, the light of madness is always in a constant state of rise and fall. At 
Gaslight’s very end, the audience is made aware that the process of Paula’s journeying is not 
one that will take place tonight, nor perhaps tomorrow or the week after. Paula’s journey as it 
reflects each of ours will take a lifetime: ‘This will be a long night’ she tells Cameron, waiting 
for the dawn to break, her transformative arc never to be fully settled. ‘It’s starting to clear’, is 
Cameron’s equally non-committal reply. 
Staying true to our self requires remaining faithful to our metamorphic character. It also risks 
being thought mad, as Emerson states: ‘for nonconformity the world whips you with its 
displeasure’ (Emerson, 2003, p. 272. It is precisely this fear that the non-conformist stirs in the 
masses and which Paula identifies in herself. Where recovery of voice and the ability to tell 
one’s story is seen by some restorative researchers as crucial to the restoration of relation and 
community, for Cavell, the recognition of a voice once lost becomes a protest against societal 
conformity. In finding our words and our language we repel the ‘lifeless conformity’ that 
threatens our self-reliance, a danger presented by settling into a role that community 
prescribes we must fall.  
 





Unlike Cavell’s (1981) writing on the comedies of remarriage (see Chapter 6), the women of 
the melodramas are not privy to conversation as a form of affirmation, but of de-creation. 
Thus ‘the figure of the friend’, or we might say the figure of the facilitator, becomes crucial in 
the matter of revelation. In order to challenge the hegemonies of power, to expose corruption 
and to speak out, it is not only enough for the speaker to have mental evidence of the fact but 
also the freedoms for speaking that are afforded by a kind of moral and ethical apprenticeship. 
Foucault makes it clear that it is this ethical relation which constitutes ‘true knowledge’ for the 
parrhesiastes. Not only does a good facilitator demonstrate and embody the critical attitudes, 
behaviours and values of the parrhesiates, she allows the student to practice parrhesia by 
cultivating a ‘space of appearance’ (Arendt, 1958, p. 198). A possibility where those who can 
relate to each other are as equals in some common project. Despite the function of parrhesia 
as being dangerous to the speaker, the facilitator has decided that telling the truth will help 
the person, or situation. This is more than professional obligation, hinting instead at a moral, 
or ethical duty with which one is bound to make a response. Reminiscent of Cavellian 
passionate utterance, the listener feels such speech as ethically necessary and unavoidable 
(Hodgson, 2010b).  
While Cameron is not the parrhesiaste in this situation (being never in a position of risk or 
personal danger), his teaching Paula how to relate to herself presents Paula with the 
opportunity for parrhesia – the chance to arrive at what everyone knows but on her own 
terms and with her own words. There is no script, or direction; instead Cameron’s dialogue is 
characterised by a sense of responsiveness. This includes the right to do and say things her 
way – alone. In giving Paula the chance to think in this way, Cameron allows Paula to gain the 
confidence in her voice, and her story. Ultimately, it is this kind of facilitation that can prepare 
the student for able, and critically democratic citizenship. 
5.9 From Self-Care to Community: Re-thinking Story in Restorative 
Practice 
That we all have our own self-identity through processes of narrative construction and, 
furthermore, that the self is subject to constant revision (as the person living it finds out where 
they are going), is well understood by therapeutic practice. In this chapter I have tried to write 
of a disruptive relation to storytelling that if encouraged would challenge both the teller and 
the listener to think for themselves. This cannot be a process of simply assimilating the 





existing framework of judgements, but a challenge to the story-teller to reappraise her relation 
to the words in use, in other words to discovering a better ‘economy’ of living. In 
foregrounding Thoreau’s attention to accounting in economic terms and reclaiming the 
language of commerce, ideas of success are subverted. The focus on the recovery of ordinary 
language (as attendant with the recovery of self) is away from the grandiose and in respect of 
the ordinary, the small, and the mundane. 
Paula’s successful recovery of the voice and her renewed faith in her ordinary words is a part 
of the therapy of philosophy. Moreover, it is not that such a position is to achieve a resolution, 
rather that for a time we are relieved of our compulsion to doubt, and to move on from there. 
Paula’s reference to ‘a long night’ at the end of Gaslight testifies to the way that, from Cavell’s 
position, returning to the ordinary does not mean nostalgically re-entering the world as we left 
it previously but confronting how we might live in a way that does not hide from our anxieties. 
We see the manner of this confrontation in Cavell’s stylistically difficult autobiographical 
writing. His deliberate obfuscation of an easy to follow narrative is consummate with his 
commitment to Emersonian moral perfectionism.  
Ending this chapter there are two points that must be addressed. The first is that Cavell’s 
appeal in autobiography takes us away from the emphasis on restorative practice’s familiar 
concern for relational equality towards more individualistic ones. The second is that story can 
only be thought of in terms of the philosopher’s right. Both are not amiss. In A Pitch of 
Philosophy, Cavell derides the ‘arrogant assumption [of philosophy’s] right to speak for others 
(Cavell, 1994a, p. vii–viii). Instead he finds immense significance in the use of ‘we’, used by 
philosophers as a way of speaking universally for others, in the phrase ‘when we say, we 
mean’. Cavell subverts the latent repression of voice by philosophy, instead showing how it is 
the ordinary ‘we’, meaning the ‘we’ that comprises both ‘you’ and ‘I’, that sustains the ability 
to own one’s voice as well as the notion of community to speak on its behalf. This is not 
arrogation of voice thorough singularity of voice nor is it to be confused with conformist 
thinking. Rather, Cavell shows how an attention to matters of voice is less a process of 
speaking at, more ‘of speaking for and being spoken for’ (Rudrum, 2013, p. 146). Returning to 
restorative practice, Cavell’s idea of accounting for takes precedence over restorative 
practice’s use of accountability, prioritising its potential for interpersonal and community 
engagement over authoritative aims. Recalling Cameron and Paula, the friend’s power to reach 
out and communicate to the lost one is essential for opening the possibility for a parrhesiastic 
relation. This is how we might, in Cavell’s words, allow those who participate in restorative 





Returning to the importance of Cavell’s autobiographical writing, it is not an enormous leap 
then to consider how Little Did I Know is itself a conversation between the reader, and the text 
since reading must involve at least two actors, the one who is lost and the one who helps the 
other to start or find their way. This captures Cavell’s moral outlook (let us not say theory) as 
one that pictures the self in an ongoing continuous quest of perfectibility. Defended against 
both deontology and teleology, Cavell seeks neither actions defendable as universally good nor 
actions maximising the good for all persons (Mahon, 2015). Instead, what is in question once 
more, is the intelligibility of the self to others. Revealing oneself to another with courage and 
responsiveness, a self can become exemplary. In Little Did I Know the revelation is two-fold, 
enabling not only Cavell to look at his life but to proffer a finding, ‘a standing gesture towards 
the reader or over hearer to enter into the discussion, to determine his or her own position 
with respect to what is said’ (Cavell, 1990, p. 8). Not only should we become lost, we are 
transformed from this condition by its ‘appeal to the reader to recognise himself and herself in 
that experience’ (Arcilla, 2012, p. 157).  
The intersection between story and philosophy is nothing less than a ‘literary redemption of 
language’ (Cavell, 1981, p. 93). In Cavell’s terms, this is the reclamation of words, his discussion 
of what counts as criteria back from the meaning ascribed to them by society and towards the 
meaning that we give to them. Such is the communal, or even political, dimension of the 
perfectionist outlook - the responsibility of citizenship and of the individual’s capacity to 
contribute to the betterment of society through ethical relation with another. Taking on board 
the impulse to conversation is to hold to the view that when ‘the veil of ignorance is lifted, we 
still do not know what “position” we occupy in society, who we have turned out to be’ (Cavell, 
2005b, p. 174).  
It is in virtue of this that ideas of relationship in Cavell’s philosophy have special importance 
since in his ideas of ordinary language philosophy, scepticism, self-reliance, and democracy, 
Cavell is concerned with how people, in the midst of disruption, find their way back towards 
one another, and to society. In the final chapter I will return to Cavell’s reworking of his 
longstanding themes of acknowledgement that I have touched on here and previously. 
Comparing his approach with that of continental philosophers Martin Buber and Gabriel 
Marcel, I finally approach how restorative practices’ foregrounding of recognition and 






Chapter 6  





“Making an agreement” 
 
MS SHAH 
You have both listened to each other’s story. Now we are going 
to move to considering how the conflict can be resolved in a way 
that is respectful, reasonable and restorative. How do you think 
we can make things right between you? 
 
NICKY 
We need to say sorry. 
 
MS SHAH 
Okay, I’m going to write down, “say sorry”. Nicky can you give 
me one of your ideas. 
 
NAZREEN 
Say sorry too? 
 
MS SHAH 
Saying sorry is already there. Do you have any more ideas? 
 
NICKY 
Ask the teacher to move to a different table? 
 
MS SHAH 
That’s really good. I’ll write down “move away” and “swap 











Doesn’t matter, it’s just for now. 
 
MS SHAH 
Let’s go over which ones will restore your relationship. The 
first suggestion is to say sorry. Let’s try saying sorry to each 
other and why we are sorry. 
 
NICKY 
Sorry for laughing and for messing about. 
 
MS SHAH 
That’s good. It’s very important not to distract others and to 
allow them to carry on with their work. Your turn Nazreen. 
 
NAZREEN 




No, that wasn’t very kind, was it? Can you remember what we do 
when we feel ourselves becoming very angry? 
 
NICKY 
Mr Davison says to take a deep breath and count down from 10. 
 
MS SHAH 









This is so pointless. 
 
MS SHAH 
I’m going to add this to our list. We just have a few more 
things to do now to wrap up this part of the restorative 
conference. First, I’m going to finish writing the agreement on 
this form … now I’m going to read it back so you can be sure it 
says what we agreed to. For restoring relation, ‘sorry’ is 
ticked and you’ve done that. Nazreen is going to tell people 
what is bothering her before she explodes, and Nicky will manage 
her behaviour at the table better. Does it say what you agree 
to. 
(Both say yes) 
Let’s check this against the criteria for agreement, does this 
meet our expectations for what is restorative? Yes? Good. I’ll 
write it out for you both and then we need to set a date for a 
follow up meeting to see if the agreement is working. Would 
12.30 next Friday be okay? Now are you ready to sign this 
agreement? 
(Both girls sign the agreement) 
Thank you for coming to the restorative conference and being 
cooperative and constructive. I will look forward to seeing you 
at the follow up meeting. 
(All shake hands and leave) 
**** 
6.2 Theorising Relationships in Restorative Practice 
In Part 2 thus far, I have introduced several topics in relation to matters of dialogue and 
transformation in restorative practice. These are: passionate utterance, scepticism, 
autobiography as philosophy, self-reliance, and Emersonian moral perfectionism. As I move 
towards this final chapter, I find that the impact of my deliberate engagement in these 
preceding areas is akin to that of writing in an echo chamber. While I have sought to separate 
my ideas thematically, the inescapable conclusion of both preceding chapters lies in 
recognising the fundamental dynamics of human relationship. It is by now a commonly 





The recognition of strong, respectful relationships that keep communities together and the 
reparation of these relationships when things go wrong leads restorative practice theorists to 
actively engage with foundational concepts of right relationship.  
My final scenario in the story of the restorative conference continues my exploration by 
seeking to portray in what way the restoration of relationship is dependent on the extent to 
which we are in agreement. Given my earlier critique, that dialogue tends to be hijacked by 
instrumentalism, and of conformity itself, the use of agreement to stand in place of relation is 
unsettling. Further, it is exactly this claim that restorative practitioners are calling attention to 
when declaring that the restorative conference exhibits ‘little room for consideration by the 
student of the meaningfulness of what is being required or for the agency of the student – or 
indeed, for the relationships within which their behaviour is manifested’ (Drewery, 2016, p. 
198). Does this mean that conversation in the restorative conference is redundant? That it has 
no means for building relationship? Clearly, we see a back and forth of exchange between the 
girls which to an observer assessing the success of the conference is an encouraging 
development in terms of building relation. However, as Fulford points out ‘to take a view of 
language as merely providing a means of exchange of information would be to ignore what is 
possible in our conversation and what the implications are of this for those involved’ (Fulford, 
2012, p. 85). It is precisely these possibilities for relational conversation that focusses this 
concluding chapter. 
While restorative interventions offer pathways to the restoration of relationships, they are 
increasingly seen as inadequate for promoting the kind of positive, collaborative relationships 
that will build deeper, relational communities. Hence, more attention is paid to the wider 
quality of relationships between learners outside of conferences as well as between teacher 
and learner. In this, classroom teachers are also expected to make central their responsibility 
for owning and healing relationships with troublesome students. Developing a relational 
culture based on relational equality promotes the sustenance of democratising, peacebuilding 
structures that are disruptive, continuous critiques of traditionally dominant, and individually 
competitive, power structures (McCluskey et al., 2008a, Vaandering, 2014). Bridging the gap 
between citizenship education and relational theory, a restorative approach is actively 
positioned to create a condition of ‘relational space where individuals and communities 
flourish’ (Morrison, 2015, p. 448).   
In the wider sphere of restorative approaches, the prioritising of relationship as a primary 





restorative justice to merge with critical theories of relation in the hope of understanding how 
restorative practice can move beyond a mere operational strategy towards building just 
relationships necessary for transitional peace, justice and development. Jennifer Llewelyn’s 
(2012) attention to feminist relational theory in developing a theory of restorative practice is 
often cited as revising the way relationships need to be prioritised. Working on an idea of 
justice presented by the Indian economist and philosopher, Amartya Sen (2009), Llewelyn 
advocates a relational theory of justice that views restorative practice as grounded in an 
understanding of the self constituted in and through relationships with others. Sen’s argument 
is interesting for its consideration of the individual’s right to agree or disagree, and the 
resulting effect on wider public freedoms. His attention to the contextualised experience of 
the individual, and her community, debunks a notion of a ‘perfect’ justice achieved by 
institutional arrangement. Instead, Sen argues that justice should not be understood as 
perfection in any ideal absolutist sense but in the sense that one might achieve something 
better. While individuals retain their agency, their right to choose, they cannot make decisions 
by themselves. Accordingly, justice (read: restoration) understood relationally is the call for 
relational equality or equality of treatment or outcome, and further, a commitment to the 
nature of relationship between parties.  
Filtering this through the notion of relational theory, Llewelyn uses the lens of relationship to 
argue that looking for a picture-perfect version of justice ignores the reality that relationship is 
dynamic and fluid. Adjusting to the centrality of relationship means adjusting the language of 
discourse from justice that is ‘done’ to ‘doing justice’ (Llewelyn, 2012, p. 296). In bringing Sen 
and Llewelyn to bear on what we consider to constitute ethical relation, I am drawing 
attention to characteristics of our human condition that are dependent on not only the 
establishment of harmony or accordance in feeling, but also its lack. Such a view of deviance 
alters our sense of what kind of responsibility is at stake in the restorative conference. Through 
the lens of relationship, how does Cavell’s notion of disagreement in criteria as part of a 
community help us to think of an ongoing sense of justice rather than one that is just done?  
One possibility is to begin my discussion by returning to a subject that I touched on earlier in 
this thesis, that is, Cavell’s writing on the conceptual problem of knowing other minds. From 
there, I will introduce the role of dialogue in building ethical relation turning to the dialogical 
philosophy of Martin Buber (2013; 2014) centred on the distinction between the I -Thou 
relationship and the I - It relationship. Buber’s philosophy holds great weight for 
educationalists; however, I suggest that in the ongoing battle against conformity, it is Cavell’s 





identity. Cavell’s reading of a filmic genre he calls ‘the comedy of remarriage’ (Cavell, 1981, p. 
1) is significant for its orientation towards what can be perceived as an education that arises 
from disagreement. Cavell’s writing of education in terms of recovery of voice and the 
associated transcendental drive of moral perfectionism is to pick out how people find their 
way back to each other, to acknowledgement, in the middle of pain, exile, or separation. 
Restorative practice’s wider argument is driven by the aspiration to our best selves, of a new 
city, how our world might be, and the words that might shape it. Unlike theories of affect, this 
does not mean avoiding disagreeable emotion as a necessary process for integration but of 
using this to confront us in our discreditable (political) state in order to go on to our next best 
self. In conclusion, I argue that Cavell’s framing of an ongoing education, as a double 
restoration – that of ourselves to ourselves, as well as each other, is crucial to notions of 
ethical relation. 
6.3 An Ethics of Knowing Another 
In Chapter 4, I exposed the ethical danger when an attitude of domination is imposed by a 
need to contain the other within the limits of knowledge. I began to explore how the wish to 
obtain certainty where there might only be uncertainty is in line with the sceptic’s demand for 
language to exist within a fixed and solid structure. It is these structures, called criteria, that 
must be in place for us to make judgements. Through Wittgenstein, Cavell shows that claims 
for the integrity of knowledge exist on the horns of a dilemma. This is the relation between 
knowing or claiming in a philosophical sense and knowing or claiming as part of lived 
experience. His treatment of Wittgenstein’s thought experiments, specifically those related to 
pain, show how a framework of rules relieves the speaker from taking responsibility for their 
own words hence emptying them from their creative ability to ‘mutually attune’ themselves to 
any persons present. Cavell shows how criteria can instead exist to reveal the basis for our turn 
to the other. 
Most of what has been written about relationship in the restorative conference tends to focus 
on ideas of agreement. The perspective is that a participant’s arrival at agreement following 
disruption is synonymous with building relation. In this respect let us look again at what ‘rules’ 
are at work in the restorative conference script and that would lead to the necessary 
cognition. It is important to note that Ms Shah starts this final phase with the presumption of 
‘good sense’ at work asking: ‘how can we make things right again?’. From there Ms Shah is 
looking out for several gauges that can ascertain that her pupils understand the wrong that has 





her responding in certain ways. There is the outward expression of an apology, ‘I’m sorry’, 
followed by statements from the pupils that indicate a positive change of behaviour. The 
coupling of these two phenomena leads directly to ‘an agreement’ where ‘congratulations’ are 
given for ‘solving your conflict’. According to ordinary language philosophy this set of 
normative procedures follows a conception of criteria as being rule-driven, and agreement as 
exclusively in terms of corresponding rules. Of course, no universal rule can relieve us of the 
anxiety found when making a judgement. That there is a crisis of uncertainty prevalent in the 
restorative conference leads many teachers to doubt the validity and rightness of such a move. 
Teachers are well aware that establishing criteria cannot lead to certainty of the existence of 
an inner state, only its semblance. An example I suggest here is: ‘she is expressing pain… but 
does she feel it?’ that becomes for participants: ‘she says sorry…but does she mean it?’ That a 
fundamental lack of knowledge permeates all our relationships is an inevitable conclusion to 
the realisation of our epistemological separation. Indeed, proponents argue that restorative 
practice is not about ascertaining certainty, but ‘acknowledging feelings’ (Hansberry, 2016, p. 
151).  
It is precisely this ethical position that I wish to explore further in this chapter. In doing so, I am 
reminded that proponents of caring ethics, whose work I considered earlier in this thesis, 
recommend that emotions (and not some pre-established rule) should be the basis for an 
ethical education. To recap, Nel Noddings states that the reality of caring consists in the reality 
of discourse between the one-caring, and the one-cared for (Noddings, 2013). When a person 
behaves out of care, she decides her actions on the basis of feeling the emotions of the other. 
Only by feeling their reality can she move past norms and principles that ensure that her 
behaviour is genuinely ethical. To illustrate, Noddings gives the example of the man who faced 
with a choice between saving his drowning wife or saving a stranger, ‘has one thought too 
many’ (Noddings and Slote, 2003, p. 344). Noddings does not deny the need for moral thinking 
since the one-caring works in a problem-solving mode that avoids slipping into the impersonal 
reasoning of the rule-follower. Nevertheless, the recommendation that principles are 
superfluous is a controversial recommendation for education since, as the framework for 
restorative practice indicates, much ethical decision-making is dependent on the content of 
the internalised rules, norms, and values of the school. Where is the line between feeling and 





6.3.1 Cavell and the Limits of Criteria 
Cavell’s disappointment with criteria and philosophy’s quest for certainty is relevant here for 
his consideration of ‘the problem of other minds’ (de Vries, 2006; McGinn, 1988). In Part IV of 
The Claim of Reason Cavell rests his exploration of the phenomena on a claim that in ‘knowing 
others I am exposed on two fronts: to the other; and to my concept of the other’ (Cavell, 
1979b, p. 432). 
What we can know of the existence of others is, due to Cartesian sceptical argument, 
imperfectly known. For the sceptic, our exposure rests on a limitation of knowledge. At best, I 
can only know that there are humans like myself, who think as I do, based on what I can see, 
for example, ‘a humanish something of a certain height and age and gender and colour’ 
(Cavell, 1979b, p. 443). However, what is shown does not presuppose that the other is not an 
‘automaton, or an android, or a golem or some other species of alien’ (p. 422) without the 
capacity to think independently. What I am shown is not enough to vanquish the doubt that I 
may be the only human here. In the face of such terror the sceptical conclusion introduces the 
concept of ‘empathic projection’ (p. 440), the inference being that my claim to know the other 
is based on knowledge of myself, that is to say, I know that I can think and feel in this way 
therefore others must think and feel as I do.  
This kind of projected thinking is resonant with predominant theories behind restorative 
practice. Both affect script psychologies and reintegrative shaming are based on an ability to 
connect with the other through an understanding of one’s own emotive history. We see this 
connection working through the pupils’ response-language: ‘I’ – ‘I could say sorry…’, ‘I could 
stop messing about’, ‘I’m going to be more aware’. At this stage, the responses do not build on 
each other’s thoughts or ideas. Instead, Nicky and Nazreen’s suggestions can be put forward as 
a ‘best case for knowing another’ (p. 432). Cavell might say they demonstrate ‘a prototype way 
of thinking and not the result of thought’ (p. 541). Empathetic projection is not a stance that 
Cavell finds reassuring since it leaves no room to express my knowledge, ‘to recognise what I 
know’ (p. 428). Instead, he pushes his investigation by drawing on another Wittgensteinian 
parable: 
Of course, if water boils in a pot, steam comes out of the pot and also pictured 
steam comes out of the pictured pot. But what if one insisted on saying that there 
must also be something boiling in the pictured pot? (Wittgenstein, 2009, §297). 
Cavell (1979b) cites three contemporaries who discuss privacy with regard to the question 





The first, George Pitcher defends the privacy of another’s sensation as an essentially 
unknowable phenomena – it makes no sense to say there is something boiling in the pot for a 
picture of a boiling pot cannot itself be boiling. Another, John Cook, suggests that we would be 
better off thinking of ‘sensations are private’ (Cavell, 1979b, p. 331) in the sense that since the 
other’s sensation is unknowable to me, it is irrelevant to my knowledge that another is in pain. 
The latter is one that Cavell finds morally offensive, and yet, challenging this by denying 
privacy – of course there must be something boiling in the pot, there is steam coming out for 
all to see – is also fundamentally ‘queer’. Finally, Alan Donegan chooses a middle ground, 
proposing that while other’s sensations cannot be pictured directly (bild) – we cannot see 
inside the pot – they can be represented imaginatively (vorstellung).  
6.3.2 Failure to Acknowledge 
Rather than siding with the above arguments, Cavell takes a different perspective. In doing so 
he asks not if the question can be answered, but if the question itself makes sense. Our three 
commentators agree this inevitably says something about the ‘potential strangeness or 
emptiness involved in both affirming and denying that there must be something hidden in the 
pot (or body)’ (Hammer, 2002, p. 62). That Cavell is concurrently drawing on Wittgenstein’s 
pain analogy also says much about the ‘appeal to, or denial of, some quasi-entity that 
accompanies people’s behaviour’ (ibid.):  
“Yes, but there is something there all the same accompanying my cry of pain. And 
it is on account of that that I utter it. And this something is what is important – 
and frightful.” – Only whom are we informing of this? And on what occasion? 
(Wittgenstein, 2009, §296). 
In showing how parable §296 applies to §297, Cavell asks us to imagine if someone were to 
stand up after hours spent at her desk and that, after a good stretch, a muscle cramp caused 
her to cry out in pain. She should exhibit all the pain-behaviour, contorting, groaning, et cetera, 
‘is such a cry incomprehensible?’ Cavell asks (Cavell, 1979b, p. 337). If we have no reason to 
doubt her pain, the utterance ‘but there is something there’ becomes meaningfully ‘senseless’. 
However, language might not prevent such an assertion from being made. In other words, the 
words do make sense to us, but we are meaning them in the wrong place (Wittgenstein, 2009, 
§500). Wittgenstein’s point is that it is absurd to ask for a justification for reacting to another 
person’s pain. That justification comes to an end at some point and when we reach that point 
there is nothing more to say than we have reached our bedrock: there is nothing more to what 





innate understanding that pain in naturally expressive and misses the nature of Wittgenstein’s 
parable. We are separate and fear of separation is what is used to frame our retreat into a 
realm of private sensation.  
Pain is expressive as it becomes manifest in winces and groans. Therefore, pain and pain-
behaviour must necessarily be united. The attempt to put into play unnecessary assertions, 
such as described above, are ‘when we feel we must enforce the connection between 
something inner and an outer something’ (Cavell, 1979b, p. 338), as if mind and body were 
two different things. To make the connection implies there is a gap between the two and leads 
Wittgenstein to ask, ‘how can I go so far as to try to use language to get between pain and its 
expression’ (Witttgenstein, 2009, §245). Cavell’s answer is nothing can be closer than the inner 
or outer, ‘there is no room between’ (Cavell, 1979b, p. 341). We react to another’s pain as if 
reacting to our own pain. Philosophy is thus disappointed when this ‘natural connection’ (p. 
338) fails ‘because quite often when pain boils in a human being pain-behaviour does not 
come forth’ (ibid.). Hence, not only is pain-behaviour no guarantee for the presence of 
another’s mind, it is no guarantee of pain or indeed of what it is that the other feels. The 
philosophical task posed by Wittgenstein’s parable, and hence of the pain analogy, is not to 
debate what cannot be seen or unseen but to show that uttering words that cannot be fully 
meant amounts to a failure to agree in judgement or to responsibly project criteria with which 
the other can make herself comprehensible. 
Thus, Cavell demonstrates simultaneously both the limits of criteria and the onus on ourselves 
for the taking responsibility over the only knowledge that we have. It is in development of this 
turn against the Cartesian tradition that Cavell refers to an expression of pain as being a call or 
demand, or claim for a response: ‘they are my (more or less) modified responses to it, or to his 
having it, or to his anticipations of it; they are responses to another’s expressions of (or 
inability to express) his or her pain’ (p. 342). If expression is our natural condition, then it 
remains both risky and full of anxiety. Yet without risk I remain unknown. As I stated earlier in 
this thesis, the call for expression can be answered or denied (indeed there may be many 
reasons to hesitate putting oneself in the position of having to consider saying, for shutting 
out, or for turning away from another), but such is the structure of Cavellian 
acknowledgement, ‘a category of terms in which responses are evaluated’ (Hammer, 2002, p. 
64), that even if the other is denied my response it is always from a position of responsibility. 
Hammer (2002) points out that this is very different to empathic projection ‘from merely 
seeing to registering that such-and so-is the case’ (p. 64). Rather is it an active engagement 





oneself ‘to the specific history of my relation to the other’ (ibid.). In other words, I do not need 
to be certain of her as human, I simply need to have an ‘attitude’ towards her as if this were 
the case, as if she had a soul.  
Despite beginning with certainty of knowledge ‘of course, if water boils in a pot’, 
Wittgenstein’s parable retains a sense of something of which we cannot grasp hold. This is not 
knowledge, but not ‘nothing’ either. Rather, the point of the ‘something’ is to reveal 
acknowledgement. The point of acknowledgment is, in the case of pain, not some arbitrary 
measure of pain but ‘the necessary difference between being you and being me, the fact that 
we are two’ (p. 356). Acknowledgement calls for recognition of the other’s specific relation to 
oneself and, in the case of moral failure, to come to a revelation of oneself as having denied or 
distorted that relation. Where a failure of knowledge results in a loss of facts, a failure to 
acknowledge results in something far worse than ignorance: this is ‘my avoidance of him, call it 
my denial of him’ (p. 389). Characterised as ‘the presence of something, a confusion, an 
indifference, a callousness, an exhaustion’ (p. 264) blocking the vision of another’s body or 
soul is to ‘suffer a kind of blindness [avoided] by projecting this darkness onto others’ (p. 368). 
Neither is blindness limited to third person relations. In the last chapter, I began to explore the 
nature of one’s incomprehensibility towards oneself. The human cost of attempting to deny 
this connection is, as I have already shown, a given basis for therapeutic psychoanalysis. Freud 
showed how cognitive trust in memory can be shattered as a result of trauma with the result 
that one becomes unknowable, essentially unintelligible towards oneself. As shown in King 
Lear, only by acknowledging one’s pain is one able to begin to know oneself thus beginning the 
road to recovery and possibility.  
6.4 I and Thou  
We have seen that the human cost of denying oneself destabilises body and soul, but what 
more can be said about the option of rejecting the other? In other words, if one cannot be 
treated as human, then ‘what thing might someone be treated as’ (Cavell, 1979b, p. 372)? The 
philosopher Martin Buber believed that in the realm of lived experience persons are often 
reduced to things or objects as a detriment to their humanity. Notably, Martin Buber’s major 
philosophical-theological work I and Thou (2013) approached objectification by attempting to 
establish a typology that would describe the two kinds of relations that people enter. These 
basic word pairs are in accordance with his twofold attitude: the I-It, or irrelation, where we 
hold ourselves apart from the object of our relation, and the I-Thou (sometime called the I-





Unlike the realm of experience, the I-You relation is unmediated: Nothing 
conceptually intervenes between I and You, no prior knowledge and no 
imagination; and memory itself is changed as it plunges from particularity to 
wholeness. No purpose intervenes between I and You, no greed and no 
anticipation; and longing itself is changed as it plunges from the dream into 
appearance. Every means is an obstacle. Only where all means have disintegrated 
encounters occur (Buber, 2013, pp. 62–63). 
There is no holding back in the I-Thou relation: each turns to the other in order to encounter or 
reflect, perhaps even to confront through connection and dialogue. In Buber’s view, the 
subject-object dichotomy is at the basis of much objectification resulting in distancing of 
common relations (Gordon, 2011). The continued dichotomisation resulting in science’s urge 
to classify, organise and ‘knit them into a scheme of observation without any feeling of 
universality’ (Buber, 2013 p. 21) leaves us with the disquieting notion that ‘those who 
experience, do not participate in the world’ (p. 56). 
Although the I-It and the I-Thou can be viewed as opposites, these being ‘the intersubjective, 
ethical, dialogical relation of the I-Thou and the instrumental, goal-oriented, monological 
relation of the I-It’ (Lipari, 2006, p. 125), persons will, and should, be in constant movement 
between both relations. Buber does not propose that we exist solely in either state. Indeed, it 
has been noted that it is this oscillation that is most significant for personal transformation 
(Morgan and Guilherme, 2014). Nevertheless, I-Thou was a concept initially published in 1923 
during a period of extreme nationalism in Germany that prompted the rise of Nazism and the 
sweeping anti-Semitic persecution.46 The German-born Buber saw the objectification of the 
Jews as the victory of the I-It relation and a suppression of the I-Thou relation. Horrifically, this 
included the Jewish Holocaust, a tragedy that allowed the sanctioning of serious crimes to be 
committed against persons who were not taken to be recognised as human, and from there, of 
an entire ethnic population. Only by ceasing to say Thou to fellow humans do we cease to see 
them as human, they become objects without rights and duties. 
Although Buber stressed that both the I-Thou and the I-It are necessary modes of being, he 
believed that ‘we exist too little in the former and too much in the latter’ (Gordon, 2011, p. 
211). For him, human beings emerge not as isolated individuals or as part of a collective, but 
rather in a dialogue or relation with other beings. Buber’s bias towards ‘knowledge of other’ 
 
46 As well as all others deemed to be ‘other’ such as ‘communists, homosexuals, the disabled or 





away from ‘self-knowledge’ has attracted those looking to provide restorative practice with a 
philosophical foundation. Understanding how pupils move may move from having an I-It 
relationship to having an I-Thou relationship, teachers are able to explain, for example, how a 
pupil responding to a classroom dare – viewing the teaching assistant as an object of fun – is 
able to move to a position of empathy and connection (Macready, 2009). According to Buber, 
only by establishing dialogue can one facilitate an encounter with others that allows one to say 
Thou, changing a relationship that is characterised by stereotyping and objectification to a 
relationship that is respectful and evolving. From a Buberian perspective, only those capable of 
genuine dialogue can see the world from the perspective of another.  
I will return to this notion later in the chapter. Before this, there remains something further to 
be said regarding ‘self-knowledge’ and ‘inter-dependence’ and the ideas of a shared common 
humanity implicit in the restorative conference (McDonald and Moore, 2001). Where common 
humanity is valued, pupils learn to relate to each other from a position that acknowledges the 
other’s human qualities and responses. This is a position that will, at the same time, enable 
individuals to experience their own unique social responsibilities through a notion of a 
common humanity that is explored in both its presence and its absence. To illustrate, Cavell 
provides examples from US history by using the example of the slaveowner that ‘does not see 
or treat their slaves as human beings, but rather as livestock’ (Cavell, 1979b, p. 372). However, 
Cavell has some further warning other than the ‘objectification as de-humanisation’ argument. 
In asking ‘what else could a person be other than a person’ (p. 372), he contends that the slave 
owner does not in fact see his slaves as animals. When he tips the taxi driver, he does not, 
unlike his horse, pat the side of his head. Similarly, he does not try to influence his horses as if 
they were human. Rather, Cavell maintains this business of being ‘not-human’ is not rooted in 
a denial of the slaves’ humanity (as opposed to stones or trees) but of the slave-owner 
acknowledging that they are ‘primarily different from him’ (p. 376) and, as such, to be denied 
the realm of justice to which the slaveowner believes he belongs. By not being merely other, 
but different, the slave-owner denies his ability to connect to the slave’s humanity. He may 
acknowledge them, may know everything about them, but is blind to their acknowledgement 
of him.  
Hence, Cavell shows that not every act of acknowledgment is inherently moral. Instead, one’s 
morality is incumbent on mutuality of relation. Only through seeing himself (the slave-owner) 
through their (the slaves) eyes, would they know that they may see themselves through his. 
This double-fronted exposure is the basis for ethical relation. Without this willingness to let 





To let yourself matter is to acknowledge not merely how it is with you, and hence 
to acknowledge that you want the other to care, at least to care to know. It is 
equally to acknowledge that your expressions in fact express you, that they are 
yours, that you are in them. This means allowing yourself to be comprehended, 
something you can always deny. Not to deny it is, I would like to say, to 
acknowledge your body, and the body of your expressions, to be yours, you on 
earth, all there will ever be of you’ (Cavell, 1979b, p. 383). 
Cavell, in making his remarks about acknowledgement and avoidance, suggests that rather 
than support ‘monologues of knowing’ (Macready, 2009, p.218), our relationship with other 
humans is not based on a practice in which there is any specific justification, but on self-
knowledge – a practice that comes naturally to us, and that builds on my attunement to your 
soul. Therefore, my mode of relating to your mind is not to know your mind but to arrive at 
acknowledgement.  
6.5 An Ethics of Dialogue 
There are some very real implications here for the restorative conference. Let us return to the 
scenario and ask if the intention to which the conference is committed is one of knowing or 
acknowledging. If, as is suggested, the intention is one of knowing, then this confirms signs of 
an ethical collapse. Let me take a moment to reiterate what I mean by the term ‘ethical’. As I 
stated earlier, I am not speaking of ethics as a branch of philosophy including the meaning and 
standards of what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in general, of well-being, right conduct or moral character. 
This is huge discipline that by necessity separates purely philosophical thought from practical 
advice. These lines of thought, in Western ethical philosophy are said to originate with 
Socrates and the Sophists, our modern knowledge of which is derived from Plato’s dialogues. 
Nor am I speaking of professional ethics and their own sets of rules or codes. Ms Shah’s 
articulation of her expectations for the conference and her responsibility to ensure pupils 
arrive safely at a resolution operate within the mutual expectations for her environment. My 
conceptualisation of ethical relation is instead related to what can be termed ‘a way of life’, 
that is, behaviour or attitudes that in any shape or form constitute that ‘distinctive way of 
being human’ (Hogan, 2003, p. 209). Cavell’s occupation with what we say and what we mean, 
to each other, belongs to this dimension. In his idea of moral perfectionism, the main focus is 
not on good or right action in particular situations but on the whole of one’s life and the state 
of one’s soul, on the questions of how one should live and what kind of person one aspires to 





reading of Shakespearian tragedy, Cavell clearly shows how acknowledgement of a character 
can directly teach us something about acknowledging the other, a feat that is said to be rarely 
found within the confines of philosophical ethics (Blok, 2019). How much more valuable would 
it be if the conference were to take as its ethical basis acknowledging over knowing. What 
might that look like? Given the focus must be centred on dialogic exchange (and its possible 
absence) I want to visit the ways in which dialogical theories of relation can characterise 
ethical relation.  
6.5.1 Genuine Dialogue and Technical Dialogue 
Having identified Cavell’s significance for an ethics of restorative relational practice, it will now 
be fruitful to re-consider two perennial issues for teachers. These are restoring relationship 
through dialogue and the relationship between an individual’s growth and her community. I 
alluded earlier to a range of ‘dialogic’ philosophies whose influence has led theorists to 
examine the work of prominent psychologists and philosophers in order to provide the 
practice with its philosophical basis. I have already pointed out that Buber’s positioning of 
people in I-Thou relationships reflects a move to ethical relation. I now want to consider how a 
more specific account of the educational thought of Buber, including notions of dialogue, 
relatedness and community, provides restorative practice with the conception of the pupil as 
both an ethically singular, and social being.  
Buber’s concept of embracing the other through the I-Thou relation is central to understanding 
his concept of dialogue. A point of departure is the consideration that ‘Buber’s dialogue is 
more than an activity in which people take part. It is what makes us people’ (Stern, 2018, p. 
49). In other words, ‘dialogue can only be grasped as an ontological phenomenon – a meeting 
of one whole being with another whole being’ (Gordon, 2011, p. 208). Called in-sight by Buber 
for its ability to allow us to see the ethical principle (Friedman, 1993), it is articulated in 
Buber’s philosophical concept of dialogue. Its three forms, genuine dialogue, technical 
dialogue, and monologue disguised as dialogue, are presented below: 
There is genuine dialogue – no matter whether spoken or silent – where each of 
the participants really has in mind the other or others in their present and 
particular being and turns to them with the intention of establishing a living 
mutual relation between himself and them. There is technical dialogue, which is 
prompted solely by the need of objective understanding. And there is monologue 
disguised as dialogue, in which two or more men meeting in space, speak each 





escaped the torment of being thrown back on their own resources (Buber, 2014, 
p. 19). 
As in I-It relations, Buber leaves room for dialogue that exists solely to ensure the delivery of 
vital information. Termed ‘technical dialogue’, this is the sort that ensures one can buy a train 
ticket from a cashier or return a book via the librarian on the counter. In these cases, the 
purpose of dialogue espouses a purposeful role that would in its absence leave a ticket 
unpurchased or a library book accumulating late penalties. In schools, technical dialogue 
ensures the delivery of educational material, of learning objectives or Ms Shah’s 
communicating the conference’s ‘respect agreement’.  
Although technical dialogue should be considered in a positive light, Buber ignores but does 
not deny the value of technical dialogue, technical dialogue itself cannot alone establish the 
world of ethical relation. For this, participants must be in possession of its ‘basic movement’ 
(Buber, 2014, p. 22), that is, genuine dialogue that is judged to be a ‘turning towards the other’ 
(ibid.). Buber, quite rightly, states that our usual turn towards the other, as in to look at 
someone and address them while speaking, is a common occurrence. Nevertheless, what 
differentiates genuine dialogue is the turn that takes place ‘as a requisite measure of the soul’ 
(ibid.). For this to happen, dialogue not only means turning to the other but also turning to 
oneself and that means ‘saying at times what one really thinks about the matter in question’ 
(Freidman, 1993, p. 141). 
Buber gives examples of genuine dialogue hidden ‘in the tone of a railway guard’s voice, in the 
glance of an old newspaper vendor, in the smile of a chimney sweeper’ (Buber, 2014, p. 19), 
suggesting that genuine dialogue is much more than verbosity but represents the spark of 
expression with which we acknowledge another to be like ourselves, not objectified. 
Moreover, Buber speaks of genuine dialogue occurring beyond the realm of humanity, with 
machines, trees, animals, and with the Thou itself.47 His dialogical claims facilitate a re-
connection in all spheres of relationality and, ultimately, to the Divine. Regarding his childhood 
interaction with a horse, he states that ‘what I experienced in touch with the animal was the 
Other, the immense otherness of the Other’ (Buber, 2014, p. 23). The Other, or Thou, exists at 
the threshold of language hence our connection with animals, and plant life, can still initiate a 
personal response in oneself which if the appropriate space is created, ‘unreservedly accepts 
and confirms him in his being this man and in his being made in this particular way’ (Buber, 
 





1998, p. 59). Genuine dialogue expects neither to influence nor extract anything specific. It 
takes place when each person gives themselves as a whole being, withholding nothing. A 
further condition is its spontaneity, developing because of the unpredictable response of the 
other. Therefore, its essential element is seeing the other or experiencing the other side. 
6.5.2 Availability and Unavailability 
I might well refer here again to passionate utterance (Cavell’s extension of Austin’s theory of 
speech acts that accommodated the effects of emotion on human communication) to 
demonstrate further examples of what counts as genuine dialogue. However, I want to 
continue the focus on ethical irrelation and its detriment to the soul by drawing comparisons 
with the philosopher-playwright Gabriel Marcel. Marcel maintained his thoughts arose from 
experience, reaching for everyday examples of ordinary life to illustrate the philosophical ideas 
he was investigating. In an argument against what he calls ‘the particular danger of “isms”’,48 
systems of thought which profess to ‘encapsulate’ the universe, Marcel warns philosophers 
against the dangers of imposing a certain kind of ‘official’ or ‘pseudo-philosophy’ upon their 
thinking practices (Marcel, 2002, p. 64). Surmising that this type of study aims to eliminate the 
central problem by turning to empiricism, Marcel saw the rise of psychology or sociology49, to 
present a final explanation as pandering to an inferiority complex. 
In contrast, Marcel perceived concrete philosophy, philosophising hic et nunc, as making 
possible the ‘creative tension between the I and those depths of our being […] directed on our 
most intensely lived experience’ (Marcel, 2002, p. 65). Like Buber, Marcel believed that 
genuine dialogue exists beyond the world of physical relation. Relation without 
communication is known as ‘communion’ likened to a giving of the self, not by what one says 
but rather like a gift, or object. Unlike Buber’s I-It, communion limits objectification by virtue 
that the self is free to take or leave the presence that it evokes. Presence, as a result of 
communion, produces a bond between those who are in participation with another, who are 
receptive to another, and who are committed to sharing in each other’s experience. Both 
aspects of communion and presence are embedded in Marcel’s notions of disponibilité, or 
availability (Marcel, 2010) wherein one may seek out others whose experiences are ready to 
 
48 Marcel refers to ‘Cartesianism’, ‘kantism’ and ‘bergonism’ as embodying a certain kind of 
academicism (Marcel, 2002, p. 60). 
49 By example Marcel refers to Jean Piaget (Marcel, 2002, p.64), the French psychologist whose 
explanations of cognitive child development were based on his theories of genetic epistemology. His 
observations of children’s levels of cognition attempted to theorise age-related processes by which the 





complement our own. This ability to transform any circumstance into opportunity, to shape 
one’s personality, is known as a vocation: a word that Marcel interprets in its truest sense, that 
of ‘the response to a call’ (Marcel, 2010, p. 17). Whether one recognises the call as such is 
dependent on the person but awareness comes from both outside and within. Moreover, it is a 
free response that is unsubjugated to the needs of the other. A life of availability is an outward 
orientation towards something other than itself. 
The opposite of the being who is ready or available is one who is self-occupied. The resulting 
indisponibilité, or unavailability, manifests itself through alienation. Emotions such as pride, 
drawing strength solely from oneself, reduces the connection to other people as ‘examples’ or 
‘cases’. Marcel pictures the unavailable self as standing inside a circle formed by his own 
cogito. Instead of Thou, the other is encountered as He or She or It. By reducing Thou to He 
that person is kept at arm’s length: 
The other, in so far as he is other, only exists for me in so far as I am open to him, 
in so far as he is a Thou. But I am only open to him in so far as I cease to form a 
circle with myself, inside which I somehow place the other, or rather his idea; for 
inside this circle, the other becomes the idea of the other, and the idea of the 
other is no longer the other qua other, but the other qua related to me (Marcel, 
2002, p. 71–72). 
However, when the other is reduced further still, to her, then they cease to be entertained as a 
person and become an object that carries out a set of functions. This happens when one is 
preoccupied with the self, to the extent that the clutter inside obscures the self from rendering 
oneself present or available. Marcel describes this as the self becoming opaque: 
I am taking up, between being occupied with one’s health, one’s future, one’s 
mistress, or one’s temporal success. Surely the conclusion follows that to be 
occupied with oneself is not to be occupied with a determinate object, but rather 
to be occupied in a certain way which remains to be defined. We might approach 
our definition by way of the idea of a spiritual opaqueness or blockage (Marcel, 
1965, p. 80).  
The description of indisponibilité is one useful to ideas of ethical dialogue. Unavailability is the 
result of preoccupation with oneself as an object such as to create a spiritual blockage. 
However, that is not to say that reciprocity can be demanded from a relationship. It is instead 
‘bound up in the gift of one’s presence’ (Marcel, 2010, p. 66). For Buber, ethical dialogue is 





that which is genuine and that which can be termed monologic. Also classed as non-dialogue 
or failed dialogue, there is no inter-human relation, no genuine dialogue, only a barrage of 
abstract ideas whose reliance on the elevation of the self blocks the possibility of encounter. 
This cannot be neatly summarised as a ‘turning away from’, more an obsession with ‘reflexion’ 
(p. 22) such as when one becomes notably more absorbed in one’s own thoughts and feelings 
to the detriment of breaking connection with the other. Whatever brief satisfaction the 
unavailable or monologic individual has it is short-lived as when we treat others as objects, as 
opposed to fellow humans, we not only deny their humanity, we also diminish ours.  
Emphasis on a dialogical stance highlights the importance of conflict, and not resolution, in 
bringing people together (Stern, 2007). To think otherwise would lead us directly to monologic 
thinking, the absence of conflict or the assumption that my point of view must be agreed on. 
What is healthily dialogic is conversation that ‘steers us away from the demonization of our 
adversaries, of those who differ with us’ (Cain, 1993, p. 130) towards the mutual and 
reciprocal acknowledgement of difference. A way of visualising this has been to draw on 
Buber’s theory of human relations as a workable approach to resolving conflict, chiefly in 
bringing hope to the Israeli-Palestinian struggle (Mendes-Flohr, 2014; Morgan and Guilherme, 
2010). This does not necessarily mean the end of division, indeed there is a real possibility that 
conflict will persist. The notion that I can come to see your side while remaining rooted in my 
own is a central point with which people may re-envisage relationships characterised by a 
more genuine ethical dimension. It is also important to make clear that Buber is not advocating 
mere tolerance of the other as the goal of reconciliation. While tolerance is an acceptable first 
step, Buber states that ‘it is not enough. I dare not turn aside his gravest objection. I must 
accept it, as and where it is raised, and must answer’ (Buber, 2014, p. 34). Without both 
acceptance and, crucially, its answer, tolerance is in danger of committing relation to the 
sphere of I-It relation, necessary but insufficient, or of monologic dialogue where we have the 
appearance of debate but where those taking part are more interested in listening to 
themselves than each other. Shady and Larson (2010) comment that ‘such a mindset does not 
help get at the root of violence and disagreement, and it does not encourage us to see how 
and if our own perspectives toward others might be problematic’ (p. 87).  
As I noted before there is a connection between overly technicised forms of restorative 
conferencing and an authoritarian commodified style of education. To prevent tightly drawn 
restorative frameworks from taking hold, I have argued that dialogue that leads to freedom in 
thinking, and ethical relation is extremely helpful. On a basic level this must mean that there is 





discussion as well as an acknowledgment the restorative process is a part of our essential 
learning to conduct dialogue ‘between’ individuals, rather than a focus on merely the 
resolution of conflict. Not only will this encourage interpersonal relations, since pupils will 
have a better chance of encountering each other as Thou, as opposed to It, but it would also 
represent a necessary step towards the sort of whole school cultural change that restorative 
theorists argue is necessary to support long term implementation. The idea of technical 
dialogue and technologies of language is significant not only for Buberian philosophy but 
ordinary language philosophy more broadly since it can be argued that in other forms of 
philosophy there is a technologising of language that moves us away from the ordinary, that is 
to say, the personal and the mundane that is characteristic of dialogue that is ‘restorative’. 
Technicising language means participants receiving a sanitised version of engagement that 
lacks the basis with which we can really know one another, this being our emotions or feelings. 
Thus, the ability to know what really happened between victim and offender is dependent on 
that deeper, emotional level of knowing, and not merely through the doing of restorative 
justice. That is to say, the performance of being restorative conflicts with the claim of 
restorative practice that it empowers victims while allowing offenders the opportunity for 
treatment and enhancement of personal competencies (Zehr, 2002, p. 17). 
There is an apparent tension here. On the one hand, I am arguing for the facilitation of 
dialogically open spaces where pupils are free to not resolve conflict (at least to reveal the 
ethical dimension of genuine dialogue). On the other hand, teachers are supposed to teach, 
and if the restorative conference can be considered a teaching space (and I do), then, in 
Buber’s words, the teacher has to ‘introduce discipline and order [...] establish a law [by which] 
he can only strive and hope for the result that discipline and order will become more and more 
inward and autonomous’ (Buber, 2014, p. 113). We can well imagine a situation in which a 
pupil makes an offensive comment about another’s skin or hair colour. In this case, there is an 
ethical responsibility placed on the facilitator to ‘establish a law’ to the contrary. In true 
dialogical fashion the facilitator may present the issue by delineating the boundaries of 
appropriate and inappropriate speech for discussion in the classroom. Known as inclusive 
thinking,50 the facilitator opens the chance to bring forward differing perspectives, seeking to 
 
50 Buber’s ideas of ‘inclusion’ are described as follows: ‘The extension of one’s own concreteness, the 
fulfilment of the actual situation of life, the complete presence of the reality in which one participates. 
Its elements are first, a relation of no matter what kind, between two persons, second an event 
experienced by them in common, in which at least one of them actually participates, and third, the fact 
that this one person, without forfeiting anything of the felt reality of his activity, at the same time lives 





understand what issues have prompted the harmful comment as well as why others might 
perceive the comment as harmful. In this respect the teacher is less in pursuit of monological 
dictations of established truths, more affording an opportunity for pupils to, if not transcend 
the law, then participate in its creation. 
6.6 An Ethics of Relation 
In thinking about the concept of law, and that of restoring relations, I am drawn to the notion 
of the restorative conference as not only a private space, but a public one. Certainly, the 
restorative conference is a place of conflict where argument and high emotion enables human 
beings to privately disclose themselves as distinct and unique persons. However, it is also 
emphatically a public space in which my alternative view over the consequences of your 
actions may be openly aired. Public spaces play a vital role in the social life of communities, 
acting as self-organising public services that constitutes a shared resource in which 
experiences and value are created (Mean and Tims, 2005). In schools, the notion of schools 
that are public spaces, in the public domain and available as a public resource, has the capacity 
to potentially ‘open up a democratic politics of education’ (Martin, 2016, p. x). Schools are not 
democracies, but they are communities whose explicit purpose, if they are to entail more than 
regulation and performance, must necessarily extend the notion of relationships beyond the 
school gate and towards the population beyond. In thinking of how the restoring of 
relationships within the restorative conference relates to the wider community, I am reminded 
of Thoreau’s depiction of the hut and the village. While descriptions of Walden often leave the 
reader imagining some remote and rural idyll, Thoreau’s dwelling is within the village limits, in 
the very midst of a public space. Throughout, Thoreau makes it clear that his private thoughts 
are often in dispute with the actions of his community. Importantly, however, his 
disagreement is still part of what it means to be in community.  
In concluding my inquiry into what ethical dialogue looks like, I am drawn back to notions of 
agreement. In business usage, an agreement is a decision or arrangement that has been made 
and accepted by two or more people, or groups. To be in agreement denotes mutual 
understanding, and mutual conformity, both valid aims of the restorative conference in situ. 
Not only is the agreement verbal, it is a written contract that can be read back.  Cavell stresses 
that agreement in language (criteria) is a matter of agreeing in judgment and that ‘this 
agreement is agreement in, not agreement to’ (Mulhall, 2003, p. 90). Just as important to 
Cavell is what happens if we find that we disagree in a specific judgement. If the guidance for 





understanding one another) has no higher guidance, or authority, than ourselves. It therefore 
follows that this limitation in how we see one another forms part of a multitude of ‘the very 
general fact of human nature […] that it should be part of the grammar of “understanding”’ 
(Cavell, 1979b, p. 110).  
How then is a notion of disagreement a part of establishing and contributing to health of 
ethical relationships? What is at risk in its absence? In seeking an explanation, I want to return 
to the relevance of ‘film as philosophy’, Cavell’s project to marry film analysis and 
philosophical thought. Shifting the term ‘dialogue’ to Cavell’s recurrent use of ‘conversation’, 
his work in a further genre of Hollywood films from the 1930s and 40s provides a propitious 
framework for showing how conversation - while not directed towards any sort of obvious or 
momentous conclusion - allows its speakers to ‘tentatively and tangentially address matters of 
common concern without also obligating them to come to any ultimate agreement’ (Long, 
2018, p. 78). In this final section, I argue that ‘conversation without consensus’ (ibid.) is vital 
for reconsidering restorative practice’s understanding of pupils’ ethical development.   
6.6.1 The Hollywood Comedies of Remarriage 
In Chapter Five, Cavell’s writing on ‘The Hollywood Melodrama of the Unknown Woman’ saw 
conversation between the man and woman as a repressive, stultifying mechanism responsible 
for the eventual de-creation of the woman. Moral perfectionism, the progression of one self to 
the next, finds expression as the demand for an education. The wife’s leaving of the marital 
union is confirmation that this request is beyond her husband’s ability to provide. Such an 
education as would be constitutive of a life together, a recreation of marriage, would occur 
‘only on condition that a miracle of change take place’ (Cavell, 1981, p. 23). A Cavellian 
understanding of how conversation is concomitant with a philosophical understanding of that 
miracle is the subject of his first book on film, Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of 
Remarriage in which he explores how an older, married couple can be married, or married 
again. Taking direction from the problematic of Ibsen’s A Doll House, he argues how the genre 
establishes the coming back together of a couple following a breakdown of their relationship. 
Unlike the melodramas, however, key to the achievement of the couple’s ‘restoration’ - 
meaning their ‘pursuit of happiness’ - is the distinctive nature of the primary couple’s 
conversation. As Cavell writes: 
The conversation of what I call the genre of remarriage is, judging from the films I 
take to define it, of a sort that leads to acknowledgment; to the reconciliation of a 





metamorphosis of death and revival, the achievement of a new perspective on 
existence, a perspective that presents itself as a place, one removed from the city 
of confusion and divorce (Cavell, 1981, p. 19). 
Before I proceed, it ought to be stated that drawing a comparison between these sexually 
charged, adult-oriented spaces and school-based practices could be considered gratuitously 
provocative. Provocation need not be a cause for drawback, since this can indicate the 
aptitude to open up new horizons of thinking. As Cavell states, ‘philosophy, as I understand it, 
is indeed outrageous, inherently so. It seeks to disquiet the foundations of our lives and to 
offer us in recompense nothing better than itself’ (1981, p. 9). Nevertheless, the educatively 
sensitive context in which this thesis is contextualised requires some further awareness. 
Therefore, I wish to state plainly that my thinking, in pursuing the value of these cinematic 
examples to a restorative philosophy, is to draw important lines of attention to communicative 
practices that affirm the importance a setting that allows its characters to ‘take the time, and 
take the pains, to converse intelligently and playfully about themselves and about one 
another’ (p. 5). The philosophical nature of this reveals how it is that ‘the pair’s saying of words 
to one another is shown to mean more; their conversations are meant to bring about 
believable change’ (p. 27). With a lightness of touch and quick-witted ease, Cavell’s couple’s 
converse ‘intelligently and playfully about themselves’ (p. 5) in the kind of rich, sophisticated 
settings that invite the time and space essential for talk of this nature. Quoting Emerson’s 
essay ‘History’, Cavell’s understanding is that these settings are essential for the enviable 
‘freedom, power and grace’ with which the rich may ‘waste their time’ working towards moral 
perfectionism. In the comedies of remarriage, the ability to speak intelligibility, such that one 
becomes intelligible both to the self and other, adds up to a past to which both admit fault 
together so as to move forward as one. 
6.6.2 Small Talk 
How does an air of equality and conviviality square itself with the very inequal and often 
distressing encounters pupils face in a restorative conference? There appears to be a problem 
with my analogy. Rather than making a claim that the cinematic couple are directly 
representative of pupils in a restorative conference, I want to make a case that conversation in 
the remarriage comedies is representative of a certain quality of inconclusiveness and that this 
lack of any pattern, or unpredictability, is vital to the restoration of relation. In Chapter 4, I 
explored how there is no overarching theory or formula for the identification of Cavellian 





add to that lack of systemisation by considering Cooper Long’s (2018) description of ‘small talk’ 
as a social function ‘intended to bring about some social cohesion and comfort between 
people, particularly between people who do not know each other well’ (p. 79). Long states that 
while small talk works to create interpersonal bonds of relation between people, such 
conversation is by its nature, inconclusive. He states, for example: 
When speaking about the weather, for instance, there is no expectation that any 
agreement will be widely important to others, or that it will be final and cannot be 
further amended or elaborated. Someone may not even feel strongly that, say, it 
looks like it is going to rain, and merely assent to such a prediction so as to be 
minimally companionable. Yet this non-accomplishment nevertheless 
accomplishes the construction of minor social solidarity. Something important has 
happened, even though, on the surface, nothing important seems to have been 
decided (Long, 2018, p. 79). 
In distinguishing the aim of small talk (in this case to talk about the weather) from its end or 
goal, Long makes a case for something that we fundamentally know to be true, that the end 
(mutual agreement/disagreement) is much less notable than what takes place in the 
meantime (establishing relation). Long develops his account by recognising the idea that 
making conversation while wasting time is a life enriching way of being in the world, and that 
one of the central ways that Cavell identifies this variety of conversation is through 
‘purposefulness without purpose’ (1981, p. 89). His use of the phrase is drawn from Kant’s 
third critique, the German philosopher’s account of the aesthetic experience that one enjoys 
when looking on objects of great beauty. Also known as the ‘Critique of Judgement’ (Kant, 
2001), Kant’s analysis states that our appreciation of what is beautiful is dependent on ‘free 
play’. Cavell draws on a Kantian construction of beauty to think about conversation in the 
same way. That a mutual and satisfying appreciation for conversation’s nature is enough to 
provide the justification for it taking place without necessarily being governed by a deeper 
purpose (Ward, 2006). According to Long, our modern idea of small talk would seem to share a 
similar structure to the kind of conversation present in the remarriage comedies. This is that in 
their seeming absence to accomplish anything, the couple are free to accomplish something, 
namely the restoration of their relationship.  
Yet there are very different things at stake in Cavellian passionate utterance and in Long’s 
characterisation of small talk. Long’s examples may be underpinned by a lack of systemisation, 





is doing today contain the same kind of emotional jeopardy that conversation in a restorative 
conference might. Although Long acknowledges that small talk can lead to irritation, or silence, 
and not conversation, by failing to acknowledge what is at stake in passionate utterance, Long 
misses the ethical responsibility involved when we expose ourselves through risky 
conversation.  
With this in mind, let me not waste any more time in exploring some pivotal scenes of 
conversation from The Philadelphia Story (1940) included in the pantheon of re-marriage 
comedies. Briefly, Tracy Lord (Katherine Hepburn) has ‘divorced the right man’, C. K. Dexter 
Haven (Cary Grant), over his drinking problems. She is about to marry George Kittredge (John 
Howard), self-made and self-satisfied and quite clearly the wrong man. A gossip magazine is 
determined to gain coverage of the wedding of the notoriously camera-shy Lords, a ruse that is 
used to gain entry for a pair of reporters (including possible love-interest Mike Connor). Using 
blackmail, Dexter persuades Tracy to let them all stay or the magazine will run a story of her 
father’s affair with a chorus girl. 
6.6.3 The Philadelphia Story 
In his reading of the Hollywood comedies of remarriage, Cavell points to what he sees as two 
main themes of this genre: the woman’s ‘demand for an education’ by the man (1996, p. 13) 
and the man’s reciprocal struggle for knowledge of the woman. Conversation is central here to 
the way in which these themes play out and to what Cavell calls ‘the quarrel, the conversation 
of love’ (1981, p. 32). In singling out The Philadelphia Story for attention, Cavell states that the 
film is not entirely representative of its genre. Firstly, our heroine Tracy Lord has not one, but 
two heroes (Mike and Dexter) that are ‘honourable and likable enough’ (p. 135) from which to 
find her match, only one of whom is the perfect fit for her. Secondly, it is the only film to 
feature a couple in which the pair’s happiness is found once again ‘in the larger world in which 
they divorced […] not in removing themselves to a world apart from the public world’ (p. 146).  
What is it about this film that makes thinking about conversation not only a possibility for 
talking about restorative practice, but as educative in itself? I would like to begin this 
discussion with a scene that contains only one spoken word. The very first in the film, Cukor’s 
opening snapshot of The Philadelphia Story’s warring pair is essential to the characterisation of 
the absence of conversation, and hence to its restoration. Here, Dexter is shown emerging 
from what appears to be the marital home watched by Tracy. Clearly the pair have been 
recently fighting as is evident by not only the emotion on their faces but the fact that Dexter 





him to throw more belongings on the ground including his set of golf clubs. Without a word, 
she breaks a (prized?) club over her knee before turning around to go back indoors. Apparently 
enraged by her final action, Dexter strides towards her and, after miming a punch, puts his 
hand over Tracy’s face and pushes her to the floor. Before the scene cuts away, the camera 
lingers on a resentful Tracy lying sprawled in her hallway and rubbing her neck. ‘Well!’ she is 
heard to finally utter as the scene fades out. Although their reasons for the fight are not known 
until later, what is clear is that the couple has lost the wherewithal for reasonable 
conversation instead resorting to violence and destruction to make their point. 
If, as Long states, small talk is primarily concerned with making people feel comfortable, then 
the image of a woman being knocked to the ground is liable to make a modern audience feel 
extremely uncomfortable. Movie trivia from the time of the film’s recording indicates that 
Hepburn was more than content with her character’s portrayal, even going so far as to 
demand that Grant take several more attempts at capturing the knocked-out image. Labelled 
‘box office poison’ (Salzberg, 2014, p. 36) by the Hollywood press machine, Hepburn struggled 
with her ‘unsettling persona’ (p. 38) consisting in both spirited personality and pampered 
darling. The success of The Philadelphia Story on stage and on screen gave Hepburn her 
personal turning point, painting her on-screen self-absorption amidst her various romantic 
entanglements as light-hearted egocentricity. Starting a film in which she is shown to be 
physically violated would be the prefect ploy to show audiences that even a strong, 
independent woman could be made to ‘behave herself naturally’ (The Philadelphia Story, 
1940). Dexter’s comment made much later in the film on the topic of what a man expects of 
his wife is, Cavell notes, a piece of instruction, moral and aesthetic, that speaks of the right 
way to live while simultaneously telling the actor how to deliver a line. It is a dualism that goes 
to the heart of the re-marriage comedy which can be described as ‘a declaration that its 
appetite for presenting a certain kind of woman, a certain way on screen’ (Cavell, 1981, p. 140) 
– and is in any case concerned with the creation of a new woman, a new human. 
To see this, I need to further explore ideas of relation and perception within the film. Following 
its opening, the film properly begins in its depiction of the pair some two years later where 
Tracy and Dexter’s presence centre stage give them the perfect opportunity to verbally assault 
each other with witty insults and rejoinders about each other’s faults, inadequacies and 
weaknesses. In the following scene Tracy and Mike are readying themselves in the poolside 
dressing area when Dexter intrudes. Not wishing to be left alone with her ex-husband, Tracy 





Dexter: Never saw you looking better, Red. You’re getting that fine, tawny look. 
Tracy: Oh, we’re going to talk about me, are we? Goodie!  
Dexter: It’s astonishing what money can do for people, don’t you agree, Mr. 
Connor? Not too much, you know – just more than enough. Now take Tracy for 
example. There’s never a blow that hasn’t been softened for her. Never a blow 
that won’t be softened. As a matter of fact, she’s even changed her shape – she 
was a dumpy little thing at one time. 
Tracy: Only as it happens, I’m not interested in myself for the moment. 
Dexter: Not interested in yourself! You’re fascinated, Red. You’re far and away 
your favourite person in the world. 
Tracy: Dexter – in case you don't know it – 
Dexter: Of course, Mr. Connor, she’s a girl who’s generous to a fault. 
Tracy: To a fault, Mr Connor. 
Dexter:  Except to other people’s faults. For instance, she never had any 
understanding of my deep and gorgeous thirst. 
Tracy: That was your problem.  
Dexter: Granted. But you took that problem on when you took me, Red. You were 
no helpmeet there, you were a scold. 
Tracy: It was disgusting. It made you so unattractive 
Dexter: A weakness, sure, and strength is her religion, Mr. Connor. She finds 
human imperfection unforgiveable. And when I gradually discovered that my 
relationship to her was supposed to be not that of a loving husband and a good 
companion, but, oh, never mind. 
Tracy: Say it. 
Dexter: But that of a kind of high priest to a virgin goddess, then my drinks grew 
deeper and more frequent, that’s all (Mike leaves). 
Tracy: I never considered you as that, nor myself. 
Dexter: You did without knowing it. Oh, and the night that you got drunk on 
champagne and climbed out on the roof and stood there, NAKED, with your arms 
out to the moon, wailing like a banshee. (Laughs)  
Tracy: I told you I never had the slightest recollection of doing any such thing. 
Dexter: I know. You drew a blank. You wanted to. Mr. Connor, what would you 
(turns and notices Mike has gone). Oh. 





Dexter: Too bad we can't supply photographs of you on the roof (The Philadelphia 
Story, 1940). 
In this scene, both characters seem to be levelling some serious accusations against the other 
for what went wrong during their marriage. Tracy insists that it is his weakness for drink that 
was the problem while Dexter argues that it was Tracy’s intolerance and self-obsession that 
proved fatal. The course of the film’s narrative would, superficially at least, prove Dexter to be 
correct. Tracy is accused throughout the film of portraying herself as a ‘goddess’. In positive 
terms she is described as ‘beautiful’, ‘marvellous’, ‘distant’, ‘cool’, and ‘fine’, her ‘fascination 
with her own image matches the admiration of those around her (Salzberg, 2014, p. 37). In less 
celebratory terms, her goddess nature is, as Dexter intimates, responsible for her 
‘priggishness’, self-superiority, and ‘too high standards’ stated to be the source of the rupture 
in her relationships. Showing little patience for other’s faults, her intolerance towards her 
father’s infidelities and Dexter’s alcoholism are problematised to the extent that she is accused 
of further prolonging their inadequacies. 
6.6.4 Non-Conformity and Ethical Relation  
How does Tracy’s narcissism and her self-interest in high society ideals allow me to 
contemplate ethical relation in restorative practices? In one way, holding a mirror up to her 
feminine ideals suggests an unerring belief in perfection. Facilitators ask pupils to tell their 
stories which are then summarised by other participants for clarity. Pupils may be asked to 
make charts of suggestions that will ‘restore’ the relationship. There is a fail-safe agreement in 
place to present some authoritative stamp that the problem/conflict has been solved. These 
deliberate constructs are designed to not only to perpetuate the illusion of infallibility but to 
offer a romanticised presentation of the individuals involved. If only we were afforded the 
opportunity for dialogue to be established, then we could be better. But this notion 
undermines the complexities of people, and of relationships, to say nothing about what we 
truly desire, even if that is irrelation itself. As the opening scenes of this film show, Tracy’s 
rejection of Dexter’s presence indicates that in seeing the other each has met their match. 
Taking this reading further, Tracy’s behaviour conceptualises traditional ideas of stardom 
recalling Emerson’s quotation that prefaces his essay on self-reliance:  
Man is his own star; and the souls that can  
Render an honest and a perfect man 





In Chapter 5, I discussed Emerson’s essay as pertaining to the need to avoid knowledge gained 
from conformity in favour of individual experience. The wisdom that springs from the 
evolution of one’s transcendence is conveyed by what is ‘the highest truth in this subject […] 
the far-off remembering of the intuition’ (p. 280). Concerning an awakening in society, 
particularly what it conceived of as success, Emerson’s call for intuitive knowledge is a uniquely 
individual response. Tracy Lord is certainly capable of commanding all light but the mythic 
image of this starry goddess figure contradicts her own assertion that she does not ‘want to be 
worshipped [but] loved’. In order to be loved, Tracy must be awakened. It is not until she is 
able to see herself – ‘my eyes are open’ she remarks in the closing frames – that the film 
‘reveals the flesh and blood reality underlying Tracy’s otherworldly appeal, insisting that she 
abandon her project of self-divination – that she must be human’ (ibid). 
In the enactment of Tracy’s humanisation, Salzberg (2014) asks an interesting question: ‘Can 
the woman (as-star) be human and if so what are the stake in her humanity’ (p. 37). From 
Gaslight, there is an understanding that the re-birth of the woman – meaning the return of the 
star - takes place outside of the boundaries of marriage. In terms of self-reliance, and moral 
perfectionism, it is this role of the prophetic light that reflects the private internal route of 
transformation that is the necessary condition for public, outward change (Saito, 2005). In the 
restorative conference, this idea references the greater ethical framework of self-care and self-
relation. Paula’s light shines inward betokening the assumption of her metamorphosis. In The 
Philadelphia Story there is something quite different happening with the female ‘star’. There is 
no doubt that Hepburn’s flourishing was due in part to her ongoing personal and professional 
relationship with Spencer Tracy, with their final collaboration offering ‘the ultimate rendering 
of this shared energy’ (Salzberg, 2014, p. 43). In terms of the film, the intense energy shared by 
the leading characters is conveyed in their ‘attuned physicality’ (p. 46). Mirroring each other’s 
movements both on a physical and a diegetic level, Dexter and Tracy engage in a wary, yet 
beautifully choreographed narrative dance that ultimately dissolves the tensions between the 
two. In terms of the film’s optics, this is not one just one star beginning her ascendance but as 
their process of self-reflection the night before Tracy’s wedding underscores, ‘two stars 
[sitting] side by side in profile’ (ibid.). Tracy’s turn to Dexter, described as her ‘giving-over to 
the other’ (ibid.), is concomitant with her directing her light towards him. 
6.6.5 Restoration as Remarriage 
However, this idea of ethical relation is not everything a reading of this film has to offer. Let us 





statement that Tracy was no ‘helpmeet’ takes Cavell to John Milton’s tract on ‘The Doctrine 
and Discipline of Divorce’ (Milton, 1990). Originally published in 1643, the doctrine posed a 
challenge to the religious, legal, and cultural principles governing marriage with Milton urging 
parliament to consider granting couples divorce for incompatibility with the right of 
remarriage for both parties. The axis of his argument reasoned that unhappiness in marriage is 
tantamount to the greatest tyranny on the commonwealth. Therefore, if the commonwealth 
were entitled to divorce a member state from that unhappiness, those who owe allegiance to 
the state must be entitled to the same consideration, as if, ‘the covenant of marriage is a 
miniature of the covenant of the commonwealth’ (Cavell, 1981, p. 151). Our participation in 
supporting the commonwealth must involve the release of sufferers from ‘a mute and 
spiritless mate’ in favour of ‘a meet and happy conversation as the chiefest and noblest end of 
marriage’ (Milton, 1990, p. 148).  
The entreaty is based on Milton’s understanding of the Biblical intent to make Eve a helpmeet 
and the suggestion that to become a helpmeet is to show a willingness to converse, the 
contrary of a scold. The emphasis is raised again when, after refusing the offer of a drink from 
Dexter, Tracy collapses into a nearby chair and remarks, ‘Oh Dext, I’m such an unholy mess of a 
girl’, to which Dexter replies: ‘Why that’s no good that’s not even conversation’ (The 
Philadelphia Story, 1940). While Cavell is quick to maintain that, in Milton’s doctrine, there is 
represented an entire mode of association, he does also mean ‘a capacity, say a thirst, for talk 
[…] as forming the pair’s essential way of being together, a pair from whom, to repeat, being 
together is more important that whatever it is they do together’ (p. 146).  
Despite (or perhaps due to) their animosity, moments of conversation between Tracy and 
Dexter can be characterised as a form of passionate utterance, revealing something larger 
about what is important to them. In the conversation in which Dexter calls her a scold, he 
takes issue with her memory of one night in their marriage in which ‘she got drunk on 
champagne […] stood naked on the roof and wailed like a banshee’. Her failure to recollect is 
linked to a failure to be fully present, to perhaps have the kinds of conversations that lead not 
to the idolisation, but of disapproval. It is why Dexter furiously exclaims that Tracy can ‘never 
be a first-class person or a first-class woman until [she can] have some regard for human 
frailty’ in herself and in others. Her eventual opening up to these ideas are marked by her 
accurate recall of her own disapproving behaviour the night before her wedding and her 
feelings of shame and guilt, the importance of which isolates the fact that despite the 
upcoming festival the decision over what to do next ‘marks the exercise of choice and of 





in marriage’ (Cavell, 1981, p. 141). Cavell draws on the re-marriage comedies’ inheritance of 
the conventions of Old Comedy (namely, Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream) to 
remind us that this philosophically therapeutic path takes place in the form of an awakening or 
remembering from something half-forgotten and alluded to in the film’s many referencing to 
the opening of eyes. In the narrative of the film, Tracy’s eyes are opened to the unsuitability of 
both George the coal owner, and Mike the reporter, and to the presence of Dexter as the 
ultimate choice. This is not due to the class or background of either men but because Dexter is 
the only one capable of giving her the education she demands, hence is the only one 
compatible with the characteristics of the genre.  
The film’s strong emphasis on Tracy’s identity – is she a goddess or a woman made of flesh and 
blood? - can be seen as ‘tracing the death and revival of the woman’s capacity to feel’ (Cavell, 
1981, p. 140). The restoration of her relationship with her father and her imminent remarriage 
to Dexter is couched in such ideas. Tracy tells her father that she feels, ‘Like a human – like a 
human being’. Likewise, she is not a goddess ‘but a queen’. In a pivotal scene, pulling Tracy 
from her swimming pool, Mike carries her, prone, across his shoulder into the house. Cavell 
notes the carrying posture as one symbolic of death, indeed her response to the indignity is to 
mutter darkly, ‘Not wounded sire, but dead’ (ibid.), alluding to her death as a goddess and re-
birth as a human. The aspect of education in which a crisis forces an examination of one’s life 
that calls for a transformation or reinvention is the province of what Cavell emphasises as 
moral perfectionism. The crisis in question, in the case of Dexter and Tracy, is whether they 
wish to continue their relationship, in effect to be re-married. Therefore, all that is being 
decided is to decide if this life is one they want to lead together, who they might want to be, 
and what they might consent to. A decision that requires nothing more than their ‘mutual 
forgiveness’ (p. 39). The morality that is being called into question does not make for ‘front 
page news, not for example, issues like abortion, euthanasia, scapegoating, torture, treason 
[…]’ (Cavell, 2005b, p. 38). In approaching this as a crisis, one is not required to pit oneself 
against an already established standing moral consensus but to think on whether there is a 
moral issue to be raised. Our acknowledged interest, therefore, in the lives of these privileged 
people is ‘their pure enactment of the fact that in each moral decision our lives, our senses of 





6.7 Speaking for Myself, Speaking for Others: Re-thinking Ethical 
Relationships in Restorative Practice 
The sealing and weaving together of the couple’s romance into marriage – a state that Cavell 
indicates can be taken to stand in for the idea of friendship – is not one that is made explicit in 
the pair’s conversation. There is no direct sense that they must be headed towards an 
agreement or conclusion. What might we draw from this in terms of the restorative 
conference? Firstly, we must reconceive ideas of agreement that constitute ethical harm. This 
necessarily entails reconceiving the conference as a process in which the terms of relation can 
be institutionally defined. This does not mean abandoning the practice, or even marginalising 
it in favour of more ‘relational’ strategies, but attention ‘to the need for openness and 
responsiveness to claims to injustice expressed in other terms than our own’ (Owen, 1999, p. 
591).  
Paying attention to the way in which The Philadelphia Story is the only film in the remarriage 
genre to find the pair’s happiness within the larger world focuses the purpose of restorative 
practice more purposefully on our imperfect community. Cavell states that the advocacy of 
moral perfectionism as a political commitment can be understood, as Mill sees it, in terms of 
the marriage act, their union symbolising the joining of wider society under a democratic 
covenant. The pursuit of happiness, meaning the pursuit of the legitimacy of marriage, is 
continuous with conversations of participation in democracy. As I mentioned earlier, the 
political situation in America was a critical subject for Cavell regarding what it means to be a 
citizen of a country founded on the commitment to freedom and justice while at the same 
time espousing racial slavery, indigenous genocide and unjust wars (Cavell, 1989). Within this 
human travesty, Cavell’s endeavour is to find a way to make democracy an attractive prospect. 
Drawing on Emerson, and Thoreau, Cavell writes of the exercise of the political voice as one 
that shows what it means to think seriously for oneself. An act that at its best takes the form of 
conversation in which participants model for one another the possibilities of a flourishing 
democratic life. Cavell’s preoccupation with the development of a political voice, as a 
prerequisite for community, lays the groundwork for thinking about what is politically 
educative about conversation, and in turn about political relation in restorative practices. 
In this chapter, I have argued for a conception of ethical relation that educates to speak for 
myself and speak for others but what more of community? To examine this more closely, I 
must highlight Cavell’s discussion of the social contract, the most explicit discussion of which is 





stand the ground that agreement (Cavell’s term is consent) is not merely a matter of 
obedience but of membership. What I consent to, in consenting to the contract, is not mere 
obedience but membership in polis which implies two things. First, that I recognise the 
principle of consent itself, which means that I recognise others to have consented with me, 
and hence that I consent to political equality. Second, that I recognise that society and its 
government, so constituted, as mine, means that I am answerable not merely to it, but for it. 
So far as I recognise myself to be exercising my responsibility for it, my obedience to it is 
obedience to my own laws; ‘citizenship in that case is the same as my autonomy; the polis is 
the field within which I work out my personal identity and it is the creation of (political) 
freedom’ (p. 23). Knowing and understanding who it is that I am in community with, and 
therefore to whom I assent, or dissent, construes the primary political identity of my 
membership in polis. It means speaking for myself, speaking on the behalf of others, and 
allowing others to speak for me as I myself consent to be spoken for. Not as a parent might, 
but as someone in mutuality with me. Moreover, in speaking I must run the risk of rebuff. This 
includes as part of political consent the withdrawal of consent from community. Dissent is not 
the undoing of consent but a dispute about its content, over whether a present arrangement is 
faithful to it. The alternative to speaking for yourself politically is not: ‘speaking for yourself 
privately [...] the alternative is having nothing (political) to say’ (p. 27). 
In this view, dissenting or withdrawing consent is not concomitant with exile. One is still 
entitled to express one’s view, indeed, as the presence of Dexter attests, to feel that one is 
entitled to speak to, and for others. Further, the hope of reaching agreement need not be 
attributed to universal good sense since claims to such agreements have a limited applicability, 
and are ultimately finite. Our ‘agreement’ may differ, we may hold different opinions but doing 
so does not rule out a return to relationship. By re-connecting the individual with her 
community and by imbuing her dialogue with the tone of philosophy and in the words of 
Cavell, the right for her to take that tone, we resist the notion of a functional aspect of 
restorative language. How we use language cannot be understood as the accumulation of a 
specific lexicology. It instead constitutes work on the self that is transformative for both the 
subject, and her society.  
It is this experience of political voicelessness that Cavell finds expressed in Tracy’s struggle to 
bring into being the sense of injustice at being left out of the wider conversation of justice.  
‘Oh, to be useful in that world’ she cries, as if to underscore her fear and perplexity over her 
moral standing. That this pair are in conversation at all is not simply about establishing relation 





something that will change her dissatisfaction with the way things are’ (Cavell, 2005b, p. 43). 
As Cavell makes clear, ‘perfectionism concentrates on this moment’ (p. 42), recognising that 
this further sense of ignorance does not arise from not knowing what one’s duties are, rather 
it is a confusion over one’s desire, attractions, and aversions. It is the kind of education that 
cannot be found in a pedagogic strategy, in success criteria or respect agreements but on 
deciding if we are to act on our self-confessed longing to be useful in the world or to be perfect 
- a goddess. Tracy’s perfectionist moment lies in her stopping to think, and hence to learn, that 
Dexter is ready for her and she is ready for him. They may yet choose to differ but their 
conversation, or marriage, reflects a social contract that permits perspective, depicting each as 
recognisable to each other, and to themselves. How we make this increasingly visible and my 






PART III  





Chapter 7  
Implications for School-Based Restorative Practice 
7.1 What Now for Restorative Practice? 
My purpose in this thesis was to provide a philosophical and ethical basis for restorative 
practice and to consider how the substance of my argument affords a re-thinking of its 
substantial practices such that I might make it possible to answer the question, articulated by 
Terri in my preface to this thesis, and so many restorative practitioners: ‘what’s just restoring 
and what’s restorative practice?’. Given that so much of this thesis is concerned with lived 
experience, it seems only fitting that I begin my concluding remarks with a reflection on my 
own experience of articulating a philosophical and ethical basis for restorative practice. As I 
noted in my opening preface, prior to embarking on this project I had been steeped in the 
world of schools that had already made serious commitments to integrating social and 
emotional learning skills, both in an instructional and behavioural sense. Although I had not 
heard much about restorative practice, the administration of embedding social and emotional 
learning practices meant that I was familiar with pedagogical devices that sought to transform 
a school’s broader culture as well as change its practices around discipline and behaviour 
management. As I turned towards the kinds of educational philosophy that I hoped would 
have much to say about how restorative practice ‘works’, I correctly anticipated the 
mystification, and frustration, I would feel at taking on this new intellectual challenge. What I 
did not expect were similar feelings of bewilderment when attempting to navigate the more 
mundane territory of what constitutes restorative practice and restorative justice, even less 
what this looks like in educational settings. 
7.1.1 New Directions 
Suffice to say that the lack of a clear path through the historical literature, and complicated 
intersection of criminal, psychological and social health theorising, has done much to place a 
contradictory value on adopting restorative practices, as suggested by the influential 
publication of ‘The Cart Before the Horse’ (Song and Swearer, 2016). The authors’ conclusion, 
that this inconsistency is related to a dearth of consultation literature in order to guide 
research and practice leads to a ‘large void’ (p. 313) in the understanding of what is consistent 
with a restorative justice philosophy, is resonant with my own conclusion, at the end of Part I, 





enormous speed of change regarding school-based initiatives), the subject of school-based 
restorative practice remains of high importance within the restorative researcher community, 
its continuing popularity paralleling the ‘the rise of the prison industrial complex’ (Thorsborne 
et al., 2019, p. 9). More than ever the creation of a ‘radically democratic approach […] to 
promote relational health’ (p. 11) and ‘elevate student voice’ (p. 12) resonates with schools’ 
uncertainty over the current educational climate. While the technologies of restorative 
practice (circles, conferencing) remain ubiquitous, it is fair to say that there has been a shift in 
thinking that sees restorative practice as in close kinship with other psycho-social approaches. 
These include Theory of Mind (Astington, 1998) and its successor the Growth Mindset 
(Hildrew, 2018) to increase empathy, transactional analysis (Hopkins, 2015), and the 
integration of restorative practice with models of positive discipline (Lustick, 2017b).  
It is a buy-in that we see evolving from the whole-school ‘nuts and bolts’ acceptance of 
restorative practice, as a full replacement programme, to schools engaging with some 
restorative elements on their own. This is not quite the same as the ‘pluck and choose’ method 
of employing whatever restorative practice method appears to get behaviour back on track, 
rather that the mode of being ‘restorative’ – talking to children, instead of punishing them – 
has entered the educational zeitgeist. There is a great emphasis placed on teachers’ ability to 
develop effective communication between adults and children in order to have a positive 
impact on classroom behaviour (Sammons et al., 2016). Understanding pupils by developing a 
more responsive language is considered more active than relying on default responses. Good 
practice, therefore, consists in adapting universal behaviour systems to individual needs 
through a focus on right language. In primary schools, this usually falls to the class teacher (in 
secondary schools there is more reliance on shaping the existing pastoral system) who can 
intentionally, and regularly, focus small amounts of time to working on relationships with 
individual pupils. While restorative practice offers an opportunity for schools to explore new 
ways of dealing with conflict, with open communication, accounting for whole-school 
implementation remains its own risk.  
There are difficulties with schools taking up the kinds of ideas I have presented in this thesis. 
Schools are under pressure from the popular press, symbolised by the teacher recruitment 
crisis, precisely because they perceive behaviour to be very poor (Rhodes and Long, 2019). 
Unlike other forms of behaviour management, restorative practice is a dialogical process that 
can be open ended. Perhaps this is why although pupils state there are benefits to their 
engaging with restorative practice, evaluation studies do not yield significant changes in 





bring something new in (Harland, 2020). This means that schools with no intention of replacing 
their behaviour policies are borrowing notions from restorative practice, such as conferencing, 
without the need for further ‘restorative’ training, and trying them out in classrooms. In 
today’s educational climate, pupils in non-restorative schools experience just as much 
opportunity for dialogue with their teachers as those in restorative practice schools. Schools 
support the implementation of explicit teaching strategies that focus on building the 
communication repertoire of learners such that they can express their wants and needs as well 
as self-regulate their behaviour. Through procedural knowledge of the restorative model, for 
example the restorative conference, previously tried dialogic strategies such as coaching can 
be newly implemented representing an important component of enhancing the skills of a 
school-based team (School Talk, 2020). At the level of teachers and school leadership, this 
minimal level of training results in very little or no further cost to themselves and emphasises 
that restorative practice can be woven into the fabric of school life with little disruption 
(Hollweck et al., 2019). This need to take departure is suggestive of the burdens that schools 
are under but also reflect a conception of ethical teacher judgement. Unlike a professional 
standard where universal ethical principles are applied to the dominant professional 
knowledge base, ethical judgement occurs each time a teacher strives to balance the fair 
treatment of pupils, justify her teaching methods, materials or her behaviour management 
techniques. It is, as Campbell argues, ‘the practical moral wisdom—the ethical knowledge—
that is infused into every aspect of such technical abilities and the humanity teachers bring to 
their practice that distinguish them as professionals’ (Campbell, 2014, p. 105).  
What has my exploration of the aims and values of education given restorative practice in 
terms of a ‘practical and moral wisdom’? Insofar as teachers’ value judgements should be 
taken enthusiastically, it is vital that these departures in thinking are not mere means to 
professional ends but inform the ends themselves. Coming back to the idea of growth and 
perfectionism, my thesis constitutes an apt standpoint from which to critically consider the 
direction of change within restorative practice. Nevertheless, the question remains if these 
changes are akin to the drawing of new, ever-widening circles, or ‘a wave that moves onward, 
but the water of which it is composed does not’ (Emerson, 2003, p. 291).  
As I discovered, the issue at stake here is not that schools do not associate restorative practice 
with an ethical culture change, rather that ambiguities occur when what they consider 
significant about the practice are its methods, say technologies, of how it is implemented 
rather than the quality of relationships it has the potential to explore and develop. This shift in 





creates the difference between ‘just restoring’ and ‘restorative practice’. Through its 
affordances of conferencing, story-telling, and building relationship, in this thesis I have 
offered a strong philosophical perspective of how a philosophical conception of our ethical 
relation with the other can encourage schools to re-think restorative practice in a way that 
resists market pressures and the instrumentalism that could be levelled at the practice.  
I am not alone in this endeavour. In moving the practice philosophically forward this thesis 
joins other current voices which reflect on the ways in which ‘right-relation is a central value 
and an ideal outcome of restorative practices’ (Bryzzheva, 2018, p. 248). The concept of right-
relation building in restorative practice theory is one that re-imagines true restorative work as 
one that is built firstly with one’s self, then with others in a world that is not imposed but 
discovered in community. My original contribution to the current literature frames restorative 
practice within a richer, Cavellian sense of self and relation. It should be considered as limiting 
the possibility for further marginalisation of pupils while embracing a more disruptive yet 
politically edifying restorative encounter.  
In previous chapters, I have summarised the kind of philosophy that evokes the sense of re-
creation and revivification that is invoked by the etymological origins of the term restorative. 
In this last chapter, I want to conclude my attempt at re-thinking by offer my claims for ethical 
relation that aligns with these metamorphic modes of thinking. My claims are not intended as 
a panacea to help alleviate the problem of behaviour in schools. I cannot state that simply 
applying my recommendations for practice as a proactive list of strategies will show that 
restorative practice now works in a better way. Rather, in my claims what I am trying to do is 
raise much more profound questions about the ethics behind restorative practice and the 
ideas that underpin them.  
7.2 Revisiting Difficulties: Themes from Educational Philosophy 
Before I continue to my claims for school-based restorative practice it would be prudent to 
revisit how I have made the case for strengthening the presence of educational philosophy in 
restorative practice and its potential for an ethical relational pedagogy. To do so, I want to 
revisit some of the main ideas I have presented thus far. I began in Part I by providing a brief 
cultural sketch of the UK educational landscape in recent decades. This included a shift away 
from progressive models of education to one heavily influenced by marketisation, 
performativity, and the subsequent policy backing of assertive or zero-tolerant models of 





internal conflicts to the desire for a more ethical and moral approach, I described how schools 
looked for improvement in such areas as SEL, school climate and connectedness, academic 
outcomes, conflict resolution, and ethical thinking. These introductory lines of thinking 
provided sound reasons for the upsurge in interest in restorative practice, making it a 
gravitational focus point for those working in and around schools who felt discouraged by the 
current educational climate.  
A descriptive account of whole-school implementation addressed the shift from the use of 
various restorative approaches, as they exist in the criminal justice environment, to a 
continuum model. In schools, research evaluating the training and support of restorative 
approaches concluded that ongoing embedding of restorative practices offered important 
learning opportunities that shape positive social relationships for the benefit of behaviour and 
academic attainment. I also found significant variation in opinion that accepted the success of 
a whole-school restorative approach often phrasing it as a failure of implementation or 
engagement. Certain ‘fault-lines’ identified in restorative justice practices, and now at present 
in schools, were thought to limit the presumed benefits of a restorative approach. Amid the 
customary barriers to implementing policy changes in a pressurised environment such as lack 
of time, preparation, or active support, lay the disturbing belief that restorative practice, an 
approach specifically designed to give voice to young people, was instead responsible for a 
denial of voice. Considering these claims, proponents argued that schools used to customary 
approaches to behaviour management find it difficult to dismantle sources of power in 
teacher-pupil relationships. The implied pressure to perform leads to forced participation and 
the under-prioritisation of genuine forms of pupil expression. What starts as a desire to 
establish a new critically democratic practice is, therefore, closer to the one-way power 
dynamic of conventional discipline.  
Urged on by proponents of restorative practice, I began to think how a richer 
conceptualisation of its affordances might help to deliver the kind of ethical thinking around 
conflict that is required by schools. When thinking of a methodological direction for my 
research, I found that proponents of restorative practice were siloed into championing two 
differing strategies. The first group state that, to date, the lack of empirical data, and rigorous 
evaluation studies regarding effectiveness of restorative practices makes any sort of firm 
conclusion on the impact of restorative practice problematic (Acosta et al., 2019; Green et al., 
2019; Norris, 2019; Bonell et al., 2018). The non-empirical ‘methodology’, I described here, 
could be perceived as embracing this second route. Coming back to my earlier point about 





philosophy’ would allow me to better ascertain what is ethical, meaning, what is most 
desirable not what works.  
In giving prominence to ordinary language philosophy, and to the writing of Stanley Cavell 
through the central section of this thesis, I proffered, in Part II, that a deepening of 
understanding of what it is that we do with language is commensurate with understanding 
how we are ‘restorative’. Attention to key themes of dialogue, story, and relation would 
contend that this major gap in the current conceptualisation of what comprises a ‘restorative’ 
literature is responsible for problematic issues of implementation fidelity, and that conceptual 
and philosophical literature on language needs to be addressed in order to build an 
appropriate theory of action for whole-school restorative policy and corresponding practice. I 
began my focus on language by exploring the notion of scripted restorative conferencing. 
Restorative conferencing has been classed as one of the hallmarks of not only school-based 
restorative practice but also restorative justice generally for its emphasis on equitable 
dialogue, transformation, and resolution through reparation to relation. As a key difficulty, I 
highlighted the use of scripts recommended by influential bodies and consisting in pre-agreed 
sequential stages, question prompts, and even specific words and phrases that are used to 
draw out pupils’ experience of the conflict.  
To discuss this, I introduced Cavell’s critique of J.L. Austin’s performatives, and subsequent 
extension of these speech acts as passionate utterance, as ways of thinking through this 
seemingly benign practice. As I have stated earlier in this thesis, Cavell’s reconceptualisation of 
ordinary language philosophy has little to do with philosophy as a method of analysis or with 
linguistics. Indeed, Cavell’s approach is to state, quite simply, that in addition to undertaking 
empirical and logical analyses of language’s structure, it is vital to also ask what is it that we 
(humans) do with language? How is what we do part of what we say and can we mean what 
we say? These motivating questions are stated as being concerned with ‘less how we know 
what we say and mean’ (Cavell, 2002, p. xviii) and more of ‘what it betokes about our relation 
to the world and others, and myself’ (ibid.). In other words, Cavell’s work lies in bringing words 
back to their everyday use and hence to bringing knowledge of the world back to ourselves 
through lived experience. Through Cavell’s framework of passionate utterance, viewed as a 
kind of improvised, moral responsibility, the idea that scripted restorative conference departs 
from traditional top down practices was problematised. Here I argued that the pupil no longer 
feels compelled to behave out of fear of punishment (let us not forget that some schools keep 
a punitive culture operating in their background), instead through the process of scripting they 





Performance itself is not to be undermined; teachers can also be actors who know how to play 
to their audience. Nevertheless, an Austinian sense of performance, as one that restricts the 
possibilities of language into readily identifiable outcomes misses the ethical aspect of 
dialogue. Scripted conferences’ demand for certainty, to be sure that relation has indeed be 
established, was exposed through Cavell’s disappointment with criteria. The important point 
here is that the removal of freedom in speaking in speech closes opportunities for 
experiencing our ethical responsibility to the other. If I am not free to speak, I am not free to 
experience that responsibility, nor can I make any assumptions about the responsibility I bear 
from my actions. My state of diminished responsibility forces me to accept a form of silence, 
an implicit voicelessness rather than voicing of experience.  
If it is through experience that we are held responsible for our past action, then the ethical 
responsibility placed on telling of one’s story is paramount. Encouraged by Cavell’s own story, 
present in his autobiographical writings, I attempted a volte-face from notions of reparation to 
instead focus on what close attention to disruption might bring to the surface. Four key 
conceptualisations of disruption were presented: chronological disruption, therapeutic 
disruption, disruption of account, and disruption of the facilitator. I explored how accepted 
thinking around these conceptualisations could be disrupted through philosophy as 
autobiography. Understood against this background, the act of telling one’s story is not about 
merely giving and receiving of account, according to a guideline, but of arriving at insight into 
what has before been unclear. In doing so, I reasoned that Cavell does not appear to be 
concerned with explaining and discussing incidents of his life as if to find reasons or solutions. 
There resides an acknowledgment that even in lifting up one’s experience to be shown we 
have already completed the work of naming what is important, instead the opportunity for 
story raises the possibility for self-transformation. This requires the willingness to free oneself 
from forms of systematic forms of speaking, imposed since we first learned to speak, in order 
to see and think differently now.  
For Cavell, this requires both identification with the child before, and the present silenced 
grownup. This disruptive act of story (as far as educative standards go) goes beyond superficial 
forms of insight, leaving behind questions of ‘why’ this happened in favour of exposing us to 
what is demanded by the present: an understanding of story, or the giving of account, that is a 
means to a (philosophically speaking) therapeutic metamorphosis or transformation of the 
self. Beginning with the assertion that the ability to give an account is it is at the heart of the 
very nature of our being, Thoreau’s holding himself to account premised on a guiding theme of 





the self is akin to the drawing of concentric circles. Our movement between them is 
characterised by loss and departure. The claim to know that relation has been restored, that 
conflict has been settled, goes against the perfectionist tradition towards self-transformation.  
If telling one’s story is a means to raising consciousness of self-transformation, then 
reproduction of stories without the concomitant transformation is a debased form of what it 
means to tell one’s story. In Gaslight, Paula’s role of the mad woman presupposes her self-
transformation through reassertion of voice. The process of drawing out her story is tied into 
her self-education but not without the encouragement of a facilitator. This dialogic encounter 
better articulates the necessity for hearing those uniquely restorative moments where we 
stand together in ethical relation and to make welcome these new forms of speaking. It is to 
be among the first hear the question: “how can I continue?” and to take up the invitation to 
exchange. It is this responsiveness – or ‘response-ability’ (Van Manen, 2016, p. 19) – inherent 
in the principles underpinning restorative practice that argues for the place of educational 
philosophy in developing teacher understanding of the practice. The significance for this is 
found in considering what we understand to be ethical relation. How I develop a relationship 
with another comes not from attempting to pin what is knowable but negotiating in a personal 
rather than a state-sanctioned way. In the first instance this means finding some space to open 
the conversation in such a way that pupils can talk freely, in the ways in which they want to 
talk, without being constrained by the need to find solutions to the problem. The significance 
for this is found in considering what we understand to be ethical relation. How I develop a 
relationship with another who at this moment is, in Cavell’s words, not natural to me, comes 
not from attempting to pin what is knowable but is an acknowledgment through ways that will 
unsettle the fixed and scripted formats of restorative practices. This is not only richly 
illustrated by Cavell’s work on film but also in the work of Marcel, and Buber, whose 
expectation for encounter with the other condemns objectification by the subject to the other. 
It is hard not to think of this when considering the ways in which the restorative conference 
‘uses up’ conflict in order to define itself.  
This has practical implications for the way in which conferences tend to operate in their desire 
to reach agreement and the curious ways in which they manage to suppress those human 
reactions such as anger, stress, embarrassment, fear, and discomfort that lead to 
disagreement. I’m not thinking here that further interjections of name-calling or explosive 
temper tantrums would give the requisite sense of dissonance. What I want to suggest is a re-
thinking of the way restoration of relation is linked to outward signs of success and to re-





how it is one continues to live with adversarial relation in the midst of community. It is this 
version of success that I believe moves what should be considered restorative from justice that 
is done, to doing justice together. 
7.3 Claims for Practice 
Where do my ideas of ethical relation in restorative practice leave me? Was it right or wrong of 
Cordelia to remain silent in front of her father? Should Paula have confronted Gregory over the 
letters? Why can’t Tracy marry George Kitteredge? To paraphrase Cavell discussion of Nora’s 
actions in A Doll’s House (another account of a woman ‘creating displeasure all the way 
around’ (Cavell, 2005b, p. 250), is this good or bad of them? If by reading this thesis, 
proponents of restorative practice are looking for a grand theory of ‘Cavellian ethical relation’ 
with which to supplement, or replace theories of relational pedagogy, they are mistaken. As 
has been pointed out before, top-down ethical theorising proves that there is no universally 
accepted, good, ethical or moral thinking that governs human behaviour. While Cavell is not an 
ethical theorist, his raising of philosophical concerns pertaining to what it means to speak for 
oneself, and for others, sheds fresh light on how schools can create the conditions for personal 
and social change. 
As I have stated before, this kind of professional ethics generally concerns itself with standards 
of good practice and codes of conduct in professional settings. In contrast, attention to Cavell’s 
work, alongside that of Buber and Marcel, challenges the over-simplified and mechanised 
routines embedded within the practice as constructing an artificial mode of speaking. Instead, 
each of the chapters in this thesis derives its importance from the knowledge that to be in 
ethical relation consists in an in-the-moment-working-out, of recognising the good action from 
the harmful action. The perfectionist strain in Cavell’s thinking, together with his ‘political 
interpretation’ (Rudrum, 2013, p. 137) of literary and filmic works, are claims for the 
exemplification, or elucidation of ethical relation. The claims that the three substantive 
chapters in this thesis have forged are listed below. 
7.3.1 Claim No. 1 
From Chapter Four: 
To be restorative presents the potential for a radical turning around such that we 






The creation of a secure framework for language is said to be most advantageous in producing 
an apology and agreement. It is tempting to think of scripted practices as articulating an 
ethical commitment to restorative conferencing. After all, scripts pre-empt the possibility of 
surprise, guiding teachers on how to act though tricky interactive and interpersonal situations. 
Yet the nature of ethical dialogue, rooted in thoughtfulness and responsiveness, is not an 
engagement with performance but the improvisational feeling for what to do, or not do, what 
to say or not say, in any given moment. From a religious point of view, a conversation or 
conversion represents a spiritual turning point. It is an argument that Cavell draws on when 
speaking of the conversion of Paul the Apostle (Cavell, 2010), framing his own turn away from 
logic towards the development of a uniquely philosophical voice. As a task of the restorative 
conference, a concept of passionate utterance allows the words of another to move me to 
understanding, to change my opinion, to make a claim upon me. Cavell’s reading of King Lear 
orients the reader towards the consequences of supressing such dialogue, stating that if 
expressive engagement is necessary for learning how to configure our moral outlook then 
closing down this capacity to be seen, to be acknowledged, risks both my own moral 
education, and my ethical responsibility to the other. 
7.3.2 Claim No. 2  
From Chapter Five: 
That restorative practice forms a reasonable basis for the recognition of 
perfectionist ethical relationships. 
Telling one’s story is not geared towards an endpoint but is a learning or coming to understand 
what may catalyse the change from one outlook to the next, as we live it, from moment to 
moment. When Cavell stresses moral perfectionism as a dimension of moral life, it is in Paula’s 
story that we see that is the absolute responsibility of the self to make this intelligible to the 
self. The calculation of the moral good or right is not derived from any categorical imperative, 
it is to demonstrate some standing by which my life matters to me and matters to you. In 
virtue of this, the act of guiding one’s story, hence helping one’s voice to emerge known as 
facilitation of the restorative conference, does not function in order to make differences 
transparent or balance reason and emotion nor to provide situational sense-making. Rather, if 
restorative practice is genuinely to be seen as initiating that next stage of moral development, 
that transformative potential, facilitators require the ethical response-ability to sense what is 





7.3.3 Claim No. 3.  
From Chapter Six: 
A restorative relational pedagogy underwrites the development of community by 
encouraging the acquisition of a political voice. 
There must always be doubt that I will ever come to relation, to begin to see your argument as 
well as accept it for my own. The appeal of Cavell’s sceptical argument, namely that what we 
know of others can only be imperfectly known, is important for those practitioners committed 
to negotiating outwardly recognisable forms of agreement. Following his investigations into 
whether we can really know if a person is in pain, Cavell demonstrates that the moral 
obligation to respond regardless is primarily ethical. Although I cannot feel your pain, to ignore 
your looks, words and gestures would be to inflict an ethical trauma such that I might risk hurt, 
betrayal, and loneliness. The comedies of re-marriage show how a richer understanding of 
conversation brings people who might not previously be in any kind of relation, unless perhaps 
opposing positions, into ethical relation. The associated democratic values lift school-based 
restorative practice from this local level into a praxis that has the capacity to create the kind of 
political voice in which ethical relation has a chance to emerge and exist, if only temporarily. 
7.4 Claims for Community 
In thinking through how to make these claims visible for schools, I want to capture something 
of the idea of what it means to be a member of a political community. Returning to my 
exploration of the significance of consent, Cavell contends that consent to membership in polis 
– in other words, to my community – constitutes my acceptance of the rights and 
responsibilities for how that community will be run. This is by necessity a relational voice in 
that one cannot possess a political voice without allowing others to speak for me (Mulhall, 
2003). David Rudrum summarises this aspect of Cavell’s political thought as a ‘claiming’ 
(Rudrum, 2013, p. 145). That is to say that one’s claims, be they beliefs or publicly made 
statements depend crucially on our ability to dissent in criteria. For claiming to be valid and 
recognisable in a democratic polis it remains that there must be some aspect of speaking that 
puts us in discomfort. Perfectionist thinking requires that one’s ethics depend on feelings of 
loss and separation, of some action that does not meet our needs. We do not, all of us, give 
verbal consent to the laws that govern us. Too often our voices are not recognised as valid at 
all. For those of us who claim to speak, ‘it means risking having to rebuff – on some occasion, 





Cavell states, dissenting in polis is crucial, even healthy, to ideas of democracy. It ‘is not the 
undoing of consent but a dispute about its content, a dispute within it over whether a present 
arrangement is faithful to it’ (p. 146). In other words, I can challenge that you have the right to 
speak for me without withdrawing from my community. 
What happens when one dissents from the polis? Where lines of (dis-)agreement in criteria 
start to question ideas of responsibility that, I, as a member of my community can hold your 
actions to account. For much of this thesis, I have written about restorative practice as a 
strategy used by schools to foster better interpersonal relationships, and more effective 
resolution to conflict. To do so, its forums seek to repair relationships that have been damaged 
by bringing about a sense of remorse and restorative action by the wrongdoer while the victim 
is asked to say how she has been affected and what needs to be done to put things right. A 
restorative approach is predicated on taking responsibility, and for developing the skills of its 
community to solve problems and repair harm. How we manage incidents of conflict in school 
is important. How we develop a restorative culture in schools making sure pupils have the 
ethical education they need to express themselves, in dissent, is critical: 
 
From The Guardian Sunday 10th February 2019: 
Headteachers across the country will this week be faced with a tricky dilemma: 
should they allow their pupils to go on strike? Thousands of schoolchildren are 
expected to absent themselves from school on Friday to take part in a series of 
coordinated protests drawing attention to climate change. At a time when 
politicians fret that young people are failing to engage with the political process, a 
headteacher’s decision to take a hard line against the strikers could be counter-
productive. But equally granting permission for a day off could set a dangerous 
precedent and lead to safeguarding issues, it is feared. Parents could be fined for 





One would-be striker, Anna Taylor, 17, from north London, said her school had 
given her “mixed messages”. “I chucked up a notice – school strike in a few weeks 
– on the noticeboard in the common room and they wiped it off, said “you can’t 
actively publicise it in schools” and “we’ll give you an unauthorised absence and 
detention if you strike”, but then they said “you can spread it by word of mouth 
and we do support your cause.” A Department for Education spokeswoman said 
the decision was a matter for individual schools. “However, we are clear that 
pupils can only take term-time leave in exceptional circumstances, and where this 
leave has been authorised by the headteacher” (Doward, 2019). 
From The Independent Wednesday 18th July 2018: 
Students’ union representatives have painted over a famous Rudyard Kipling 
poem at the University of Manchester in a protest against “racist” and 
“imperialistic” literature. Kipling’s poem “If” was replaced by the students’ union 
executive team with “Still I Rise”, by black poet and civil rights activist Maya 
Angelou, to better reflect the union’s values. The union representatives decided 
to immediately remove Kipling’s words – which had been painted on a wall by a 
hired resident artist – from the students’ union building at the University of 
Manchester. Sara Khan, liberation and access officer at the union, said students 
were not consulted on the decision to display Kipling’s poem – which concerns 
paternal advice to the speaker’s son. They decided to take action when they saw 
the artwork, not because they disagree with the sentiment of “If” – which has a 
quote inscribed above the entrance of Wimbledon’s Centre Court – but out of 
opposition to Kipling’s other colonialist texts. In a Facebook post, Ms Khan wrote: 
“We, as an exec team, believe that Kipling stands for the opposite of liberation, 
empowerment, and human rights – the things that we, as an SU [students’ union], 
stand for” (Busby, 2018b). 
From ITV Friday 6th September 2019: 
A group of pupils who attend a school in East Sussex have been protesting, 
alongside parents, over the school's plans to introduce a new “trousers only” 
uniform policy for all students. The Priory School on Mountfield Road in Lewes is a 
mixed school which teaches boys and girls between the ages of eleven and 
sixteen. The ban would mean that girls can no longer wear their school skirts. 





they have just nine months of school left. They say they could continue using the 
uniforms they are wearing now. Pupil, Nina Cullen, says that she does not think 
the policy would be gender neutral because buying the new uniform would cost 
girls more money than it would cost boys - who already have the uniform 
trousers. She also expressed concerns about pupils discarding all their skirts at a 
time when the impact of so-called “fast fashion” and its effect on the 
environment is in the news and high on the public and political agenda. 
Girls who ignored the new policy and wore skirts today were banned from 
entering the school. Police officers were called during the protest to help prevent 
pupils who were involved in the demonstration gaining access to school premises 
(ITV, 2019). 
From The Wiltshire Times 16th December 2019: 
Hundreds of children refused to go to lessons earlier today and gathered on the 
playing fields at plans to sell off acres of playing fields. Phil Bevan said he was 
“proud of the students” for standing up for what they believe in but wishes it 
hadn’t gone on for so long.  
Year 11 pupil Gracie Greenwood, 15, said: “The fields are used by everyone really 
often, for football, athletics and other things. The plans would see back gardens 
bordering our netball court which would make a lot of people feel vulnerable. We 
all feel very uncomfortable about the situation. I hope the school will listen to our 
protest. We were there for so long.” 
Year 10 Charlie added: “About three quarters of the school were out on the field. 
We all care about the school so much. We use the fields a lot, we play football and 
socialise there. They were trying to tempt us in with films and Kahoot (quizzes).” 
The school is hosting a public meeting tonight at 6.30pm to get more feedback 
about the plans (Garg, 2019). 
Each of these news vignettes demonstrates that, for these young people, there is no exit from 
the ‘conversation of justice’ (Cavell, 2005b, p. 172). This phrase recognises the central 
importance of the present state of our interactions – be they cooperative or antagonistic – and 
the drive to reform ourselves in the direction of our burgeoning sense of self-realisation. That 
there is a clear protagonist, and what appear to be conditions of law, make the idea that to a 





society. It is this theme that is worth insisting on since the moral and ethical response the 
students are seeking is not some further construction of law but ‘an offer of conversation’ 
(Cavell, 2005b, p. 253). While behaviour management remains a critical matter that can cloud 
the working day for too many teachers, there is a wider point that restorative practices has the 
potential to allow pupils to participate in decisions that affect their lives, and the sense of how 
to challenge them. 
As things stand, expressed in the scenarios I have drawn, pupils have little chance to 
contribute to decisions about what they are going to do, and how they are going to do it. This 
is the case in the rest of their learning and the wider school environment – even teachers have 
little say in what they teach. Yet things must change. If in speaking of a perfectionist notion of 
a restorative relational pedagogy one must experience a moral crisis in order to work towards 
our next self with those in our language community, then this has vital implications for not 
only how we demonstrate aversive thinking but how we bring each other back to community. 
Since beginning this research, I do not think I could have imagined the need for education to 
provide spaces where different perspectives and experiences can be tested out. On 23 June 
2016, the United Kingdom voted 52 to 48 percent to leave the European Union (BBC, 2020). 
The result revealed longstanding deep divisions not only in the political parties that govern us 
but also the sadness, anger, schism, and grief that revealed a country has little common 
understanding of who we are, and what binds us together. There are those who suggest that 
our general lack of education is at fault (Hobolt, 2016). It has been put forward that voters’ 
incomprehension over the workings of the European Union, and Britain’s democratic rights 
and responsibilities, were left easily swayed by the simplistic rhetoric of the Leave 
campaigners. As a result, schools are facing renewed scrutiny over their teaching of Citizenship 
Education (Hopkins and Coster, 2018). There is little wrong with the notion that young people 
need to be taught a curriculum that will help them to navigate the ongoing ramifications of 
Britain’s leaving the EU or a space where questions of identity, diversity and multiculturalism 
can be debated. Such intentions pave the way for pupils’ socialisation into what democratic 
decision-making entails.  
Through Austin’s theory of how we understand people to communicate, we know that it is not 
enough that a teacher’s utterances be understood; they are also committed to doing things 
with those words. Put another way, what she says, or teaches, about these ‘pedagogical 
perlocutions’ (Warren, 2013, p. 266) should also bring about a perlocutionary charge that 





hopes to confer. However, as Paul Standish has recently affirmed, ‘this is not the heart of the 
problem’ (Standish, 2020 np). Austin’s theory of performativity is also a theory of sovereign 
performativity (Butler, 1997). This refers to the notion that utterances only become 
performative when they are spoken by someone who holds the right, or right protocols, to 
make such a speech. In political terms, this traditional conception of performance legitimises 
the status quo and protects the social, cultural and political traditions that maintain it. What is 
needed, therefore, is the means by which these norms can be subverted, where speech is put 
to more subversive ends and where the notion of authority is not blindly accepted but made to 
continuously reassessed.  
Cavell’s reticulation of ordinary language philosophy frames this as ‘not a blind or idiosyncratic 
trust but depends upon testing out one’s reactions and responses against those of others’ (p. 
7). Disputes over words, such as what we mean when we say, cannot be settled by turning to 
law, or criteria but by working out, or through, that difference. This involves my testing my 
words against yours through an aspect of my experience and by learning what those words 
provoke in response such that I may have a renewed understanding of this aspect (of the 
world). As shown by the selection of news items above, such exercises in judgement involve 
rejecting the received or acceptable point of view, of rejecting criteria as it flourishes in an 
educational climate that naturally supresses our individual response in favour of conformity. 
The implications of Cavell’s consideration of voice together with his conception of the political 
run right throughout each article where use of one’s voice is deployed, not to reproduce 
another, but to make one’s own judgement known.  
Further, the hope of reaching agreement need not be attributed to universal good sense, since 
claims to such agreements have a limited applicability, and are ultimately finite. Our 
‘agreement’ may differ, we may hold different opinions, but doing so does not rule out a 
return to relationship. While they may or may not be representative of my thoughts, they are 
claims to a community in which the claim, the degree, quality and content of the judgement 
may be equably explored. The alternative is not speaking for myself representatively or 
speaking for myself privately, it is to be rendered politically voiceless. It is in knowing this that 
the potential for ethical relation, as conceptualised by the idea of restorative practice that 














You have both listened to each other’s story. What do you want 
to see happen as a result of our meeting today? How can we 














Before, I had to say I was sorry and then we had to do an 
agreement saying we’ve sorted everything out. 
 
MS SHAH 
When was your last conference? 
 
NICKY 
Think it was Tuesday? 
 
NAZREEN 
Can I say something? Am I allowed to get on with my work without 
Nicky bothering me all the time? 
 
MS SHAH 










What does your teacher normally do? 
 
NICKY 
Gives us points for good behaviour. Or moves us around if we’re 
talking too much. 
 
NAZREEN 
I don’t want to move seats though. I like sitting where I am. 
 
MS SHAH 
Do you want to move Nicky? 
 
NICKY 
Not really. Nazreen helps me when I’m stuck with my Maths. 
 
NAZREEN 
Only cos I’m supposed to! 
 
NICKY 
Yeah, well, it’s called peer support? 
 
NAZREEN 
I don’t want to be a peer support anymore. I just want to be 
able to work on my own. The thing is, right, we always get told 
what to do and I’m fed up of it. 
 
MS SHAH 
What are you fed up with Nazreen? 
 
NAZREEN 







Say what you feel. Try talking to Nicky though, not to me. 
 
NAZREEN 
I need to get a good mark in my SATS, so I have to concentrate. 
My mum and dad are always on at me to do my homework, but I’ve 





We’re not really friends with each other though. Look, I’m not 






Is being friends something that will help you both? 
 
NAZREEN 
You can’t be friends because someone says you’ve got to be 
friends. Being friends is different. You just want us to get on 
and not say anything else about it. 
 
NICKY 















But you do it all the time! 
 
NICKY 
Yeah, and I’m sorry, all right? We can’t all be perfect like 
you. Anyway, what about you ripping up my work that I’m going to 












What do we do now? 
(looks to MS SHAH) 
 
MS SHAH 
(Thinks for a few seconds) 




What…do we just go back to the classroom? 
 
NAZREEN 
What do we do if it happens again? 
 
NICKY 
Don’t we have to tell you. What will Mrs Wright say about what 







What have you agreed? 
 
NICKY 
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